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In the name of God



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***From Maragheh to Nakhchivan,
The De- Historization of Iran in the Late Seljukid
Architectural Tradition of the Tower Tombs in Azerbaijan***

Bahram Ajourloo¹

Abstract

The developmental process of architectural tradition of tower tombs in Azerbaijan during the 12th – 14th centuries (AD) is one of the basic questions in the Iranian history of architecture. Historically, the architectural constructions and decorations were developed in Nakhchivan by the end of 12th century. Based on the formulated doctrines of the former USSR academy, the late Seljukid architecture in Nakhchivan was indigenous and originated from the local innovations. Turkish art historians have classified the late Seljukid architecture in Nakhchivan as a variety of Turk – Islam tradition in the post-USSR years. These kinds of de- historized studies have not considered the socio- cultural relationships among Qazvin, Maragheh, Tabriz and Nakhchivan within the Iranian cultural context. The main aim of this study is to investigate the general specifications of the 12th – 14th centuries (AD) architecture of the tower tombs in Nakhchivan and Maragheh to examine their artistic and technical interactions appeared in the glorious architectural monuments during the Iranian Late Seljukid – Ilkhanid history of architecture. Methodologically, the origin of Nakhchivani tower tombs should be sought in the architectural manner of Maragheh due to the chronological order of their existing Persian and Arabic inscriptions. Although the USSR and Turkish decontextualized subjectivities in the architectural history of Nakhchivan are not well-reviewed, the architecture of the tower tombs in the Late Seljukid Nakhchivan has a processual trajectory initiated from the early Seljukid Kharāghān in Qazvin to the late Seljukid Maragheh and then the Nakhchivani manner of Ajami Nashawi.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, De- historization, Iranian history of architecture, Late Seljukid, Maragheh, Nakhchivan, Tower Tombs.

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Introduction

The developmental process of architectural tradition of tower tombs in Azerbaijan during the 12th – 14th centuries is one of the basic questions in the Iranian history of architecture. Historically, the architectural constructions and decorations were developed in Nakhchivan by the end of 12th century. Based on the formulated doctrines of the former USSR academy, the late Seljukid architecture in Nakhchivan was indigenous and originated from the local innovations and not inspired by the Iranian culture. For example, the precious works of Salamzadā (1976), Efendizade (1986), and Bretanizki (1988) during the USSR time were among the most cited references. During the post- USSR years, Turkish art historians classified the Late Seljukid architecture in Nakhchivan as a variety of Turk – Islam tradition (*e.g.* Yazar, 2000; Hacıyev, 2017). In such studies, the territories of post- USSR Republic of Azerbaijan, the architectural monuments in the former Persian lands of Transoxiana and Khwarazm are decontextualized from their Iranian cultural- historical context. Historically, the post-USSR Republic of Azerbaijan was composed of the Caucasian Qarabagh, Shervān, and the Azerbaijani Northern Mughān and Nakhchivan, were founded for the first time in the Southern Caucasus at the end of WWI and were re- established in December 1991 (Rezultade, 1990). For this reason, the de-historized terms of ‘Northern Azerbaijan’ and ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ (*e.g.* Yazar, 2000; Shaffer, 2002) are certainly contemporary and are not formed earlier than the 20th century.

Archaeologically, in contrast with the de-historized¹ doctrines, it should be noted that Iranian architectural innovations and forerunner masterworks in Qazvin, Maragheh, Urmia and Isfahan have played key roles in the architectural development of the Late Seljukid Nakhchivan. In addition to the former USSR academy, the mutual artistic and social interactions between Nakhchivan and Maragheh in basic resources of this field are not well-documented (Ajourloo, 2009; 2010; 2013). Among these foreshadowing basic resources, one would refer to Wilber (1955), Pope (1969), Giyasi (1991), Blair and Bloom (1996), Pirniā (2001)

1 . Touraj Atabaki (2004) in his review of B. Shaffer’s (2002) *Borders and Brethren* has specified the term and concept of *De- historization* as the Iranophobic aspect of historiography in the former USSR and the post- USSR Republic of Azerbaijan.

Ettinghausen *et al.* (2003), Hillenbrand (2004) and Əmənəzadə (2016). Based on their anachronic presentism in history, for example, Giyasi (1991) and Əmənəzadə (2016) have decontextualized the architectural monuments in the historical Azerbaijan (Atropatene) from the Iranian context of civilization under the contemporary de-historized concept of ‘Southern Azerbaijan’. Like Pirniā (2001), L. Korn (2010) in his remarks on the Iranian art and architecture in Azerbaijan during the Seljukid dynasty has limited his discussions within the present geopolitical borders of Iran. In other words, the investigation of the architectural traditions in Nakhchivan in the 12th – 14th centuries (AD) has been merely restricted to the borders of the former USSR. These kinds of de-historized studies have ignored the objectivity of socio- cultural relationships among Qazvin, Maragheh, Urmia, Tabriz and Nakhchivan within the Iranian cultural- historical context. Historically, such socio-cultural close ties, contrary to the de-historization of Perso-Azerbaijani interactions formulated by the former USSR academy, are well-presented in the Persian literature during the High Medieval Period. For example, Nezāmi of Ganja, the famous Persian poet, has been honored by the Seljukid governor of Maragheh (*e.g.* Luther, 1987; Nezāmi, 1999, 2015). In the geographical masterpiece of *Nuzhat al-Qulūb* (1340), furthermore, Nakhchivan and Urdūbād, as the territorial parts of the historical Azerbaijan, fall within the frontiers of Iran (Le Strange, 1919: 90). Later historical objectivities validate the report of *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*. In addition to the Persian inscription of Abbās Mirazā Qajar at the St. Stephen Church in Jolfā, his fleecy carpet portrait, at the Carpet Museum of Nakhchivan, has a Persian poem to verify such a historical viewpoint (Figure 1).

بحمدلله که بر جان مرده باز جان آمد ولیعهد ابد مدت باذربایجان آمد

Archaeologically originated from the Turkic burial cults of the Eurasian steppe (*e.g.* Hillenbrand, 2004), the architecture of the tower tombs, adopted by the Seljukid elite class, is a remarkable cultural appearance in the architectural traditions of the 11th – 13th centuries (AD) in Western Asia. Later, the Mongol Ilkhanates and their pastoral- nomad successors, *i.e.* Āq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu in Iran and the East of Anatolia adopted this tradition of architecture.

Methodologically, the origin of Nakhchivani tower tombs should be sought in the architectural manner of Maragheh due to the chronological order of their existing Persian and Arabic inscriptions.

Discussion

The architectural tradition of the tower tombs during the Late Seljukid Maragheh, under the rule of the local Seljukid dynasty, known as the Atābakān of Azerbaijan, Shams al-Din Ildegoz and his successors (1135 – 1224 AD / 530 – 622 AH) is well-presented by four survived unique samples: Gonbad-e Sorkh, Gonbad-e Modawar, Gonbad-e Kabud and Urmia Sae'Gonbad (Figure 2). Regardless of the disputed Gonbad-e Kabud, these works existed earlier than the Nakhchivani Late Seljukid tower tombs especially Momena Khātun, Joseph ibn Quseyr and the Ilkhanid Qarabāghlār.

The Group of Maragheh

Gonbad-e Sorkh is the first member of the group in Maragheh. According to its Kufic inscriptions, the mausoleum has been constructed by Bani Bakr Mohammad ibn Bandan ibn Hassan Me'mār, the master of architecture, in 1146 AD / 542 AH, under the patronage of Abd al- Aziz ibn Mahmud ibn Sa'd, the local governor of the region in the Late Seljukid. Gonbad-e Sorkh (the Red Dome) has a cubic shape probably covered by a pyramid dome that collapsed later. The building is in ornamental brick decorated by the embedded tiles in turquoise color. This is known as the Kāshi-e Mo'aqqali technique (Figure 2). These turquoise tiles should be considered as the earliest samples of the tile works in the Caliphate and post-Caliphate architecture of the Middle Ages. They were used later in Iran, in the early 13th century, and in the Seljukid Anatolia. In addition to the tile works and ornamental bricks, seven blind arch panels - two in three sides and one at the main entrance - would be indicated as the basic elements adopted by the Nakhchivani architecture later. They could be observed in Momena Khātun and Joseph ibn Quseyr mausoleums. Besides the tower tombs of Nakhchivan, clearly the Red Dome has inspired the architect of the Ilkhanid tower tomb, Ghaffāriyya in Maragheh (Figure 2).

As it can be seen in Ghaffāriyya, contrary to the local innovations of Ajami Nashawi in Nakhchivan, formerly discussed by Salamzadā (1976)

and Giyasi (1991), the architect has done his best to follow the Gonbad-e Sorkh example both in form and in the composition of the ornamental bricks and turquoise tiles. Subsequently, although Ghaffāriyya seems not to follow the architectural doctrines of the Ilkhanid Tabriz that is famous for its full usage of tile lining as the basic architectural decoration, less or more it reflects the same manners (Ajourloo, 2010; 2013). For instance, the technique of muqarnas gable arch applied in the main entrance of Ghaffāriyya is similar to the tower tombs of Sæ'Gonbad (the Three Domes) in Urmia and Qarabāghlār of Nakhchivan (Figures 2, 3). According to the inscriptions, the construction of this tower tomb was completed during the reign of the Ilkhanate Sultan, Abu Sa'id Bahādor Khān who was dead in the Caucasian Qarabagh (1336 AD / 736 AH), as recorded by the Persian historians (Spuler, 1968; 1989).

The second structure in Maragheh is Gonbad-e Modawar (the Circular Dome). It is about 10 meters far from the northern façade of Gonbad-e Kabud. According to its Kufic inscription, the circular tower tomb dates back to 1167 AD / 563 AH. The inscription presents no information about its patron and architect. Its main entrance has a plain arch well-decorated by the composition of the ornamental bricks and turquoise tiles (Figure 2). The same as the Red Dome of Maragheh, the pyramid dome of this tower has fallen. Obviously, the building structure was influenced by the Turkic tradition of entombment under the tower tombs during the Medieval Ages.

Unlike the above-discussed monuments, the tower tomb of Gonbad-e Kabud (the Dark Blue Dome) in Maragheh is controversial. Not only the pyramid dome of the tower, but some of its Kufic inscriptions, including the date and the name of the architect and the patron is damaged (Figure 2). Regardless of the fact that people of Maragheh would imagine the building as a mausoleum for the mother of Hulāgu Khān the Mongol, the tomb clearly belongs to the Late Seljukid. Archaeologically, it is remarkable that the construction date of Gonbad-e Kabud (1198 AD / 595 AH) suggested by A. Godard has not been confirmed yet.

To the author, Gonbad-e Kabud might be considered as the mausoleum of Sultan Alā al-Din Karpa Ar Aslān, the Seljukid Atābak ruler of Maragheh. Rāvandi in his work entitled, *Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur dar Tārikh Āl-e Saljuq* (1201 AD / 599 AH) and Ali Ibn-i al-

Athir in his work named, *Al- Kāmel fī al-Tārikh* have recorded his years of reign as 1188 – 1206 AD / 585 – 604 AH. During these years, he supported the Persian poems of Hakim Nezāmi of Ganja known as Ganjavi. Nezāmi also presented Sultan Alā al-Dīn Karpā Ar Aslān with his famous masterwork entitled, *Bahrām Nāma*. In his Persian *Bahrām Nāma*, Nezāmi of Ganja has great admiration for Iran:

همه عالم تن است و ایران دل نیست گوینده زین قیاس خجل

Meanwhile, Nezāmi's other Persian masterwork known as *Makhzan al- Asrār* is presented to the Seljukid Bahrām Shāh (de Blois, 2012).

Although the construction date of the Dark Blue Dome is not certain, its architectural specifications and decorative elements seem close to the mausoleum of Momena Khātun built by Ajami ibn Abu Bakr Bannā Nashawi in Nakhchivan. In other words, the architectural and decorative features of Gonbad-e Kabud in Maragheh are not similar to those of the Red Dome, Gonbad-e Modawar and the tower tomb of Joseph ibn Quseyr in Nakhchivan, but it is close to Momena Khātun. Similar to Momena Khātun, the building is ornamented with the Kufic inscriptions of the holy words of 'Allah' and 'al-Hamd', all embedded in a geometric brick decorated by the turquoise glazed bricks of the 12th century (AD) of Maragheh.

In the meantime, it is so interesting that the main entrance of the Urmia Sæ'Gonbad as well as the decagon façade of the Momena Khātun have muqarnas gable arches which Salamzadā (1976) would rather to consider them as the basic element of Nakhchivani architecture invented by Ajami ibn Abu Bakr Bannā Nashawi. The tower tomb of Sæ'Gonbad (the Three Domes) was built in 1184 AD / 580 AH for Sheykh al-Muzaffari, the Atābak governor of Urmia (Figure 2). The Three Domes of Urmia displays the influence of Maragheh tradition of the tower tomb architecture, and as a result, it should be categorized under the group of Maragheh. Its circular form and dimensions, 13m height and 5m span, is close to Gonbad-e Modawar. Moreover, it has a muqarnas gable arched entrance earlier than the Momena Khātun (1187 AD / 582 AH). Accordingly, the Kufic inscription of Sæ'Gonbad in Urmia confirms the factual Iranian origin of the muqarnas gable arch applied in the Late Seljukid Nakhchivani tradition of architecture. This is an outstanding

material fact never documented by any former Iranophobic works such as Salamzadā (1976), Efendizade (1986) Bretanizki (1988), Giyasi (1991), Aslanapa (1996), Yazar (2000) and Əmənizadə (2016).¹

The Group of Nakhchivan

The architectural tradition of Nakhchivan is well known for its three surviving monumental tower tombs called Joseph ibn Quseyr, Momena Khātun and Qarabāghlār (Figure 3). Among them, Joseph ibn Quseyr and Momena Khātun have been planned and constructed by Ajami ibn Abu Bakr Bannā Nashawi (Salamzadā, 1976; Giyasi, 1991). The Ilkhanid tower tomb of Bardaa (1322), which is near Qarabagh and is built by Me'mār Ayub (Giyasi, 1991), follows the Nakhchivani manner of architecture as well. The general specifications of the architectural tradition of the Late Seljukid Nakhchivan, under the artistic patronage of Ajami Nashawi, which latter left an influence on the architectural tradition of the Ilkhanid Tabriz in the 13th – 14th centuries (AD) should be noted as well (Ajourloo, 2010; 2013).

First, the designation of complexes, as it could be seen in Momena Khātun. Second is the attachment of the two high minarets to the portal of architectural complexes and mosques. Momena Khātun and Qarabāghlār (1320 AD / 720 AH) are good examples. Finally, the complete coating of the monuments by the Iranian technique of Kāshi-e Mo'aqqali, as it could be seen in Qarabāghlār in Nakhchivan (Figure 3). The Ilkhanid mausoleum of Qarabāghlār due to its applied Kāshi-e Mo'aqqali technique plays a key role in the Iranian history of architecture in Azerbaijan. This decorative technique was developed from the Late Seljukid Maragheh and later Iranian architects re- applied it in the tower tombs of Sheykh Heydar (1329 AD / 731 AH) in Khiāw of Ardabil, currently known as Meshkin'Shahr (Figure 4) and the Dome of Allah Allah (Gonbad-e Allah Allah) attached to the mausoleum of Sheykh Saffi al-Din of Ardabil (Figure 5).

Further, the engineering and construction technique of the high-collared domes is another Iranian architectural feature that could be detected in Nakhchivan. Archaeologically, regardless of the Ilkhanid

1. All of the gable-arched entrances applied in the Seljukid Anatolian structures are later than the 1215 AD (Hillenbrand, 2004).

Arch of Alishah in Tabriz, perhaps the Seljukid Friday Mosque of Ardabil presents one of the first samples of high-collared domes in Iran which differs from the Seljukid ones in Isfahan and Khorasan (Ajourloo, 2010). Later, this technique was developed in Tabriz architectural manners in the 14th century (AD) and finally stretched throughout Iran until the early years of the 15th century (*Ibid.*). The fine works of the great architects from Tabriz and Isfahan in Samarqand present such influences (*e.g.* Golombek and Wilber, 1988). If one accepts the possibility of the usage of the high-collared technique for the later collapsed dome of Momena Khātun Friday Mosque, the socio-cultural exchanges between Nakhchivan and the inner Iran would be re-verified.

The first noticeable sample in Nakhchivan group is the tower tomb of Joseph ibn Quseyr in the outskirts of the old quarter of Nakhchivan. This monument is one of the rare samples in Ajami Nashawi's first works (Figure 3). According to the Arabic Kufic inscription of the tomb, its architect was Ajami Nashawi and its patron was Shahid Joseph ibn Quseyr. The written year in its inscription is 1162 AD / 557 AH. Contrary to Maragheh, the architect has decorated the façade of the tomb by the ornamental bricks, which in the motif of hexagon star, later known as the Judaic either Magen David or the Solomon's seal represents the concept of royalty for the Seljukid Turks (Figure 3). The intensive use of the ornamental bricks, instead of stucco and tiles re-confirms the author's idea that Ajami Nashawi was inspired by the two tower tombs of Kharāghān in Qazvin (Figure 6). These tower tombs are planned and built by Me'mār Mohammad ibn Makki Zanjāni and Me'mār Abu al-Ma'ālī ibn Makki Zanjāni for the two Seljukid governors, *i.e.* Abu Sa'id ibn Bijār Sa'd and Abu Mansur Iltāy Tekin ibn Tekin in 1067 and 1092 respectively (Kiāni, 1995). The external shells of these double shells tower tombs are collapsed. However, by paying attention to the pyramid dome of Joseph ibn Quseyr, it is possible to infer that these mausoleums had pyramid domes during the Seljukid Atābakan of Azerbaijan.

Ajami has followed the architectural doctrines of Maragheh and was inspired by the mausoleums in Kharāghān of Qazvin to plan the Joseph ibn Quseyr in the year 1162. Later, the mausoleum of Momena Khātun truly reflects his pure creativity and innovative mind. In other words,

Ajami has established his own architectural doctrine in the mausoleum of Momena Khātun built for the queen of Atābak Ildegoz in the year 1187 (Fig. 3). By its decagon plan and a high collared internal pointed shell, which had been covered once by an external pyramid dome, Momena Khātun presents itself as a rare sample of architectonics in the history of architecture in the Late Caliphate times.

Based on the architectural drawings of Salamzadā (1976), the height of Momena Khātun from the lower cellar to the peak of the internal elliptical pointed dome is 22.5m (Figure 3). This system of divorced double shells is comparable with the double shell dome of Tāj al- Molk (1088) in Isfahan, Persia (Figure 7). The dome of Tāj al- Molk has an internal elliptical pointed shell with a medium height. It has 10.7m span and 19.5m elevation (Ashkan and Ahmad, 2009; Moradi, 2020). This basic sample from Isfahan re-validates the Persia influence on the Medieval period Turkic tradition of the tower tombs in Nakhchivan. It also displays the application of the Persian technique of muqarnas in the lower rim of the Momena Khātun dome. Furthermore, as it is documented by M. X. Ne'matova (Неймат, 2001: 52), the sources of inspiration for Momena Khātun were the masterpieces of Persian literature created by Nezāmi of Ganja and Khāghāni of Shervān.¹ It has a Persian poet in Kufic inscription embedded in the turquoise Kāshi-e Mo'aqqali (Figure 7):

ما بگردیم پس بماند روزگار ما بمیریم این بماند یادگار یا رب چشم بد دور کن

Although the entrance of Momena Khātun has a plain pointed arch similar to the tower tombs of Kharāghān, Gonbad-e Kabud and Gonbad-e Modawar, it should be noted that Ajami has applied the technique of muqarnas gable arches as the decagon decorative façade. Each of them is well-decorated using the technique of Kāshi-e Mo'aqqali originated from the group of Maragheh. In other words, Momena Khātun tower tomb is a composition of Maragheh heritage and Ajami's engineering abilities and innovative mind. His legacy displayed architectural creativity and

1 . The same as Nezāmi, Khāghāni of Shervān, by his famous Persian poem, has glorified Khorāsān in Iran:

چه سبب سوی خراسان شدنم نگذارند	عندلیم به گلستان شدنم نگذارند ...
گر فرمان ندهدم به خراسان رفتن	باز تبریز به فرمان شدنم نگذارند ...

engineering innovation in Tabriz in the 14th century (AD). It is reflected in the architectural complexes of Ghāzāniyya, Rashidiyya and Alishah of Tabriz (Ajourloo, 2010; 2013).

Conclusion

The architecture of the tower tombs in the Late Seljukid Nakhchivan has a processual line originated from the Early Seljukid Kharāghān in Qazvin to the Late Seljukid Maragheh and then Ajami Nashawi's works in Nakhchivan.

It is reasonable to conclude that Maragheh and Nakhchivan have had mutual architectural interactions. Hypothetically, to the author, the architect of Gonbad-e Kabud, Ajami Nashawi, is the main figure.

The author considers two lines of formation processes in the Late Seljukid architecture of Nakhchivan. Joseph ibn Quseyr is the first one following the architectural manner of Maragheh and Qazvin. Momena Khātun is the second one reflecting the Nakhchivani manner of architecture.

Furthermore, as it is hypothesized from Gonbad-e Kabud in Maragheh, the Nakhchivani architectural manner and Ajami's innovations were not restricted to the geographical frontiers of Nakhchivan. As the Ilkhanids were gaining more power in Tabriz in the 14th century (AD), Ajami's manner of architecture left its impression in the Caucasian Qarabagh and the south of Araxes. The complexes of Ghāzāniyya and Alishah of Tabriz, the Öljeitu Dome of Sultānniyya and the tower tombs of Bardaa, Sheykh Heydar and Allah Allah in Ardabil are real examples for such impression in the context of Iranian civilization.

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


Figure 1. A Persian poem on the fleecy carpet portrait of Abbās Mirazā Qajar in the Carpet Museum of Nakhchivan (Qādim, 2004).




Figure 2. The group of Maragheh clockwise: Gonbad-e Sorkh, Gonbad-e Modawar, Sæ'Gonbad (Urmia), Gonbad-e Kabud and Gonbad-e Ghaffāriyya (Courtsey of RICHT - ICHHTO).



Figure 3. The group of Nakhchivan, Up from left to right: Joseph ibn Quseyr, the enterances of Joseph ibn Quseyr and Momena Khātun. Down from left to right: the section of Momena Khātun and Qarabāghlār and Bardaa (Courtsey of J. Giyasi).




Figure 4. Khiāw, Sheykh Heydar tower tomb (Courtesy of RICHT, ICHHTO).



Figure 5. Ardabil, Gonbad-e Allah Allah tower tomb (the author).



Figure 6. Qazvin, the tower tombs of Kharāghān (Kiāni, 1995).



Isfahan, the dome of Tāj al- Molk (After Pope, 1969)

Figure 7. Isfahan, the dome of Tāj al- Molk (Pope, 1969).



Figure 8. Nakhchivan, Momena Khātun, a Persian poem in Kufic inscription under the muqarnas rim of the dome (Courtesy of M. Rezvanfar, RICHT, ICHHTO).

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***Third Power Policy and its Role in the Creation of US-Iran
Relations in the Early Rule of Naser al-Din Shah (1850 –
1857 AD)***

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Abstract

Iran in the 19th century was different in foreign policy perspective. The catastrophic failures in Russo-Persian wars, the partition of Caucuses from Iran and the Tsars' plans for accessing southern seas of Iran, British rule over India and Southern Indian Ocean waterways, all revived the importance of Iran as a buffer country in the Eastern policy of London politicians; events which transformed Iran into a center for Russian-British Bipolar Paradigm rivalry. The Iranian politicians acknowledging the dangers of such dual external rule were seeking a third power to decrease the pressure of their Northern-Southern neighbors. Qajar politicians believed that a third power would be a better balancer against Russia and Britain and would be assisting in the protecting national independence and territorial integrity. On the other side, America as a developed country, which set aside civil wars successfully, with the slogan of friendship and trade, was eager to establish political relations with countries like Iran and sign amity and trade agreements. This was the circumstances in which diplomatic relations between Iran and the US was established in the 19th century (AD).

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Introduction

The Russo-Persian wars were the starting point of Great Powers, i.e. Russian and British intervention in the Iranian internal affairs in the first decades of the 19th century. Expanding influence of Russian in Iran and protecting Asian colonies of Britain created a security belt around India to support Afghan rebellion and subsequently separate Afghanistan from Iran. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia penetrated and dominated Iran. Not only receiving various bonuses, they also exerted domination on Iranian foreign policy eliminating the possibility of acting independently with other governments in the foreign policy and international milieu for Iran.

Iranians in this period were aware of the dangers and consequences of the bipolar paradigm, viewing it as a tool for the partition and division of Iran, resulting in loss of independence and sovereignty in the agreement forged between Russia and Britain in the beginning of the 20th century.

Understanding the threats and dangers of the Russian-British Bipolar Paradigm, Iranian politicians acted upon a policy, which was applying a third power decreasing pressure between the two powers. Implementing the third power policy was in fact a policy in which Iranian geopolitics and colonial power rivalry imposed on Iran, which fundamentally got a realistic and ingenious policy. Choosing France as a third power in the Russian and Persian wars was unsuccessful after the signing the Tilsit Treaty. After such a try, Iranian politicians especially Amir Kabir were attracted to the US as the third power.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed and documented investigation of the motivations and reasons for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and the US. To this end, we would like to answer these questions: What were the characteristics of the third power from the perspectives of Iranian rulers and why did Iranians view the US as a good example for their third power policy? In addition, why did the US model, as a third power, fail?

The probable hypothesis here is that Iranian politicians considered the third power country characteristics as geographical far distance and having no interest and direct colonial greed. So, the United States of America was considered as more qualified than any other country.

However, the lack of knowledge of Iranian rulers and politicians about the complexities of the nineteenth-century colonial paradigm and the dominance of the two northern and southern neighbors, i.e. Russia and Britain over Iran's foreign policy and destiny, as well as the unwritten agreement of the two powers caused disintegration against the third power. This prevented the US government from expanding into Iranian politics and economics. In addition, US policy of active isolationism at the time, did not want or could not conflict with the Russian and British governments over Iran.

The purpose of this paper is to study why the relationship between Iran and the United States began in the mid-nineteenth century in the form of the emergence of a third power policy and the reasons for the failure of this policy. In the process of hypothesis testing and answering research questions, we will use the theoretical framework of the third power policy.

In terms of Iranian-American relations, many books have been written in English and Persian regarding the United States - Persian diplomatic relations. The most notable one is written by Abraham Yeselson (Yeselson, 1956). Today, it is a classic book about the history of political relations between Iran and the United States and the other book by Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes; *The United States and Iran: a documentary history*, which has tried to examine a narrative history of relations between Iran and the United States (Yonah, et al. 1980).

In Persian, there are also books about the history of relations between Iran and the United States (Rezâzâdeh Malek, 1971), the history of Iran-US relations in the period of Qajar and Pahlavi (Deldam, 1989) and cultural relations between Iran and the United States: from the beginning to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Mohammadi, 2009). The book entitled "Iran-US relations from the beginning to The Coup d'état of 1953 August 19" by Afshâri (2014) which has described and narrated in details the relationship between Iran and the United States throughout the history.

The current article is a case study about the third force policy researched and conducted using data belonging to the archive office of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran known as

the center for Documents and History of Diplomacy. Some of these documents are applied for the first time.

According to the documentary style of the present paper, the research method we have chosen is a qualitative research method in which the method of data analysis is based on description and explanation.

Theoretical Framework

Third power Policy was as a strategy for an under-dominant country, which is controlled by the two colonial governments.

In the Third power Policy; the under-dominant country tries to reduce the political-economic pressure of the two dominant poles by leading a third power into the game, to gain the possibility of acting in the international arena. International coalitions fluctuate according to the conditions and requirements of the time.

This oscillates between keeping the country's survival and independence, gaining national interests and participating in the international coalitions. Third power Policy can be considered as a policy between the policy of negative balance and positive balance, which tends to balance. On the one hand, it does not want to surrender the policy of positive balance and successive concessions to the two colonial poles and on the other hand, it is not strong enough to refuse to concede concessions to any of the power poles. Therefore, it is practically moves towards the using of third power policy (Sheehan, 2000, p. 35).

The characteristics of the third power and its policy-making require its own components and conditions in order to be successful. Otherwise, it will come to harm the under-dominant country. These components and features include:

- The Third Power country should not have a colonial, interventionist or dis-honorary background in the host country and their presence in different parts of the country should not be dangerous.
- The Third Power country must have the power and ability to stand against dominant powers, reduce the pressure and aggression of those powers.

- The Third Power country should be far from the geographical boundaries of the host country so as not to find territorial greed.
- The Third Power country should not be in a position to become the next hegemonic power.
- The presence of The Third Power country should be limited and managed, or it should be in the areas in which temporarily assisted the most and has the lowest cost and harm.
- The Third Power country policy must be implemented by experienced politicians, and in a distinct process according to strategic planning and a scheduled program.

The absence or inefficiency in any of the components, or even a computational error in the choice of the third power and the time of its use, can have the opposite effect and it will increase the pressure of the two poles and crush the under-dominated country among the millstones of economic-political domination of the two more dominating powers. What justifies the use of the third power policy is more than the result of obligation and despair. Because the country in trouble has instinctively learned to overcome the two powers; so the third power is more an urgent action than a choice. Of course, another point that makes the use of the third power hopeful for the politicians of the under-dominated country is to take the advantages of the conflict of interests and sometimes the gap between the two dominating powers and using them to maintain and survive, which is the most pragmatic and objective aspect of third power policy. This approach disrupts the equation to the detriment of the under-dominated country when the two powers decide to resolve or reduce conflicts and tensions, so it cannot be considered as a permanent and reliable lever (Ali Sufi, 2010, p.369).

Therefore, choosing the third power policy, along with its possible outcome and benefits also has risks. In order to have successful implementation, it needs informed and prudent politicians.

Iran and Third Power Policy

Iran which was located on the east and west of the world found geopolitical superiority since the 18th century. In addition, the industrial revolution of Europe, having raw materials, the market for consumption and the privileged geopolitical position in the region were the contributing factors to this situation.

Geographical location of Iran had practically made Britain the southern neighbor of Iran. The position of Iran placed it as the protective wall of India. Britain penetrated into the Qajar court. Therefore, weakening of Iran could have prevented the invasion of any other country on the periphery of England. On the other hand, Russia as the northern neighbor of Iran sought to develop its own boundaries to govern the global trade, extended it from the south of Iran to India. They had a greedy eye on the eastern British realm. Obviously, the competitive conditions of the Russian and British countries created uncontrollable explosive social and political conditions for the Iranian (Ibid, p.43).

In this way, the Qajar government in the early nineteenth century was largely reluctant to enter into imperialist games, and therefore did not have a specific strategy for advancing its foreign policy toward the two great powers, Russia and Britain. Therefore, they tried to compensate their diplomatic weakness in the face of British and Russian colonial policies (Modir Shanechi, 1996, p.148).

In fact, the third power was a third-party state that Iran would use according to its political situation. For the first time, Mostashâr al-Dowleh referred to the policy of the Qajar under the term “political doctrine of the Iranian government” (Mostashâr al-Duleh, 1982, vol. 2, p.53). This policy was gradually the basis of Iran's foreign policy until World War II (Farmân Farmâeiân, 1976, p.12).

The history of third-party policy dates back to the wars of Persian-Russian Wars, during the reign of Fath Ali-Shah Qajar. The Iranian government entered into negotiations with the French government but cooperation with Iran was abandoned before the policy could be implemented due to the Tilsit Treaty (1807), between France and Russia.

Subsequently, England took the place of France in this equation. Iran found itself encircled by two powerful neighbors. Iran sometimes thought about using France as a third power and measured the use of the United States for this purpose. This policy reached its pinnacle in the unification of Iran's national forces with Germany and Ottomans during World War I (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1996, p.343).

After the signing of the Turkmenchay Treaty, Russian and British policy got closer. During the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, by the proffer of Mirza Taqi Khan known as Amir Kabir, the dominant and prestigious chancellor of Iran predicted that the America would be one of the world powers in the future. The United States did not have a negative and colonial background among the Western countries at the time (Zoqi, 1989, pp.28 & 290). This made Iran more and more aware of the intention of the third power alliance, to get rid of the balance of the two powers. Of course, Iran's accession to the Third power gradually made the Russian and British powers more determined and united to confront Iran, so that they agreed to expel the Third Force from their bipolar axis, and the policy of the Third power practically failed, like the Morgan Schuster American case. Thus, the Iranian government despairingly referred to the policy of the third power until the nationalization of the oil industry, which was replaced by the policy of negative balance instead of the policy of positive balance (Kazemzadeh, 1975, p.46). Meanwhile, Amir Kabir, Prime Minister of Nasser al-Din Shah, was an exceptional figure in the history of Iran's foreign policy during the Qajar period. His thought was based on the protection of national interests and the knowledge and mastery of international custom; hence, he believed in a policy of balance and non-interference in Iran's affairs (Kaveh Jebeli, 1992, p.93).

Amir Kabir tried to increase the country's diplomatic maneuvering power by increasing the number of foreign actors in Iran's political and economic spheres. Nevertheless, the traditional and authoritarian structure of the Qajar government did not provide an opportunity for the Amir's policies to succeed (Ibid, p. 95).

The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the United States

The isolation policy of US was the principle of Monroe's Doctrine since 1823 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1991, p.75). Due to the United States' advantages such as being far from the threats of European states and the existence of huge resources in the America allowed American politicians not to participate in the political engagement of the European scene (Maldwyn, 1974, pp.171-178).

The American politicians were considering filling the gaps and unlike the colonial states of Europe, they wanted a good deal of free trade in the world and principles such as non-intervention and non-engagement and political indifference with Asian nations, including Iran.

Amir Kabir's preliminary assessment of establishing relations with the United States was due to the possibility of co-operation for the formation of marine forces. However, the main problem was the stabilization of Iran sovereignty over the Iranian Naval authority in the Persian Gulf. Amir Kabir should be regarded as the first person who ordered political relationship with the US government (Adamiyat, 1975, pp.573-581).

Treaty of Amity and Shipping

In 1849, Amir Kabir issued a command to Mirza Mohammad Khan Iran chargé d'affaires in Istanbul to discuss with Gorge Marsh, the American political representative, to prepare a treaty. At the same time, the US president, Zachary Taylor, signed a commission for signing a contract with Iran on June 28, 1850 (Rezâzâdeh Malek, 1971, p.89). These long and confidential negotiations lasted more than 500 days. The reason for prolonging these negotiations was the fear of negotiations revelation to the Britain. Finally, the Iran-American Amity and shipping treaty signed between Mirza Mohammad Khan and George Marsh in eight articles, on October 19th, 1851 (The Fourth Political Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1972, p.3). The most tangible impression of this agreement for Iran was sending a book about geography for Amir Kabir, which even Nasser al-Din Shah was eager to study (Op cit).

The Amity included an introduction and eight articles, written in both Persian and French. Article 1 of this treaty: The permanent amity between the two governments and the two nations of Iran and the United States announced. Article 2: considering the principle of the freedom of trade between the two countries is to be respected. Article 3: The customs' duty of the imported and exported goods applies to the agreed law. Article 4: the merchant ships freed the two governments to go to ports and harbors with their own flag. The right to sail in rivers on both sides was also free. Article 5: Establishment of three US consulates in

Tehran, Tabriz and Bushehr alongside with three Iranian consulates in Washington D.C., Boston and New Orleans. Article 6: consular rights to both parties. Article 7: emphasized the irreversibility of the two countries' relations in the event of a war with a third country, and article 8 referred to the approval and implementation of the treaty over the course of the next year (Sepehr, 1998, p.114).

Amir Kabir died one month after signing the treaty. The treaty did not ratify due to the intervention and influence of Britain. The new minister resident in Turkey, Carroll Spence condemned Britain's influence to invalidate the treaty (Rezazadeh Malek, 1971, p.91). It was interesting to note that Iran did not grant a concession without mutual rights; but thought of it from the viewpoint that Iran had no chance for shipping in its own rivers at that time, let alone in the rivers of distant lands such as the United States. Later, Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, Amin al-Sultan, passed the right to the Britain (Teymoori, 1984, p.77).

Treaty of Amity and Trade

There was no relations between Iran and US After the abandonment of the amity and Shipping for several years until the rise of the dispute between Iran and Britain about the issue of Herat in 1857, Farrokh Khan Aminulmulk Ghaffari, Iran's ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, met with British Ambassador Cyril Radcliffe to hold peace talks.

Britain imposed a hardship condition on Iran, Nasser al-Din Shah ordered Farrokh Khan to take part in negotiating with the US Minister in Istanbul (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, p.10). In parallel with this action, the Ambassador of Iran to St. Petersburg, Mirza Qasim Vali was ordered by the King to begin negotiations with the US ambassador.

Mirza Qasim Khan in a letter to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 13 January 1856, referred to this issue:

Although, we have an amity treaty with Britain, but they are not pleased with the American government's amity toward the Iranian government. Utterly, the US government is not good with the British government. They will interfere and cause tribulation. The British government managed all of its affairs with plot. It's also famous in this country that

although the United State of America and the United Kingdom of Britain have signed bilateral treaty, but both are opposed with each other (Ibid, p.96).

In addition, Mirza Qasim Khan in another letter to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 12 January 1856 emphasized the necessity for a political relationship and the importance of signing a treaty with the US government. He wrote "The US government has an amity treaty with most of the countries, unless with the Iran government and they are very eager to have relationship and friendship, Seymour, the ambassador of America has repeatedly talked with me about this regard" (Magazine of Foreign Ministry of Iran, 1976, p.5).

Mirza Qasim Khan Vali and US Ambassador to Russia, Thomas M. Seymour initiated negotiations under the observation of the Russian government. The political documents of both sides confirm that Americans had believed: "... It does not seem that the Russian Tsar makes objection to the ratification of treaty between Iran and the United States, and it is possible that the Russian Minister in Tehran would assist in the improvement of talks" (Rezazadeh Malek, 1971, p.100).

Iran clearly agreed with Russia's participation in the negotiations, because the Iranian Minister, Mirza Agha Khan Nouri, wrote a letter to Iran's Ambassador to Russia, Qasim Khan Vali: "The reason I write the letters frankly to the Russian government embassy is the fact that the Russian Chargé d' Affaires is between two countries to confirm the treaty and he has received a letter from the authorities of his own government to make good efforts in this regard." (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Report transcript, 1992, pp.24-25) Starting talks between Ambassadors of Iran and the United States in St. Petersburg, the Foreign Minister of Iran, in an official order, called his Ambassador to Russia in 19 February 1857.

... in different ways, he explained to the ambassador of the United States about Iran's position to the controversial events between Iran and Britain, especially the issue of Herat, and ultimately in order to end the relations between the two governments and gain the advocacy of the US government and inspire the ambassador. The cause of the

hostility and frustration of the relations between Iran and Britain was not a common excuses which the British excuses about, but the amity and friendship of Iran-US relations ... (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD, Case 5, File 13, Sheets 4-5, February 19,1857)

Then subsequently quoting that:

The Iranian government sent a packet of letters, a power of attorney and instructions for the Iran's Ambassador to Istanbul signing an agreement about the friendship and business in the Istanbul. The envelope was lost, British agents opened the letter, and the Iranian objectives were discovered, which were against Britain wishes. It would have revealed that the Iranian government was in favor of the friendship with a state that wages war with England. It is unclear where it will lead. Whenever that brother is able to produce the material which has been explained to the Ambassador of United States and compels him to write to his government, it would be very good (Op cit).

Both countries agreed to pursue a negotiation process in Istanbul. Once again, Iran appointed Farrokh Khan Amin al-Dawleh as the head for talks with the US ambassador to Istanbul (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, pp. 138 &114).

Mirza Malekum Khan was trying to provide convincing evidence for Spence, the ambassador to Istanbul, and emphasized the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom (Ibid, p.116). Iran urged the United States in a way that, "since the Iranian government does not have a navy in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy will engage Iran's merchant ships under its protection, and the United States promised to protect the islands and ports of Iran from the domination of the British government and the invasion of Muscat Imam" (Khormoji, 1984, pp. 221-225). He told: "Tell them if the government of the United States wanting to make a small part in these seasons, the Iranian government does not see fit to confirm a treaty." (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Report transcript, 1992, p. 25).

Iran conditions made it strict for the United States, because they did not recapture the islands of the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, from Britain. In addition, the Iranian ships had the right to raise the flag of the United States and the United States committed to use the navy in the Persian Gulf and support Iranian ships (Navaei, 1986, p.604). The American ambassador Carroll Spence clearly stated to Molkem Khan “if Iran does not leave such demands, there will be no hope to confirm the treaty”. Meanwhile, he pointed out that the fate of the United States is that “we will take the future of the world and its friendship will be beneficial for the Iranian nation and government” (Yeselson, 1956, p.186) and among the conditions of Iran, only political representation in Bushehr was established which was in accordance with article 7 of the treaty (Afshari, 2014, p. 102).

However, the United States followed the Monroe Doctrine, isolationist policy. Finally, Farrokh Khan's actions failed for the intercession of the United States (Amin al-Dawleh, 1967, pp. 221-225).

The treaty finally concluded in December 13, 1856 in eight articles, the Contracts of Amity and Trade, in two languages and Farrokh Khan Amin-al-Dawlah and Carroll Spence signed. The original versions of the treaty exchanged after the signing by President Franklin Pierce and Nasser al-Din Shah in June 13, 1857 (Vaqaye Etefaqiye, 1272, Jamadi Al-Awal, 15, No.238).

According to the treaty, diplomatic and friendly relations were established between two countries basing on diplomatic, commercial, and citizenship matters. In addition to the establishing an embassy in Washington, the government allowed to establish a consulate in three cities as New York, Washington, and New Orleans. The US government could have consulates in the cities of Tabriz, Bushehr and Tehran, for the protection of American citizens in Iran. (Center for Documentation and The History of Diplomacy (CDHD), Case 8, File 9, Sheets 1.1 &1-2, June 13, 1857) In addition, under article 5 of the treaty, Iran recognized the legal protection of us citizens in by capitulations (Ibid).

The contract was limited to consular and commercial affairs, and did not have the value of the plan signed in 1851 under the supervision of Amir Kabir. Even they eliminated freedom of shipping and the lack of

influence of the state of war with the third country. Nevertheless, the conditions for the most favorable nation continued for both countries (Khormoji, 1984, p.221).

Iran and the United States ordered their representatives to negotiate with the representatives of the other party. Mirza Qasim Khan pointed out an important point to foreign minister in 21st of January 1856: "Now in the United States, they want to establish a shipping line which is reaching India; as soon as this route is completed, it will be very close to the United States for Iran around Bushehr" (Mojani, 2005, p.118).

The treaty signed when Iran was on the margin of political bankruptcy. Britain wanted to separate Herat from Iran, aimed at preserving India and Iran did not want to come under the pressure from Britain. The letters about the Prime Minister to Amin al-Dawlah indicated a kind of gullibility and sense of high flying of the Iranian state against the British. The Prime Minister insisted that the treaty should not sign without a security warranty and provision of the United States Navy (Deldam, 1989, p.39). The remonstrance of Spence and the United States government rejected Iran's requests, and Iran ignored requests and signed the treaty.

Finally, France mediated Iran-British relations with Napoleon III. The French emperor considered himself as a friend (Amanat, 2014, p.464). He promised to Iran that when the sick man of Europe, Ottoman Empire dies, Iran could dominate Iraq and control the vital British way to the Persian Gulf. These imaginative words, instead of the loss of Herat, raised the possibility of attack of Ottoman rule in the mind of Shah. As a result, Farrokh Khan and Amin al-Dawlah went to Paris to sign the Paris treaty between Britain and Iran in March 1857 with the mediation Napoleon III, thus Herat and Afghanistan separated from Iran (Amin-al-Dowleh, 1967, p.27).

So after the conclusion of the Iran-US agreement, a new recipe was issued to Farrokh Khan Amin al-Dawlah, which allowed the establishment relations with other governments, and in particular the conclusion of similar contracts with Austria and Belgium (Ibid, pp. 114 &171).

The Beginning of Iran-US Diplomatic Relations: A Strategy with Two Intentions

After the independence of the United States from Britain, the Americans engaged in domestic affairs and the development of their civilizational infrastructure for a century, rejecting European colonialism in the Eastern countries according to the values of the American founders, while the Monroe Doctrine led American leaders. He warned against any adventure in the East. Unlike the European colonial powers such as Portugal, Spain, England and France, which directly colonized the eastern lands, the United States entered the trade competition with the European colonial powers under the slogan of free trade in the seas, but this competition, according to Monroe's doctrine, should never have led to a political-military confrontation (Al-Dawood, 2016, p. 87). Accordingly, the United States began concluding trade and maritime treaties with various countries in the early nineteenth century in order to compensate for its backwardness in the field of colonialism and, unlike the European states, to show a peaceful and non-colonial face. On the other hand, Iran, with its terrible defeats against Russia in the early nineteenth century and the loss of parts of its territory, has slowly entered a new world that was not like the intellectual world of the Qajar kings. A world they did not know the rules of the game, so the acting of the European powers stunned it. Iran's failed alliance with France to counter Britain and Russia was an example of Iranian government officials' ignorance of the requirements of the new world, a coalition that led to the dissolution of Iran and the country's subsequent domination of Russian and British colonial policies as two poles. He placed rivals and confined his foreign policy to the rivalries of the two northern and southern powers. In this way, the possibility of any sustainable action in the international arena was taken away from the Iranian government. This strait in foreign policy prompted Iranian diplomats and politicians instinctively seek a third power to counter and reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain. In addition to benefiting from the political and economic support of the third power, they will be able to gradually score points from the two poles of power, maintain, and secure the country's independence and interests in this political game (Terensio, 1984, p.126). The policy of the third power from Fath Ali Shah to the Mossadegh was a traditional and fixed policy of the Iranian kings and political leaders.

Whenever the Iranian government invited a third power, Russia and Britain increased their efforts to cooperate with Iran. By reducing their contradictions under the guise of countering the influence of the new power, they were challenging Iran's foreign policy, which was largely a reaction to this new power. During Amir Kabir prime ministry, the United States pursued its trade efforts under the guise of concluding trade and shipping treaties with various countries around the world. Amir Kabir cleverly decided to establish relations with the Americans following the proliferation of Iranian political actors. It was also favorable to the Americans, and for a long time the US foreign policy apparatus sought to open relations with Iran. During the eight years since the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries, two valuable trade-moderation and shipping treaties were signed between the two governments (Kazemzadeh, 1975, p.231). However, this opening of the relationship and the conclusion of the treaty had two different intentions. The United States wanted trade relations expansion without any political interference and, more importantly, to hand over political obligations to the Contracting Parties, because the official US policy at the time was not based on political interference and entering into the colonial conflicts of the European colonial powers. Of course, even if they wanted to intervene, they were not so strong in the political and international arena at the time that they could compete with the British government, and the United States still did not see the strategic importance of Iran because. It took decades for oil to be discovered in Iran so that Iran could find a strategic position in US foreign policy (Ibid, p.128). On the other hand, Iran wanted and intended to establish a relationship with the United States. Iranian politicians, who were somewhat unaware of the priorities of US foreign policy and global equations, expected the United States actively enter Iran's political arena and conclude trade agreements and open the doors to US-Iranian trade. If they had got involved in Iranian issues, they would face the Russian and British governments, whether they would like it or not. However, as mentioned, Iran was not a priority for US strategic policies, and the US focus was on Central and Latin American countries. The Iranians even tried to take advantage of the differences between Britain and the United States and persuade the country to enter the Iranian political scene so that they could receive security guarantees from the United States, but

the Americans explicitly refused to accept it (Amin al-Dawla, 1988, p.29).

Along with the two different intentions of Iran and the United States to open diplomatic relations, the lack of a self-consistent structure in Iran's foreign policy and the consequent lack of long-term strategies in country's public interest, were another reasons for Iran's failure about the third power policy.

Amir Kabir's achievements in opening relations with the United States and concluding a treaty and consequently protecting the interests of the Country; was based on Amir's personal adequacy and sense of patriotism, because the things were different after the death of Amir Kabir and the appointment of Mirza Aqa Khan Nouri as the Prime Minister. Prior to his appointment to the presidency, he was a British citizen (Raeen, 1994, pp.256 -257) who with the assistance of the United Kingdom and all the resources proclaimed his Anglophile attitude and considered as the executor of British policies in Iran (Etemad Al-Saltaneh, 1970, p. 237).

Therefore, it could not cooperate with the policy of the Third power, which was to the detriment of British interests, in a way that the concessions and benefits that Amir Kabir had made to Iran in the Treaty of Amity and Shipping in 1850 with the United States were revised in a new version and all the Amir's achievements vanished in the treaty which was signed by the order of Mirza Agha Khan Nouri in 1857.

As a result, Mirza Aqa Khan Nouri's first measure after the prime minister was to abandon the policy of the third power and turn to a policy of positive balance in order to protect British interests, which its peak was in Iran's withdrawal from Herat and its annexation to Afghanistan.

In this way, Iran failed to achieve its main goal of establishing relations with the United States, but they concluded two important agreements based on the principle of complete integrity, which later became the basis of political and legal relations between Iran and the United States.

Conclusion

Iranians, after the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, gave many political economic privileges to Russia; the United Kingdom also received the same concessions. There was a major competition between Russia and England in scoring from Iran. The United Kingdom wanted to protect India's colony and Russians wanted to reach the southern warm waters.

This caused the foreign states control the foreign affairs and even the domestic policy of Iran desirably. The Iranian authorities considered such a bipolar structure dangerous for the independence and sovereignty of the country. Therefore, Iran focused on attracting a third power to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain.

During the nineteenth century France, the United States and Germany were the governments that Iran was trying to use as a third power. The United States of America had a special position because was a young and powerful state and among the nations, it was famous for liberation and was not a colonial siege. Geographically, it was far from the borders of Iran and could not be a serious threat for the country's territorial integrity. Therefore, all the characteristics of the third power were in the United States nature. On the other hand, the United States had passed the civil war, and did not want to be colonial and so, they were trying to develop free trade and have treaties with other nations. Having economic struggle with Britain, it was seeking to capture the world's trade markets, and Iran attracted the United States to open up trade and politics. In addition, the fate of Christian minorities who were living in Iran was also highly important for American religious authorities. Iran needed a third power and expected the United States to intervene directly on Iranian issues and protect Iran's independence.

According to the research hypothesis that was tested and proven during the discussions, the United States of America was more qualified than any other government in terms of politicians and government officials, but the complexity of international politics in the nineteenth century and the priority of national and long-term interests of countries in foreign policy was something that was hidden from the eyes of the Iranian rulers or at least did not have a proper understanding of it.

So they insisted on protecting Iran's independence from both Russia and Britain, in other words, they wanted a comprehensive US intervention in the country's politics, unaware of the active isolation policy of the United States, which only desired to cooperate and contract in the field of free trade and maritime, which was not compatible with Iranian tendencies. At the same time, until the WWII, Europe was the center of world politics, and the United States, despite its political and economic power, still did not observed itself as an old-fashioned government to resist against professional European powers such as Russia, Britain, and Austria. In addition, Iran at that time, Unlike the Ottoman Empire, did not have the multifaceted appeal for great powers to make them interested in playing a role in their internal affairs; it still took decades for oil mines to be discovered in Iran and Iran changes to a strategic position for US foreign policy.

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
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***The Position of Superstition and Anti-Superstition in Iran's
Political Thought with an Emphasis on the Qajar Era***

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Abstract

During Qajar era, superstition and anti-superstition have had great impact on Iran's political thought. Superstitious context as an irrational process and major obstacle to the growth of political thought in Iran, exhorted the society towards subjectivist and reductionist approach. Rational intellectuals, on the other hand, endeavored to erode superstitious trends for pushing the society towards rationality and development. This article with a qualitative historical and analytical methodology and through collecting the library data tries to answer the question that "how superstitious culture had influenced the political thought of Iran during the Qajar period?" The hypothesis of the research is that the culture of superstition and irrationality through subjectivism and reductionism influenced the political thought of Iran during Qajar era, which in its turn led to the "intellectual despotism" and consequently to the "political tyranny". Based on the Giddens conception of the interaction between structure and agency, the

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article concludes that the contextual factors notably the superstitious culture led to the despotic mindset of Iranian rulers during Qajar period.

Keywords: Political Thought, Superstition, rationality, development, Qajar era, Iran.

Introduction

Superstition and anti-superstition, constituted major trends in the history of political thought during the Qajar period. Superstitions were so prevalent in the Iranian society that the Qajar kings such as Naser al-Din Shah, Muzaffar al-Din Shah and Mohammed Ali Shah were largely captured by superstitions. Instead of resorting to wisdom, thought and science, they went through a variety of superstitions to solve political and social problems. Meanwhile, there has been a kind of covert superstition among some Iranian political elites who were fascinated by the approval and encouragement of the ordinary people. In the social context, superstitious thinking, coming from cultural poverty, constituted major obstacle to political thought of Iran due to its reductionist approach.

On the contrary, rational intellectuals have always sought to overthrow this superstitious flow, because they considered it as one of the factors involved in the degeneration and collapse of the Persian society. They believed that superstitious thoughts erode the sapience, intellection and development, and the dominance of mythical thoughts on rational thought leads to the emergence of insipience and vulgar thoughts. Scholars, who fought against superstitions, believed that the import of superstition into the political arena leads to its substitution to wisdom and science, which itself was thought breeding.

Anti-superstitious thinkers believed that superstitious culture had an undesirable implication on political thought in Iran, whereas a rationalist approach would improve political thought and pave the way for political and economic development of Iran.

The article with a qualitative historical and analytical methodology and through collecting the library data tries to answer the question that "how superstitious culture had influenced the political thought of Iran during the Qajar period?"

The hypothesis of the research is that the culture of superstition and

irrationality through subjectivism and reductionism influenced the political thought of Iran during Qajar era, which in its turn led to the "intellectual despotism" and consequently to the "political tyranny". Based on the Giddens conception of the interaction between structure and agency, the article concludes that the contextual factors notably the superstitious culture led to the despotic mindset of Iranian rulers during Qajar period.

The works in the field of superstition during Qajar period are mostly dedicated to explaining the political culture of that time, and especially the prevalence of superstition among the Qajar kings.

Sheikh ol-Eslami (1989) in his books "Portrait of Ahmad Shah" and in his article (2006) entitled "Particularities of Mohammad Ali Shah" explains extensively the connection between superstition and political decision-making process during the Qajar period. He examines the impact of superstition on the decision-making system from the viewpoint of policy-making, neglecting its social and political impact on the process of Iran's underdevelopment.

Vikor (2006) in his book entitled "Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law" explains that the confrontation between religion and law was the reason for the gap between law and its implementation in Islamic societies like Iran. This cleavage becomes bigger if the religion is misinterpreted with superstitious ideas. In this context, the rational approach towards religion can reform the cultural and social structures and facilitate the role of public and governmental actors in the cultural and political system.

Sariol-Ghalam (2010) in his book entitled "The Political Culture of Iran" believes that the rationality is the basis for political and economic development. It is the product of the persuasion by political elites which takes place in a complex and rational society based on competitive culture in the economic and political context. On the contrary, in a society deprived of developmental approach, the superstition resurges. Therefore, development would be realized upon the socialization of rational norms in the society and the constructive role of influential elites.

Bashiriyeh (2008) in his book entitled "the obstacles towards the

political development in Iran” believes that the fragmentation between social and political culture in Iran hinders the development in the country. This cleavage would boost the way for irrational behavior of government and superstitious culture of people.

Yu (2017) in his book entitled “The Role of Political Culture in Iranian Political Development” explains the major cultural impediments to political development in Iran and focusing on the historical attitudes of Persian society, considers that attitudes of elites and cultural particularities of people were the key elements in slowing down the process of development in Iran.

Mohebi (2014) in her book entitled “The formation of civil society in modern Iran: public intellectuals and the state” focuses on the role of reformist intellectuals as agents of change in Iranian society. She posits that these intellectuals were especially effective due to their role in presenting new ideas to a wider constituency. She believes that the dynamics of cultural system determines the direction of political development in Iran. Therefore, in order to eliminate superstitious culture in Iran, different reformist intellectuals should reinforce the role of civil society in order to rationalize Iran's socio-political context.

Rahnama (2011) in his book "Superstitions as Ideology in Iranian Politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad", emphasizes that religious superstitions are based on economic, social and political context of Iranian society especially in the Qajar era, which has led to social degeneration, without addressing how superstition has affected Iran's political thought during the Qajar period.

The research literature review demonstrates that the available sources are more narrative and less analytical about the relationship between superstition and political thought in Iran during Qajar period. Therefore, the present article attempts to analyze how superstition has influenced Iran's political thought taking into consideration social and political underdevelopment as a context during the Qajar period.

We try in the present article to elaborate, in the first section, the conceptual framework. In the second section, the impact of superstition on the political thought of Iranian politicians of the Qajar period would be scrutinized on, and in third section, the impact of anti- superstition on

political thought in Iran, during the Qajar period would be explained.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this research is the social theory of Anthony Giddens which can establish a significant connection between development and rationality (Mestrovic, 1998). In his idea, structure is interrelated with functions, actions and agents. The social structure in which the context of rationality or superstition is developed would be based on political and public culture which plays a vital role in social life (Giddens, 1984) as well as on a rational account of actions based on a sense of routine and tendency for having self security (Craib, 1992). Therefore, 'action' or 'agency' as a continuous flow of conduct (regular series of acts) would interplay with the structure of society (Giddens, 1979). In this perspective, the rational comprehensive model argues that the decisions or actions can be based whether on logic, scientific reasoning and rational assumptions or emotions and superstitions (Sandercock, 1998; Allmendinger, 2002; Faludi, 1978, p.179). Therefore, the impact of rationality or superstition on the process of political thought during Qajar era would be elaborated based on contextual factors of the Iranian society which were in close relationship with the political and cultural agents or elites who were putting emphasis on the qualitative and perceptual dimensions of superstition and rationality.

Therefore, based on Giddens's theory, the social context or structure is as important as governmental actors and elites' role for the growth of superstitious or anti-superstitious culture. In fact, superstition is in contradiction with wisdom and rationality. Wisdom reinforces the power of deep thinking and understanding the realities and opposes the superstition in the way of understanding and the method of perception. Rationality which is based on cause and effect analysis as well as on cost and benefit calculation requires the involvement of rulers and intellectuals for disseminating the deep thinking about social events and interactions, whereas superstition avoids deep analysis of realities, and exhorts society towards simplistic and emotional ideas. (Salehi Amiri, 2015, pp.11-19)

Based on the research conceptual framework, the elites should

endorse their respective responsibility to eradicate superstitious culture in order to pave the way for flourishing the wisdom in society. The best way to combat superstitious culture is to increase public awareness and insights through disseminating critical thinking, as one of the requirements of the growth of rationality in all layers of society. The appropriate way to combat the superstition is to deploy general effort for exhorting the society towards rational approach in scrutinizing on ideas and analyzing events, explaining natural and metaphysical phenomena as well as interpreting their inter-relationship. In this conjuncture, the development is in close correlation with rationality and in contradiction with superstitious culture. In order to orient the society towards the development, the reform should take place in the social structures as well as in the elite and people perceptions so that the critical thinking would substitute the superstitious beliefs and ideas. Therefore, rational interpretation of religious teachings, by anti-superstitious intellectuals and rational-minded elites would pave the way for social and political development. (Enayat, 1979; Kermani, 1983) On the contrary, the political and social backwardness is rooted in superstition, falsification and irrationality of people and elites (Najmabadi, 1997, p.45) as well as in the absence of government of law, whose combination with the superstitious culture would impede the development (Kermani, 1983). Therefore, the sum of interaction between social structure/contextual factors and the actors/agency based on their tendency towards rationality or superstition would determine society's developmental or under-developmental direction.

The Impact of Propensity towards Superstition on the Political Thought of the Iranian Politicians during the Qajar Era

In this section, firstly the impact of propensity towards superstition on thought of politicians of the Qajar era is discussed and then its effect on the ordinary people in Qajar era would be examined.

Propensity towards Superstition among Political Figures of Qajar Era:

The most important impact of propensity towards superstition on the political thought of Iran can be seen as a reductionist approach to the analysis of domestic and foreign policy issues, which is considered as a

major obstacle to understanding the way ahead of politicians of Qajar era. According to Dariush Shayegan, superstitions can be considered as "mental idols" that prevent political understanding (Shayegan, 2002).

The Qajar period can be considered as an era full of superstitions and superstitious beliefs. The Qajar era, especially the relatively long era of Nasserli reign, suffers from propensity towards superstition. During the Qajar period, the kings had a number of special astronomers with whom he was consulting in his works. These astronomers also had to attend at the time of birth and predicted the fortune of the newborn (Dieulafoy, 2011, p.108).

The Qajar kings were allocating particular value to astronomers in such a way that the astronomers had a high position in the court of Qajar kings, in a way that sometimes they could establish a wed with Qajar king and marry his daughter, like Marriage of lady Shah Jahan known as Khan Bibi, Fath Ali Shah's daughter with Mirza Abdolbaqi Gilanni. Astronomers at the Qajar court, in addition to setting the exact time of the New Year and announcing it at the ceremony of the Nowruz in the presence of king based on the ancient custom, also were setting the time of accession of the new king to the throne. In addition to the efforts of the Qajar kings to start their monarchy at the auspicious and blessed hour, due to the noblesse of this period, with full observance of the rules of astronomy, they observed the blessed times that were appointed by astronomers when entering or leaving the city, or at the time of meeting with the ambassadors (Sepehr, 1998, p.550). The Qajar kings' belief in the science of astronomy was in the way that they were accustomed to use astronomers' opinion in political events during their reign, and based many of their actions on it.

Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, to whom Reza Gholi Khan Hedayat referred as a person who was aware of the science of geomancy and Astronomy, was the first person of this dynasty who paid special attention to the auspicious time of his return to the city. "On the fifteenth day, king [Agha Mohammad Khan] was supposed to enter Tehran and for some time he stayed in Firoozkooh, with two days delay, because it was not an auspicious time", Olivier quoted about believing in auspicious and inauspicious times. (Olivier, 1992, p.91) Among the

famous astrologers of that era, according to Mu'min al-Dawlah, we can mention "Malahagh hakim", who was the leader of the astrologers and witches of the Jewish neighborhood, to "Pirbabajado", "Mirza jam Bazan" and "Haji Kermani"(Mo'men al-Dawlah, 2001, p.62).

Also According to Pierre Amedé jaubert, Fath-ali Shah (described by Bontems as a person interested in astrology) and his companions' trip to Soltanieh countryside and his meeting with king, all took place at the time appointed by the astronomers of the court (Jaubert, 1968, p.358).

According to his memoirs of trip to Iran, De Kotzebue^Λ mentioned that:

"Since the great ambassador had given me obligingly the epithet of astronomer, the minister (Mirza Abdul Wahhab, Minister of Fath Ali Shah) who was keen on astronomy and mathematics, personally invited me. Iranian people believe in astronomical prediction, I also thought about using this [matter] to increase the credibility and reputation of the embassy and after giving his opinion to the Minister about the benedicts of time and the conformity of the stars on the friendship of two nations, the minister also stated that our astrologists believe that for the time being celestial bodies foretell a blissful fortune (De Kotzebue, 1986, p.235)."[Astronomers] had set a special day to accept the ambassador, and it took some time for Fath Ali Salah to reach Sultaniyeh and we were waiting for twenty days," as one of the ambassadors of Western countries wrote in his memoirs (De Kotzebue, 1986, p.230). Reza-Golikhaneh^Υ mentioned the consultation of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar with his astronomer Mirza Mohammad Hussein Isfahani during the uprising of the khans^Υ of Khorasan against the Prince Mohammad-ValiMirza in 1850. According to him, because of the astronomer's opinion, according to the way the stars were located, the Kings of khorasan were in power for 17 years and if anyone wanted to overthrow them after this period, he could wait so that 17 years would be passed. Therefore, Shah sent Abbas Mirza to Khorasan to suppress them after 17 years (Hedayat, 2001).

^ΛOne of the travelers who visited Iran during Qajar period

^ΥThe title of Feudal in Iran

Fraser quoting Sir John McNeil, who himself quoted Hassan-Ali Mirza's utterance, the governor of Khorasan, that before Abbas Mirza's death he predicted the month of his decease, saying that king would not be alive until 1871 (Fraser, 2005, pp.209-210).

In addition to Fath Ali Shah, his son Abbas Mirza and his son Mohammad Mirza also pursued this superstitious approach during their travels to various regions. Behavior of crown Prince Mohammad Mirza remained unchanged even during his reign and after the death of Fath Ali Shah until the arrival of auspicious time, he spent a week in Negarestan garden outside of Tehran, and after that, he ascended to the throne.

After the accession of Mohammad Shah to power, his well-known minister, Hajji MirzaAghasi also played a major role in promoting superstitions in political thought of Iran. A person, who according to sources, was taught supernatural sciences about conjuration and enchantment by MollaAbdolsamad Hamedani and by knowing these sciences, he made predictions whether about himself, the Qajar kings and princes or in connection with the political-military events of governance at the era of Mohammad Shah. According to some sources, he predicted Abbas Mirza and Fath Ali Shah death, long time before their decease, by revealing these things to Mohammad Mirza who was his teacher; he made himself a bountiful person in his eyes. These things caused the relationship between Hajji MirzaAghasi and Mohammad Shah in the course that he became prime minister, which had predicted it himself (Etemad-Al-Saltaneh 1978:184; Jahangir-MirzaQajar, 2005, p.76).

Nasser-al-Din Shah, after Mohammad Shah, was also a very superstitious man; he had a particular astronomer in his system of governance, to whom he was consulting before taking any action and asking him about auspicious and inauspicious days. Not only did he consult with his astronomer, but also he consulted with one of his women's beloved who supposedly was overfilled with the love of God. (Vaghaye Etefaghie newspaper 1888, No.252, p.5) Nasser-al-Din Shah Qajar, was a person who believed in superstition for arranging his trips to some countries or returning from them (E'tezad-Al-Saltaneh, 1861, No. 11915).

Nasser-al-Din Shah did not do any serious or important issue unless

he had asked his astronomer to bead bids¹ regarding the auspicious times before doing it, and since the first advisor of the Shah was an astronomer, so it could be said that the great part of the destiny of country was determined by astronomers (Saran, 1984, p.72).

During the 50-years reign of Nasser-al-Din Shah (from 13 September 1848 to 30th April 1896), especially during the 50th anniversary of his reign or after his death, many sources of this period talked about the astronomers' prediction on the way of his kingdom's decline. Mokhber-Al-Dowleh explains the predictions of the Qajar prince Mohammad Vali Mirza's, who was familiar with science about conjuration. According to him, reign of Naseri had some dreadful happenings and eras after 50 years and in case of the risk being resolved, it will continue for thirty years; the prince that QajarShah praised his predictions in other matters too, and if his predictions came true he would give him a reward. Therefore, the king was listening to the predictions, and he was convinced of their correctness. Doust-Ali-khan Moayer-Al-Mamalek quotes Tajid-Al-Dawlah, the king's wife talking about his delight in passing through the dreadful happenings and eras of his reign that Mohammad ValiMirzaJafar had predicted in the first year of his reign (Ettehadieh and Sa'davandian, 1982, pp.60-61).

In the case of the next king of the Qajar dynasty, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, the available literature suggests that, in addition to believing in superstition, he has been strictly bound to them. His arrival in Tehran after the death of Nassir al-Din Shah was made at the well-appointed time of the astronomers. In the case of the succeeding king of the Qajar dynasty, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, the available writings suggest that, in addition to believing in such a thing, he was strictly bound to them. His arrival in Tehran after the death of Nassir al-Din Shah was done at the auspicious time determined by the astronomers (Afzal-Al-Molk, 1983, p.17).

Eugene Aubin narrates that "Abdul-maghfurNajm al-Dawlah" (the

¹A kind of religious fortune-telling in which you bid beads while praying to predict the fortune or misfortune

astronomer of the court in that time) published calendars every year, in which he provided information on historical events, days and months with astrological content. This person was mandated to find the appropriate time for starting new celebration according to stars, after the death of Muzaffar al-Din Shah for the coronation of Mohammad-Ali Shah (Aubin, 2012, p.155).

It is mentioned about the coronation of Mohammad Ali Shah in the book "The Moon of the Fourteenth Night" as follows: "At that time, the astronomer consulted with the heavens and whispered by stars to choose an auspicious time for coronation, but Mohammad Ali Mirza, who later became a king as Mohammad Ali Shah, did not want to wait and the astronomer inevitably, despite the inappropriate condition of the stars, choose and recommended an inauspicious time" (Lorey and Sladen, 1910, p.103).

In sum, kings and rulers of the country were severely constrained to the superstitious thoughts. Certainly, this procedure has had a profound impact on the society, pushing it towards subjectivism and degeneration.

Propensity towards Superstition in Ordinary People during the Qajar Era

Since during the Qajar period there were a few literate people. Mostly Iranian ordinary people, at that time, were captured by superstitions. This situation created and developed certain beliefs among the Iranian people in the Qajar era. An example was the popular belief in the fact that the horses whose feet were auspicious were ominous, or number thirteen was considered to be inauspicious. Even those who were exempt from business, refused to mention thirteen, and after the number twelve instead of thirteen they were using the word "ziyade" and then they were citing the next number. Generally, auspiciousness and inauspiciousness of three things were considered as important: house, horse and wife. Regarding wife and horse they used the terms *khoshghadam* (lucky) and *badghadam* (unlucky). According to Polak, some of the king's wives were forced to leave the court because they were inauspicious (Polak, n.d., p.156).

¹It is a word used instead of the unlucky number 13

Ali-qoli-mirza E'tezad-al-Saltaneh, in his book *Falak-Al-Saadeh*, repeats the words of *Etemad-al-Saltanah* with more moderation. Although he did not deny the beliefs of aristocrats in astronomy, he believes that they used it only in times of emergency, such as dismissal from their office, and, on the contrary, introduces the ordinary men, women, and stupid people as main believers of astronomy (E'tezad-al-Saltaneh, 1861).

A little awareness of astronomy and knowing a few astronomical terms and perception of printed calendars of every year was enough to be visited by the people, and this constant and persistent visiting was so beneficial- financially- that had turned into a source of wealth and fortune for Iranian astronomers during the Qajar period. As James Morier stated, almost every Iranian city had its own astronomer (Morier, 2007, vol. 2, pp.73-74).

Referring to the calendar to determine the auspicious time to sew and wear clothes, shoes and even new socks, going to the bathroom and visiting, traveling, setting the time to take the trousseau, and the day of marriage, all indicate that the ordinary people of the Qajar period also used the science of astronomy on a large scale in their everyday lives (Khansari, 1963, p.12).

The social and cultural conditions of this period were in a way that these superstitions were accepted by the community. Therefore, the political elites who did not have the capability to administer the country misused the superstitious culture to govern.

Impact of Combatting Superstitions on Political Thought of Iran during the Qajar Era

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to fight against superstitions in the Qajar era was the critical rationality of some prime ministers, thinkers and elites of this period.

The Role of Political and Religious Elites in Combating Superstitious Culture

Among the prime ministers, there were only a few who wisely wanted the development of the Iranian community by rationality, like Gaem Magham Farahani, Amir Kabir and Sepahsalar, who were

expecting the rationalism of the Iranian society. However, because of the suppression and tyranny of the Qajar kings, their era did not last long. For example, insipient people killed MirzaTaghi Khan Amir Kabir. Then Hajji MirzaAghasi, the sixth chancellor of that era, was a mendicant man who was a very devious and wicked person and promoted superstition for the sake of himself to gain the position of chancellor (Mahmoud, 1988, p.511). From 1835 to 1848 (the year of the death of Mohammad Shah), he was in charge of the Iranian Chancellery for 13 years (Gholi, 1998, p.62).

Of course, during the Qajar period, there were religious writers and thinkers who were protesting against the state of superstitions and were struggling to reform the beliefs of the court and the people. Writers such as Sheikh Hadi Najmabadi (1871-1941), Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asad Abadi (1875-1934), Allameh Naeeni, Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabaei, etc. played a major role in reinforcing the critical rationality.

Sheikh Hadi Najmabadi was a critic Mujtahid[\] and provider of the awakening of Iranians. Through social interaction with various groups of people, he was advising them, to avoid superstitions and blind imitation. He believed that superstition, fear of criticism, and bad habits were considered to be human diseases. Therefore, wisdom is the most important prophet that guides man to the right path (Ha'eri, 1981, p.91). He severely criticized Nasser al-Din Shah and his senior government staff. With these criticisms, he aimed to fight by the help of religion against the oppression and superstitious beliefs and to exhort his country to some social and political modernization (Ha'eri, 1981, pp.93-96).

The central concept in Sheikh Hadi's religious thought was the rule of intellect and wisdom, emphasis on rational understanding and the rejection of bias and imitation in religion to seek the truth. The only criterion for the correctness of rules of piety is nothing but reason, which God has entrusted in the nature of humanity in order to distinguish God's path from inaccuracy (Najm-Abadi, 1999, pp.105-106). Therefore, the Sheikh was highly rational. He recognized the wisdom as the first prophet, which God has placed in man. He qualified the wisdom as the

[\] A person who guide people about divine rules

Prophet who separated the path of God from the path of Satan (Najm-Abadi, 1999, p.109). He considered ornamentation of religious beliefs and superstitious arguments as unacceptable and believed in the rationality of divine knowledge (Tabatabaee, 2014, p.181).

Other writer and thinker of this period was Seyyed Jamaloddin AsadAbadi. The importance of Seyyed Jammal's work was in his tireless struggles against all despotic governments in the Middle East. He was also considered as one of the critics and inveterate fighters against the Nasser-al-din Shah regime (Enayat, 1979, p.56). He was the first person that discussed, at the end of the nineteenth century, the "purification of Islam from superstition", "the necessity of acquaintance with new scientific and technological advances for Muslims," and "unity of Muslims". He believed that superstitions are like a fake glamour that prevail the society, leading to the self-deprecation of the people against colonialism. He relied on the Islamic self-esteem for fighting against superstition (The collection of the Martyr Motahari, 2010, vol. 24, p.153).

In the Orvat-Al-Vosgha newspaper, published in Paris, he was emphasizing on "eradication of superstition from Islam", "Condemnation of blindly traditionalism and mere imitation" and "Adoption of the new science and technology in the Islamic world." (Ha'eri, 1981, p.59).

The Role of Iranian Journalists and Intellectuals in Combating Superstitious Culture

The Iranian journalist played their effective role in awakening Iranian people and rationalizing public opinion. In this connection, the rational and developmental outcomes of the publication of Orvatol-Vothgha by Seyyed Jamal-od Dine Assadabadi since 1883, that of Ghanoon by Mirza Malkam Khan Nazem-od-Douleh since 1889, that of Shahsavan by Mirza Abdol-Rahman Talebof since 1888, the monthly magazine of Hekmat by Mirza Mahi Khan Tabrizi since 1891, Habl-ol-matine by Seyed Jalal-od Dine Hosseini Kashani (Moayedol Eslam) since 1893, as well as weekly magazine of Soraya under the joint supervision of Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan Kashani and Seyed Farajollah Hosseini since 1897 should be taken into consideration prior to the constitutional revolution (Ghasemi, 2006, pp.54-59).

Furthermore, the role of journals such as Toloue, Kamal, Adab, Omid, Majlesse Melliye Tabriz, Al-Jenab, Eslamiyeh and Nourouz in disseminating rationality and developmental approach in political and social arena in Iran should be regarded as constructive one (Jabbarlooye & Shabestari, 2004).

During the period 1906 - 1909, the chief editors of around 90 Persian journals were trying to awaken the Iranian society from the political ignorance, such as Seyed Mohammad Sadegh Tabatabaee & Adibol-Mamalek Farahani (Newspaper of Majles), Majdol-eslam Kermani (Nedaye Vatan), Reza Modir-ol-Mamalek Harandi Esfahani (Tamaddon), Morteza Gholi Khan Moayedol-Mamalek (Sobhe Sadegh), Mirza Seyed Hassan Kashani (Hablol-Matine), Mirza Jahangir Khan Shirazi & Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (Sour Esrafil), Mohammad Taghi Bahar (Khorasan), & Seyed Mohammad Reza Mosavate Shirazi (Mosavat) (Parvin, 2000).

In fact, in the era of constitutional movement, there were three intellectual currents in Iran which were against superstitious culture: firstly secular intellectuals such as Mirza Fath-Ali Akhoundzadeh, Taghizadeh & Mirza Agha Khan Kermani; secondly reformist and Protestantist intellectuals such as Abdol-Rahim Talebof; and thirdly realist and modernist intellectuals such as Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem-ol Douleh & Mirza Youssef Mostashar-od-douleh (Khalkhali & Pouzesh, 2016: 92-117). They were trying to establish semi-modernist reforms in the Iranian political and social culture and to transform the traditional structures into modern ones (Ajoudani, 2003, pp.40-41).

Mirza Fath-Ali Akhoundzadeh believed that the bigotry and ignorance were the main obstacles towards the development of the country. Therefore, the dogmatic and superstitious perception of religion should be changed (Zaker Esfahani, 2000, p.336). He believed that underdevelopment is rooted in the opportunistic approach of rulers in the political system who misused the ignorance of ordinary people for consolidating their power. (Adamiyat, 1956, p.148) In his viewpoint, even the ethics is based on wisdom. Therefore, the context of intellectual and mental evolution should be prepared through education and knowledge sharing, in order to pave the way for national progress (Adamiyat, 1970, pp.117-119).

Mirza Agha Khan Kermani was for the rationalization of culture and

elimination of superstition for boosting the development of Iranian society (Kasravi, 2006: 136-138).

Abdol-Rahim Talebof believed that science and freedom are the two factors of civilian progress of each society (Talebof, 1978, pp.84-187). The main obstacle is the ignorance as the origin of superstitious culture (Mirani, 1979, p.98).

Mirza Malkam Khan Nazem-od-douleh was insisting on law and legacy as the main factors of social progress. He was for the modernization from above (Adamiyat, 1961, p.52).

Mirza Yousef Khan Mostashar-od-douleh who wrote a dissertation entitled "one word" (i.e. Law), believed that for the elimination of superstitious culture, the society should endorse the superiority of legacy as the main factor of progress and negate the misinterpretation of religion (Kermani, 1983, pp.170-172).

From 1909 to 1921, the Iranian intellectuals were insisting on the necessity of the rationalization of structures and actors. For instance, Mohammad Taghi Bahar believed that the reason for Iran's underdevelopment after constitutional movement was their non-consideration of science, rationality and modernity (Akbari Beiragh, 2000, p.142). In this context, Ahmad Kasravi was thinking of modernization of Iran based on humanism, public awareness, internal awakening and negation of imitation (Kasravi, 1977, pp.41-42). He believed that development requires the rationalization of society and its modern identification before the rationality of its rulers (Golmohmadi, 2001, p.219).

Furthermore, some intellectuals by disseminating their anti-superstitious ideas in journals such as *Iran-e Nou* in Tehran, *Shafagh* in Tabriz and *Nou-Bahar* in Khorasan during Ahmad Shah Period played an important role in promoting anti-superstitious culture in Iran (Sariolghalam, 2019, pp.112-124).

Conclusion

It can be understood that Non-academic, insipient, emotional and populist approach, caused the propensity of political thought, during the Qajar period towards superstition, led to extremism, populism and superficial approach, prevented intellectual growth and scientific

approach and impeded the discourse of development and rationality.

In addition, the superstitious culture, by holding the political rationality back, reproduced the political tyranny of the Qajar period, the lack of political development, and the refusal of critical political thinking. The congruency between the "superstitious culture" and the "lack of rationality" during the Qajar period caused "intellectual tyranny," followed by "political tyranny." In other words, the superstitious culture and the reductionist approach led to the reproduction of political despotism and these two reinforced and reproduced each other.

In the Qajar era, the superstitious beliefs in the personal life of individuals became outspread in the "collective culture". In the "political decisions" of this era, superstition and fighting against rationalism were visible. So it can be said that the superstitious culture strengthened the process of underdevelopment in the Qajar era.

Thus, the superstition, as a destructive element of reason, science and religion, accompanied by the spread of magic and witchcraft, which were rooted in fight against rationality and escaping from science, led to the orientation of society towards absence of science, irrationality, ignorance, and unawareness. The superstitious culture, through eroding intellect and opposing to science, led to lack of consciousness, illiteracy, law-breaking and political tyranny. "Superstition", "superstitious culture" and "superstitious thought" led to "the incorrect understanding of the relation of cause and effect in scientific, social and political events. Such a superstitious thought in the context of law-breaking and political despotism provided an opportunity for denying critical rationalism and impeding political development in Iran during the Qajar period.

The prevalence of superstition has influenced the rulers and elites approach towards the development. Their perceptual and imaginary understanding of previous events caused their stereotypes and mental patterns to impede true understanding of social and political realities. In addition, the reduction of mind to a partial part of reality or to supernatural superstition and its generalization to the totality of social changes led to a one-dimensional approach, or a tunnel approach in the political thought of the Iranian society. The propensity towards

superstitions also caused "the self-confirmation bias" in the Iranian political thought. This cognitive error was because that the minds were more in pursuit of the security of their previous knowledge rather than the search for and understanding of reality.

In contrast, elites and thinkers fighting against superstition, such as Sheikh Hadi Najmabadi, Seyyed Jamaledin Asadabadi, Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba'i, Akhundzadeh, Kermani and Taghizadeh during the Qajar period had come to the conclusion that superstition constitutes "psychological and individual" and "collective, cultural and social" derivations, leading to the consolidation of the political tyranny of the Qajar dynasty. So these thinkers and writers along with some patriotic politicians started to criticize the prevalence of non-scientific, anti-rational, emotional and populist approaches as major factors of propensity towards superstition, due to the prevalence of social lumpenism and reductionist perception and the increase of people's ignorance and illusion as barriers to intellectual understanding and political development in Iranian society.

Scrutinizing on the political culture of Iran and its impact on political and social thought during Qadjar period, we notice the destructive effect of superstition on the rationality and development. In fact, the superstition tries to transform the "thought", as the intellectual product of persuasion, wisdom, awareness and deep thinking into "idea" as the product of habits and instincts, which lead to simplistic calculation as well as dogmatic and populist approaches. In the superstitious context, the superficial understanding of modern thought by the intellectuals, the non-congruence and non-interaction between intellectuals and people, the lack of inter-subjectivity in the perception of modern concepts, such as development, among people, intellectuals and political elites as well as the exploitation and misuse of public ignorance and illiteracy by opportunist governmental elites for reinforcing the pillars of their political power have prepared the grounds for superstitious culture as the main factor of underdevelopment during Qajar era.

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***The Early Life of Shah Esma‘il
In Contemporary Published Venetian Sources***

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Abstract

The second earliest published contemporary account that mentions and discusses Shah Esma‘il I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, his family, his rise to power, as well as his Qezelbash followers was a report published in Italian in 1506. This article offers a translation and an analysis of this report, plus four letters that are attached to this report which shed light on the role that the Sophy played in European anti-Ottoman politics.

Keywords: Shah Esma‘il, Qizilbash, Messianism, Bayazid II, Ottoman-European conflict.

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The first accounts on the rise and life of Shah Esma`il I were not written in Persian. In fact, the first one was published as a broadsheet in German in 1502.¹ Why is it that one year after Shah Esma`il had taken Tabriz and declared himself to be king of Iran and Twelver Shi`ism to be the religion of his state that this was considered important enough to inform the public in Germany about this? The reason was European politics. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent Ottoman conquests of European territory caused much alarm among political and religious leaders in Europe. In fact, on 30 September 1453, Pope Nicholas V (r. 1447-1455) in response to the huge outcry among Europe's intelligentsia and population, immediately called for a crusade against Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451-1481), but he failed to get support. (von Pastor 1955, vol. 1, pp. 463-64; Kayser 1885, pp. 208-31) Although European states also saw the Ottoman onslaught as a threat, they were more concerned about the threat of their European neighbors and rivals. Therefore, despite continued efforts by successive Popes to drum up support for an anti-Ottoman crusade they were never able to bring about a unified force of European states to execute such an exploit. The idea of a crusade received renewed impetus from the military success of Uzun Hasan, the Turkmen ruler of W. Persia and E. Anatolia (r. 1453-1478) against Mehmed II. The Venetians who in 1463 had established relations with Uzun Hasan, in 1473 sent Giosafat Barbaro as ambassador to Tabriz. He did not come empty-handed for he sailed with three galleys with some cannons, harquebuses, gunpowder and other military equipment and 200 Venetian soldiers. However, the high hopes for Uzun Hasan's continued military success against Mehmed II were dashed when Uzun Hasan was defeated at Bashkent (11 August 1473). (. von Pastor 1955, vol. 2, pp. 388; von Palombini 1968, pp. 13, 18-23; Berchet 1976, pp. 1-22) When the various Venetian envoys reached Uzun Hasan's court the latter refused to further undertake military actions against the Ottomans. (Babinger 1953, p. 410) Emboldened by Ottoman military reversals in Europe, Pope Innocent VIII (r. 1484-1492) once again called on all Christians to rise against the Turk, but most European states refused to participate. Therefore, after the death of Innocent VIII his successor Alexander VI Borgia (r. 1492-

¹ For an annotated translation and the German text, see Floor 2016.

1503) initially did not try to revive the call for a crusade.(von Pastor 1955, vol. 3, pp. 221-25; Ferrara 1940, pp. 203-17) However, this changed when in 1499 Ottoman forces attacked Venetian possessions in the Mediterranean. These attacks shook many in their appeasement attitude and on 1 June 1500 Alexander VI called for a crusade against the Turk who was said to be about to attack Rome.(Ferrara 1940, pp. 187, 203-17, 291, 396) However, to launch a crusade required money. Therefore, the Venetians urged Pope Alexander VI to call on the believers in Europe to give money to fund this holy cause. In particular, to use the money collected to induce other Christian states to join the Venetian war effort against the Ottomans.(Fisher 1948, pp. 66-68, 74; von Pastor 1955, vol. 3, pp. 438-41)

Apart from beating the drum about the Ottoman threat, another inducement to attract support to finance and participate in the crusade, was the rise of Shah Esma'il. In the fall of 1501 news reached Venice about the military successes of Shah Esma'il. In the earliest Venetian letters (first half of 1502) he was described as a prophet of 14 years old, with a huge army of 150,000, who preached against the religion of Mohammad and had written to the Ottoman Sultan to withdraw from Anatolia and Karamania otherwise he would wage war on him.(Scarcia Amoretti 1979, pp. 2-3, nos. 2, 3, 6 (March-May 1502)) The Venetians considered this news and the prophet's characteristics a hopeful development that held promise for a new ally and one that might open a second front in the Ottomans' rear. They also viewed the success of this 'prophet' as a potential effective rallying cry to mobilize public opinion and the public's money by depicting the Sophy as coming to Europe's rescue.

To reach the large, dispersed and linguistically diverse population of Europe in a short period of time modern technology was used. The invention of the printing press in the mid-fifteenth century had made books and pamphlets relatively cheap and accessible. Therefore, to reach the European masses, use was made of so-called broadsheets, the forerunner of the newspaper.¹The first broadsheet about Shah Esma'il in

¹. On the successful use of this new type of the media, see Houston 1988; Lorenzen-Schmidt and Poulsen 2002.

June 1502, was a targeted instrument of Venetian foreign policy to influence the population of Germany to help finance its war effort, one that was supported by the Pope himself. Although the broadsheet was in German, the source of information was Venetian. To appeal to the credulous masses, the rise of the prophet to the east of the Ottoman lands, who fought the Turk and allegedly denounced Mohammad, and who might even be a quasi-Christian, was used as an inducement to give money. As such it may also be considered one of the early examples of the regular ritual of some European states to try, or at least go through the motions, to include Persia in their unsuccessful attempts to bring about the containment and defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹

After the publication of the German and Latin text of the 1502 broadsheet the myth of the Sophy, as Shah Esma'il was usually referred to, started to take form in Europe. In the subsequent years this myth acquired more definite form, depth, and specific overtones. The purported facts concerning the Sophy were fast food for the early 16th century political spin-doctors. He was depicted as being a crypto-Christian or to be at least very friendly to Christians and to be very anti-Turkish, which characterizations were gross exaggerations. The Sophy is painted as the ardent ally of the Christians and the arch-enemy of the Turks. He kills them by the scores and destroys their "temples and mosques." He was made out to be a crypto-Christian who was "like the dove who brought the olive branch to Noah's ark, which is the sign of peace, between God and humanity." (Rouillard 1938, pp. 32-34)

Shah Esma'il or the Sophy as he was generally known, was perceived as an egalitarian, who shared his riches with the common man, which very much appealed to the oppressed masses in Europe at that time. The lower classes of Florence and Venice actually believed that this Sophy would liberate them from their misery. A popular Florentine carnival song of ca. 1503 heralds that "the coming of the Sofi is certain: soon he would redistribute riches, giving to those who have less." (Rota 2009, pp. 31-37; see also Ponte 1977, 1-2, pp. 5-19) In Germany similar sentiments prevailed as is clear from an excerpt from a letter from Germany by Zacaria Contarini, who compares the desire of the urban

¹ On this issue, see von Palombini 1968.

population of Germany to be their own rulers to this “superstition of the prophet,” as he called it.(Scarcia Amoretti 1979, pp. 8 (30/05/1502), 12 (11/09/1502)).

The Italian broadsheet that I present here in translation is the first attempt by a European author to present a more comprehensive and systematic biography of Shah Esma'il and to ‘explain’ his rise and potential role to a European public that was both interested, beguiled and befuddled by what it had learnt so far about his person. People wanted to know whether he was of royal descent or a commoner, a prophet or a charlatan, and whether the hope that he would, if not stop, at least hurt the Ottoman onslaught, a hope that had been raised by earlier publications and rumors, was true or not. Rota tries to address all these questions and concerns and emphasizes the religious character of the rise and life of Shah Esma'il as the key and driving force of his success.

This second broadsheet presented here in translation from the Italian text known as *La Vita del Sophi* (The Life of the Sophy) was authored by Ioannes Rota. According to Pierre Jodogne, the earliest publication of *La Vita* dates from 1506 and its text is slightly different from the next three Italian editions and, moreover, it does not have the four letters appended to it as the other three. Jodogne assigned 1508 as the date of the second Italian edition, from which a French translation was made. The first complete German translation was made in 1515 from a third undated (1509?) Italian edition, while the fourth Italian edition was published in 1515, which was not translated into other languages. Jodogne discusses the minor textual differences between these various Italian editions as well as the link between a particular Italian edition and its translation into French or German.(Jodogne 1980, pp. 215-32) The French translation was made by Jean Lemaire, who had come across Rota's *Vita* during his visit to Venice in 1508. When he published his *Traicté de la différences des schisms et des conciles de l'église* in May 1511 Lemaire included a French translation of Rota's *Vita*, without attribution, as *l'histoire moderne du prince Syach Ysmaïl surnommé Sophy Arduelin, roy de Perse et de Mede et de plusieurs autres terres et provinces*.¹ Jodogne submits that Giovanni Rota must have written his *La Vita del*

¹. For a modern annotated and critical text edition, see Lemaire 1997. This French text was translated into Latin in 1572, see Jodogne 1980, p. 217, n. 10.

Sophi, between 26 August 1504, when Rota wrote a letter from Aleppo, and 1508, when Jean Lemaire acquired a copy of this *Vita*.(Jodogne 1980, p. 218) Because the *La Vita* does not refer to events after 1506, it is likely that it was written prior to that date.

Thus, in total there are four Italian editions (all undated, but probably published respectively in 1506, 1508, 1509, and 1515), one French translation (1511) and one German translation (1515).¹ The German translation was published twice in 1515; once in Nuremburg and the other in Augsburg.(Göllner 1994, vol. 1, pp. 34 (nr. 32), 60 (nr. 76); Jodogne 1980 pp. 220-21. The electronic version of the German text is available via Google books, q.v. *Das Leben und gewonhait und gestalt des Sophy Königs der Persien*.) Like the 1508 and later Italian editions, the German translation has four letters from Venetian informants, dating from 1507 and 1508, that provide additional information on the Sophy. Of these translations the French one is the best known, i.e., it has been several times reprinted and sometimes used and referred to in a number of articles concerning the Sophy. The other ones they all have in common that they are hardly used in studies concerning the life of Shah Esma`il.

Although this second broadsheet deals with Shah Esma`il's biography I don't discuss this here, because there are many studies available on this subject. I only provide clarifying footnotes to the translated text. When a name occurs for the first time I reproduce the orthography as used in the first Italian edition (e.g. Siras; sic. Shiraz), while when the same name occurs later I use the modern orthography (e.g. Shiraz). Because I had no access to the later Italian editions, this made the translation of the four letters sometimes difficult, but I have tried to make the text as intelligible as I could. For easy reference the page numbers that occur in bold in the translation below refer to the German text.

English Translation.

To the Most Serene and Most High Prince of the Venetian Signoria,

¹ For a bibliographical discussion, see Jodogne 1980, pp. 215-24. An abridged German translation was published in 1510.

Lord Leonardo Laurentani.[\]

Ioannes Rota, medical doctor^ʔ

As I found myself in Aleppo, the city of Soria [sic; Syria], Most Serene and High Prince, I heard that Your Serenity was desirous and wishing to learn in particular of things about the amazing Soffi [sic; Sophy], therefore, I have become a more industrious investigator and hope that the present report may satisfy Your Magnificence's curiosity; but not having intended to do so, I only have investigated that which I have been able to learn myself about amazing things and news. About which, for as much as I understand Your Serenity's wishes, I will briefly and succinctly report on what many worthy persons have told me, having omitted all vain talk of the common people, and only reporting all that which many respectable people and honest merchants have told me. This report is in three different parts. First, we will report on his family and descent. Secondly, about his life. Thirdly, about his amazing wars that he has waged so far, with which we will conclude our report and would there be anything in there which is untrue, then I beg Your Eminence not to accuse me of lying because I submit more or less whatever has been reported to me. Thus, is not my fault, having only transmitted it.

As to the first part, I report to Your Serenity that Mahmed [sic; Mohammad] had a brother's son named Hali [sic; `Ali].^ʔ It was by [Mohammad], after his father's death, that [`Ali, who] was little, was nourished and raised, and Mohammad always honored and obeyed him. From the aforesaid `Ali, by right and the true male line, is descended he, who nowadays and by us is called the Sophy. Just like the descendents of Mohammad in the male line are called *seriffi*,^ʔ likewise [end page 2] the descendants of `Ali are called *seriffi*. They are not less respected than the others, in particular by the Persians, who revere `Ali not less than

[\] Leonardo Loredan, Doge of Venice (r. 1501-1521).

^ʔ Nothing is known about Rota; he was in 1504 in Aleppo, while in one letter he is referred to as Zuan Rota, see Jodogne 1980, pp. 217-18.

^ʔ `Ali b. Abu Talib, the first Imam of the Shiites, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad.

^ʔ I.e. *sharif* or noble, the honorific for descendants of Mohammad, also referred to as sayyeds. The French and German translations have *Scriphi*.

Mohammad. Nor is the aforesaid Sophy, which is his proper and true name. As to their religion, which he heads, he wants that out of humility they do not wear a silken, but only a woolen cap. Because in the Arabic language wool is called *sof* and, therefore, their sect¹ is called Soffi. They have to live in poverty, have to fast and engage in vigils and prayer diligently, although many badly observe these [obligations]. His true and proper name is Siah Ismail [sic; Shah Esma'il], which means 'the prophet Ismail,' his ancestors, and in recent times his father, have almost always governed a region named Ardueli [sic; Ardabil], because of which the said Soffis are also called 'Ardueli.' Some also call them *Cenaseri*,² because they are in the habit to wear a colored head cover with twelve folds, and *cenaser* means 'twelve' in Arabic. Because this headdress is universally red, they are called 'chusel bas' [sic; *Qizilbash*] in the Turkish language, which means 'red head.'³ Therefore, this sect⁴ due to various circumstances has several names.

His father was a very learned man such as in religion [theology] as well as in many other sciences, in particular in astrology. He was poor, [led] a frugal and simple life⁵ and was very much loved by Cassam Beg [sic; Hasan Beg] or as we call him Vson Cassano [sic; Uzun Hasan], so much so that he gave him his own daughter as wife from which [union] was born this Shah Esma'il, whom we now call the Sophy. Because of this it is clear that he is of the noblest royal lineage through his mother. This suffices as to the first subject, i.e. his lineage and his descent.⁶

¹ The first Italian edition of 1506 has here *seda* not *secta* like all the other Italian editions. Jodogne 1980, pp. 222-23. Clearly, 'seda' was a printer's error for 'feda' or 'faith,' and therefore, the translation 'sect' is correct.

² The German translation has *etnasari*, which is an improvement and is an adequate transliteration of the Arabic word *ithna 'ashari* or twelve. The French translation has *Etnanazer*[y] or *Nazer*.

³ On the various kinds of headdress or *taj* worn by the Safavid followers, see Floor 1999, pp. 277-89.

⁴ Here also the Italian original has 'seda' instead of 'feda.'

⁵ Soltan Heydar (note: not Sheikh Heydar) knew more about military warfare than about Sufi spirituality. Also, he was neither a poor nor a virtuous man, and he loved to go raiding, killing people and getting booty. Woods 1976, p. 119; Khvandamir 1362, vol. 4, p. 427; Khvonji 1992, p. 58.

⁶ Esma'il's father was Soltan Heydar (1459-1488). His mother was Halimeh Begi Agha or

As far as the next subject, that is his life, is concerned, Your Serenity should know that the father of Shah Esma'il during his life always sought to raise and educate him in both in proper manners as in good learning and mostly in their religion. Of the father it is said that through astrological science he knew from his son's birth [end page 3] what kind of man he would become. It was not given to the poor father to teach him much, because Iacob Beg [sic: Ya`qub Beg], son of Cassam Beg [sic; Uzun Hasan] and his brother-in-law, who shortly thereafter succeeded his father to the Persian throne, hated him very much and persecuted him to death and took from him the small region that he governed.¹ At that time, his son Shah Esma'il was eight years old or thereabouts.² Because he was little, and fearing for his death, he was forced to flee to Lezian [sic; Lahejan], a town in the province called Acilan [sic; Gilan],³ close to the Caspian Sea, whence we get *lezi* and *trachozī* silk.⁴ He lived there for many years with a lord called Pir Haly⁵ and during the time, eight years or more,⁶ he never wanted to eat food from the court [whether] by request or inducement. He only lived of what God gave him⁷ and whatever remained on the table he always returned it to God by giving it to the poor. Now he is 22 years old,⁸ small

¹ Alamshah Khatun, who was a daughter of Uzun Hasan and Despina, the daughter of Kalo Ionannis, last Greek ruler of Trebizond, both of whom were Christian.

² Against the orders of Soltan Ya`qub (r. 1478-1490), Soltan Heydar marched to Shirvan to attack the Shirvanshah. The latter asked Soltan Ya`qub for help, who sent an army that defeated Soltan Heydar, who was defeated and killed by friendly fire in 1488.

³ Esma'il was only 15 months old, for he was born on 25 Rajab 892/17 July 1487.

⁴ Esma'il with his brothers with 20 *morids* fled to Lahejan at the end of 898/Sept-Oct 1493. Khvandamir 1370, p. 38 has with 200 *morids*.

⁵ The German translation has *letzni* and *tracatzi*. *Lezi* silk means *legi* (Lahejan) and spun silk. The term *trachozē* is derived from Persian, "*tar-i quazz*, i.e. fabric made of the fiber (*tar*) of raw silk (*quazz* < *qaz*, *khaz*, *kaj*)."⁶ Scarcia 1969, pp. 211, 228. On the various kinds of silk in Iran, see Floor 1996; see also Molà 2000, p. 55.

⁶ Pir Haly or Pir `Ali refers to Kar-Kiya Mirza `Ali, ruler of Lahejan. Laheji, p. 103.

⁷ Esma'il came to Lahejan in 1494 and left in 1499, thus, he only stayed there for five years.

⁸ That is he lived from what people gave him.

⁹ Esma'il allegedly was born on Tuesday 25 Rajab 872 or 17 July 1487. Given that he was 22 years old, this implies that this text may have been written in 1508 rather than earlier as suggested in the Introduction.

of stature, thickset and erect. He is very severe in [the pursuit of] justice in such a way that now all his officials appointed over many a town and province, whom he has found to have taken the goods of private persons or to have committed some other crime, he had them all killed and appointed others in their stead.^١ He is as open-handed as it is possible to say. (al-Qomi 1363, vol. 1, pp. 62, 71; Montazer-Saheb 1349, p. 525; Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 51-52) He does not accumulate money or wealth; he does not care about it. He spends and hands out so much that many believe that he has knowledge of hidden treasures, so that when he needs gold he has it dug it up where it is located. He drinks wine, but in private,^٢ and eats pork meat.^٣ As one of his servants told me recently, he had a pig in his house and fed it [to become] fat and big, which, to vilify the [Great] Turk, called it *el conduchar baisit*.^٤ He likes all virtuous works, be it handicrafts or education, and, when somebody makes him a worthy present then he pays twice of thrice its value, so that nobody ever leaves him [end page 4] who is not content or satisfied. He is revered by his people as a prophet and to get more fame he does not let himself seen other than with a covered and veiled face.^٥ In carnal matters, quite properly, he heeds the country's customs.^٦ In accordance with their custom, he has [female] slaves, but he has married none of

١. In a letter dated 26 August 1504, Joanne Rotha (sic) wrote from Aleppo that the Sophy did not allow anyone to interfere with the passage of caravans. Therefore, a single man could safely travel from Astarabad to Tabriz with gold in the palm of his hand. Scarcia Amoretti 1979, p. 73.

٢. Esma'il was an alcoholic, who drank in public and prided himself on being able to drink anyone under the table.

٣. According to Constantino Lascari, Esma'il I ordered his pigs from Cyprus. Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, p. 36. In 1505, Esma'il allegedly made an Ottoman ambassador eat pork telling him: "I eat it and you don't want to eat it?" Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, p. 81 (25/10/1505).

٤. *El conduchar baisit*, meaning *khondegar* Bayazid II. *Khondegar* is a Persian term meaning 'emperor, king' in particular used as the title of the Ottoman Sultan.

٥. This indicates that Esma'il still believed that he was the *na'eb-e Imam*, reflecting the artistic practice to depict prophets and Imams with a veiled face in Persian miniatures. The veiled face (*velato capite*) as well as the fact that he was venerated as Ali's substitute (*in loco de uno Ali*) and not as a king, but as a holy man and a prophet (*sancto et propheta*) is also confirmed by a Frenchman, who, in 1507, was in Esma'il's camp. Scarcia Amoretti 1979, pp. 139-40.

٦. Esma'il I was a very lascivious men, who had sexual relations with both women and boys. He had surrounded himself with a court that engaged in the same sexual debauchery. For details, see Aubin 1988, pp. 53-54; Floor 2008, pp. 322-24.

them so far.[\] And here ends the second part.

The third and last part still remains, which is about the amazing wars he waged, about which one should know that, when was driven away from his homeland and lived in Lahejan, his maternal uncle and chief enemy Ya`qub Beg died,^ʔ who, as has been stated above, had his father killed and had taken his land. Because of his death all of Persia was in arms and so much adversity and war happened that in less than two years the kingdom changed hands five times.^ʕ Because of this, the death of the chief enemy, the armies were busy continuously fighting each other, which made that Shah Esma'il was able to easily return to his homeland, and because he was much loved and revered there he took back the rule over his land. Having obtained this and stayed there for some time, he gathered a small army (if one wants to call 700 men^ʕ an army) and marched to a town called Symiacque [Shamakhi] not so far from his border. It is a place from where we receive much raw silk [called] *canari*, *thalani*, and *mamodeni*,^Δ which he unexpectedly immediately won, sacked and burnt it with fire and flames rather than that he miraculously took it with the men that were with him given that the city and land should have been sufficiently [able] to withstand a large and

[\] The French translation has here: "he has no female slaves at all unless they are joined in marriage [to him]." Lemaire 1997, pp. 245-46.

^ʔ Soltan Ya`qub died on 11 Safar 896 or 24 December 1490. His death led to a succession war, which sapped Aq-qoyunlu strength and facilitated the rise of the nominal leader of the Safavid order, Sheikh Esma'il.

^ʕ During 1490 - 1497, there were five Aq-Qoyunlu pretenders, who were competing for the throne, to wit: Beysanghor b. Ya`qub (1490-91), Rostam b. Maqsud b. Uzun Hasan (1490-97), Ahmad Gövde b. Ughurlu Mohammad b. Uzun Hasan (1497), Alvand b. Yusof b. Uzun Hasan (1497-1504), and Mohammad b. Yusof b. Uzun Hasan (1497-1500).

^ʕ This number is also in Lemaire 1997, p. 247; see also Jodogne 1980, p. 222 who notes that in the later Italian editions the number is given as 300. Therefore, the German translation also has 300 men. Esma'il left Lahejan with 20 men (al-Qomi 1363, vol. 1, p. 48; Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 187-88). Having arrived in Ardabil only 200 men promised to join him. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 47-88, 187-88. He had 300 men in Erzenjan (B. Khvandamir 1370, p. 45), but by August-September 1500 he had been gradually joined by 7,000 followers. Laheji 1352, p. 105; Ben Khvandamir 1370, pp. 51-57.

^Δ On these terms, see Molà 2000, p. 55; Scarcia 1969, pp. 199, 212.

powerful army of more than three thousand horsemen.^λ When he had done this his fame grew so big that daily from many parts and lands many people of his sect and religion joined him and this because, through their books [they knew] that a new prophet of their religion would come, who would make it prosper and thrive and would [end page 5] subdue and destroy all others. In this connection I need to point out to Your Serenity that the Mohammedan sect is divided into 72 main sects, as stated in the Koran, their law, from which they know that of the 72 [sects] only one will enter paradise and the others to the fires of hell, but it [the Koran] lets undecided which one of them will go to heaven.^ϣ Because of this each one maintains that its sect is the right one. Of these 72 the Soffica [sic; the Sufis of the Safavid order]^ϣ is the one and they believe that it is the only one that leads people into paradise and they say this Shah Esma'il has been sent by God to reveal it [i.e. the sect] to everybody, and to increase and expand it [Shi'ism] and to thoroughly destroy the other seventy-one in such a manner, if possible, that no memory would remain of them and would be relegated to oblivion. Because of this, nobody in Shah Esma'il's army is paid, just like when we go on a Crusade. Therefore, from many parts of Asia people from his religion come to join him^ϣ with wife and children, if they are not

λ. The people of Shamakhi had fled from the city before Esma'il's arrival. The sources don't report any military activity against the city, let alone burning it. Perhaps Rota or his source confused the massacre of Shamakhi's inhabitants and the destruction of the city and its environs by Soltan Heydar, Esma'il's father, in 1488. Khvonji 1996, p. 62; Parsadust 1375, pp. 152, 258-59.

ϣ. On this subject, see Goldziher 1971, p. 154.

ϣ. Initially, Esma'il acted as Sheikh Esma'il, the *morshed* or leader of the Safavid order. It is only, after Sheikh Esma'il had taken Tabriz in the fall of 1501 that he had the Shi'ite version of the *khotbah* read. Parsadust 1375, p. 277. Although he declared himself to be a Shi'ite, nobody in Esma'il's entourage owned even a handbook on Shi'ism. To guide them on this righteous path they had to search hard and long in Tabriz before a long forgotten text, the *Qawa'id al-Ahkam* by Motahhar al-Hilli was accidentally found in a qadi's house. Parsadust 1375, p. 282. For the time being, it sufficed for Esma'il's supporters to curse the first three khalifehs and support Shah Esma'il and kill anybody who opposed him. Much of the practice of the beliefs of Esma'il and his followers showed that it had more in common with ancient Turkic customs and shamanism than with Islam, see Aubin 1988, pp. 44-48.

ϣ. According to the Venetian reports the fact that Esma'il distributed all the booty to his followers and kept nothing for himself "This had the desired result, for even those who were not Sufis, flocked to his banner. In this, in the course of a few days, he had more than 4,000 men, among them, many adventurers in great numbers, who were attracted by the lure of booty and gore. Thus he gathered

hindered and forbidden by their chiefs and lords, as these last two or three years the Turkish king Baisit [sic; Bayazid II] has done.¹ Because he saw this Shah Esma'il's army grow as well as his might and territory, he drove by force all those from Anatolia, who professed [their adherence to] his sect and religion, who numbered as many as ten thousand and had their faces marked, so that they could be recognized by anyone, sent them to Romania and that they might not assemble without great difficult he dispersed them over various regions, far away from one another, such as in the faraway border areas of Greece, Albania, Bosina [sic; Bosnia], and Serbia. I was told [this] by a Turk, a respectable person, who had seen them in Modone.² I leave it to Your Serenity to consider, whether the things that are told about him are not fables, given that with all the great power that he has the Turkish king fears that of Shah Esma'il.

But let's return to our subject. After his victory at Shamakhi his army increased such in size, both foot and horse, that it numbered about one thousand or less,³ and it was bolstered to come to the most noble town of Tauris (sic; Tabriz), the capital of the kingdom of the Persians, [end page 6] to boldly attack king Aluant [sic; Alvand], who at that time was its king, and to do battle with him. He had an army, apart from foot, of five thousand horse, he [Esma'il] broke and defeated it and obtained the rule

5,000 men. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 47-49, 187-88.

1. In 1502, Shah Esma'il's ambassador brought Bayazid II a letter with the Shah's complaint that the Ottoman authorities had prevented his followers to move from Anatolia to Iran, and he asked Bayazid II to allow their free movement in the future. Esma'il I's argument was that the travelers were pilgrims who came to visit the center of his order at Ardabil, as they had done for decades, rather than soldiers joining his cause. In his reply to Sayyed, not Shah, Esma'il, Bayazid II promised that he would allow free movement of Safavid adherents under certain restrictions, because full-scale departure would hurt the economy and weaken the military levies of Anatolia. Therefore, he would allow new pilgrims to leave, after the old ones had returned, which was, of course, not acceptable to Esma'il I. Feridun Bey 1274, pp. 345-46 (received Safar 908/6 August-3 September 1502). For an analysis, see in particular Allouche 1980, pp. 70-82. On the measures taken by the Ottoman government to prevent this emigration, see Yildirim 2008, pp. 303-15.

2. On this subject, see Sohrweide 1965, pp. 95-221. Venetian reports indeed confirm the marking of the faces of the deported Qizilbash. Scarcia Amoretti 1979, p. 12 (27/07/1502). Modone is the Venetian name for the town of Methoni in Messenia (Peleponnesus – Greece).

3. Esma'il divided the Shamakhi booty among his soldiers. This exploit made him famous and new recruits arrived. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 51-52, 187-78.

over Tabriz. Whence it was confirmed that he committed the greatest cruelty against the Turkmen[\] (thus are called the soldiers of this land) and not only against men, but also against women and prostitutes. He had them all killed in various ways. And because he could not take revenge on Ya`qub Beg, his maternal uncle, because he had died, who, as I have reported in the foregoing had killed his father and had taken his land, he went to his tomb, which was very magnificent and beautiful as befits such a king, and he had it totally razed and smashed into pieces, so that no sign of it remained. He had the bones taken out from the grave and had these all burnt and the ashes thrown into the wind.^ʔ When his mother, Ya`qub Beg's sister learnt about this, who was with Esma`il her own son, she took courage, both because he was her son and because he still an adolescent, took him to task about this. He found this punishment so severe and vexatious that he immediately had his own mother seized and killed. Some say that he killed her with his own hands.^ʔ Because of the above reasons, day by day, his army grew and it became more audacious and powerful. Because of the great cruelty that he committed against the Turkmen and their relatives they greatly feared the name of the Sophy. Despite all that king Alvand had not lost heart, even though he had been defeated in battle and expelled from the kingdom. On the contrary, full of courage and energy he raised a new army that was even more powerful than the previous one, favored by all lords and soldiers of the country. He put it into proper order and marched against Tabriz and when he was near it he called the Sophy to the battlefield; in accordance with the ancient custom of the armies of that land, who never attack farmed lands [around the cities] and do not destroy and damage them,

[\]. Although European authors continued to refer to Safavid soldiers as Persians, they were mostly Turkic tribesmen, see Sumer 1371.

^ʔ. The tombs of the Aq-Qoyunlu kings and of those lords who had been present when Soltan Heydar died were opened and their bones burnt. According to Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, 104-05, 189-91. Aubin 1988, p. 46 has argued that this act may be a shamanistic ritual due to the belief that a person's soul lives on in his bones. Esma`il had started disinterring Soltan Joneyd's enemies already in 1501, when he was at Baku. Khvandamir 1362, vol. 4, pp. 461-62; Qomi 1363, vol. 1, p. 66.

^ʔ. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 104-05, 189-91. According to Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, p. 22 (27/11/1502) his mother was still alive in November 1503. In fact, Esma`il had another of his father's wives beheaded, because she had remarried one of the men, who had been at the battle where his father died.

but always fight in the countryside and whoever is victorious there becomes lord of the land. When the felicitous Sophy learnt this, he gathered his entire army [end page 7] that was twice or thrice less in bravery and strength than king Alvand's, boldly advanced to attack him and defeated him, and crushed and killed the greater part of the enemy; returned with a large booty; few escaped. This event caused so much terror in the hearts of the Turkmen - they are those of whom I have said above that in this land they always held the military arts in their hands - that as soon as they heard the name of the Sophy they all fled trembling, and did not stop until they were where they believed they were safe. Shah Esma'il returned victoriously to Tabriz with so much glory and fame that after this victory more than before many of his people joined him, and so many that in a few days his army grew to six thousand and more in number.^١ It now came to pass that Morat Can [sic; Morad Khan] learnt that his first cousin king Alvand had died - also called his nephew - to whom he had ceded the rule of Tabriz by agreement, while he had taken the rule of a most noble city in Persia named Siras [sic; Shiraz],^٢ which [is known] for its very fine steel, and where are all kinds of splendid arms made, be it for men or horse, about which I feel unable to satisfactorily have an opinion. Thus, he learnt of the massacre, the dishonor and the killing by Shah Esma'il of the Turkmen, of their wives and their children and therefore, being very cautious in matters of war, recognizing that the longer he continued raising an army against him, the more his force would be growing, he decided to raise a powerful army against the aforesaid Sophy as soon as possible and thus he did. He gathered all his forces to the last man and out of caution he thought, "if I only once triumph over the Sophy then I will be a steadfast and strong

١. After Esma'il had taken Tabriz in the summer of 1501, Alvand fled to Diyarbekr where he raised new troops, with whom he returned to Tabriz in May of 1502. Esma'il had just left for Eastern Anatolia to invade Dhu'l-Qadr territory to subdue 'Ala al-Dowleh. When Esma'il learnt that that Alvand had returned to Tabriz he hurried back to Tabriz, where he arrived in October 1502. On arrival he found that Alvand had fled again to Diyarbekr. Alvand was unable to raise new troops and, after having failed to get Mamluk support, sought protection of 'Ala al-Dowleh. For the end of Alvand, see Aubin 1988, pp. 22-23.

٢. In early 906/the summer or fall of 1500, an agreement was reached between Alvand and Morad to divide the Aq-qoyunlu dominions in two parts at the Qizil-Uzan River. Alvand received Diyarbekr, Arminiye, Azerbaijan, Moghan, and Aran, while Morad received the two 'Eraqs, Kerman, and Fars. Woods 1976, pp. 171-73, 292, n. 123.

king without any opposition in all of Persia,” and so it would have been if these events had occurred as he wished. Therefore, he gathered in a few days a fine, powerful, and very strong army of twelve thousand horsemen covered with the finest, beautiful and exquisitely worked armor with a large number of battle-hardened foot soldiers and departed with the army on the road to [end page 8] Tabriz and took with him, after ancient Persian custom, all his wives and children.^١ This came to the ears of Shah Esma`il, who energized like a dragon and furious like a lion almost over night gathered his small army, both foot and horse, which did not number more than eight thousand, and was unequal in strength to that of the aforesaid Morad Khan. He [Esma`il] was so eager for battle that he could not wait in Tabriz for his enemy to come to him, but courageously he marched towards Shiraz^٢ - the two cities are at a distance of 20 days journey from one another - and so much did both armies advance towards each other that they met right in the middle of the route. At this point Shah Esma`il did not tarry, although his force was much weaker than Morad Khan’s army, nevertheless he was the first to attack and to inflict wounds. In the first encounter the Sophy had the worst part of the outcome and many of his men were killed. Despite this they never turned away, not because of gold or status, but they fought for [their] faith and none of them feared death, because they believe that if they die they go to paradise.^٣ Just like wild boars they continued to fight ferociously, walked over the dead bodies of their comrades without any fear and fought there where the battle was most severe. They fought so much longer and bravely that they broke and smashed Morad Khan’s entire army, an event that truly is more miraculous and divine than

١. Morad did not march to Tabriz. In fact, Esma`il left Tabriz in May 1503 (end 908) (at *Nowruz*, Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, p. 199) and marched towards Hamadan, where Morad and his army were. Here a battle took place on 24 Dhu'l-Hejja 908/20 June 1503 near Alma Bulaghi. Parsadust 1375, p. 289.

٢. After his defeat at Hamadan, Morad fled to Fars pursued by Esma`il. Morad entered Shiraz in September 1503. Ghaffari-Qazvini 1343, p. 268; Qomi 1363, p. 81. He then fled to Baghdad. He then approached ‘Ala al-Dowleh, who welcomed him and gave him one of his daughters in marriage. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, p. 199.

٣. For the almost divine admiration of Esma`il by his followers, see Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, pp. 115, 206. The Ostajalu considered him the *moqaddameh-ye zaman* or Precursor of the Lord of Time. Shirazi 1369, p. 38. In general, see Glassen 1971 and Willem Floor and Mohammad Faghfoory, “Shah Esma`il – Deputy of the Hidden Imam?” (forthcoming).

human. The killing was innumerable; of the prisoners none were spared, but for the women whom he gave in marriage to his men. He acquired great booty of supply wagons [the baggage train], the finest arms and the most beautiful horses. With a few men, Morad Khan fled towards Bagaded [sic; Baghdad], where, until my departure from Soria [sic; Syria] he still was.¹ After the victory by the courageous and fortunate Sophy, he went with his army to Shiraz, which he reached in a few days, entered it and assumed [end of page 9] the rule of the aforesaid city without any struggle. Here he remained for many months, because it is a city filled with arms with which it was easy to strengthen the army. Here his army became larger than normal, because in numbers it reached over fifty thousand. He made the army that in the beginning was almost without arms into one that was most splendid and well accoutered, which, anyone who saw it, would consider being something amazing and wonderful. Now, in the Persian realm there did not remain a single opponent of note to the Sophy, except for one lord and commander of a very staunch people, who had seven castles that because of its very impregnable and strong location no Persian king, not even Uson Cassano [sic; Uzun Hasan],² had been able to take, he then decided to undertake this notable feat. This was not easy for him, because he was occupied for more than two years in constant fighting and besieging them and many of his men were killed, among whom his principal officer. But in the end he took them all and returned victoriously.³ Thereafter, he took many large towns in Media and Persia, amongst which one called Here [sic; Herat], a very big city. Of the others I do not know the names. He then went to Straua [sic; Astarabad] and Corassan [sic; Khorasan] and en route he took a very strong castle from a Turkmen chief, who, all the time, robbed many merchants who passed by to go to Tabriz. This victory brought him quite a large treasure and much silk of various kinds

¹. Morad Khan went to Aleppo and in vain asked for help from the Mamluks. Barbaro-Contarini 1873, vol. 2, p. 199.

². The French translation has “except for,” which is the opposite of the meaning of the Italian word ‘neanche’ (i.e. ‘not even’) that is used here.

³. This probably refers to the campaign against Hoseyn Kiya Cholavi or Cholabi in Ramadan-Dhu'l-Hijjah 1504. Fort Golkhandan, Firuzkuh and Fort Asta/Osta were taken and Hoseyn Kiya was burnt alive. Laheji 1352, p. 159; Parsadust 1375, pp. 290-92.

that recently the aforesaid [Turkmen] chief had taken by force from several merchants.^١ He also conquered many [other] towns and lands the names of which I cannot recall. At the time of my departure from Aleppo, he was with his army at eight days journey from Tabriz to conquer a strong castle, the only one in Persia that had remained in the hands of the Turkmen. I am certain that since then he has taken it, given the big and mighty army that he has with him now, which number 410 thousand, among which are 100 thousand [end page 10] horses covered with the finest armor, according to merchants who recently came from there, who have informed me. They also report that he has distributed the governorships of all the towns of the Sultan as well as those of the Turkish king among his commanders. The said merchants also state that after he has taken the aforementioned castle, he with his entire army will march to Baghdad and through Mesopotamia will come to Armenia Major and Minor,^٢ where he may descend without any opposition. Having arrived there, he will find himself at the borders of Alidoli [sic; `Ala al-Dowleh]^٣ and of the Turkish king, and may decide to do whatever he thinks is best and to stay there as long as he likes it.

Herewith comes to an end [the part about] his amazing wars, which is the last part of our report that although it is still rather rough, simple and unadorned, nevertheless it would bring me great pleasure and be a boon to learn that I have given satisfaction to Your Serenity. *Que diu nobis et patrie foelicissima valeat.*^٤

Cum gratia et privilegio/ with gratitude and honor

End.

New information from the knighthood

^١ This probably refers to the same campaign against Hoseyn Kiya Cholavi. Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, p. 73 (26/08/1504).

^٢ Greater Armenia roughly encompassed the area stretching from the Euphrates River in the west, the region of Artsakh and parts of Iranian Azerbaijan to the east, parts of the modern state of Georgia to the north, with its southern boundary abutting the northern tip of Mesopotamia. Armenia Minor refers to the land lying west and northwest of the river Euphrates.

^٣ Ala al-Dowleh Dhu'l-Qadr against whom he marches in the spring of 913/May 1507-1508.

^٤ May our God and fatherland be the most auspicious.

The Sophi soldiers`against the Sultan and the Moslem Turk.

We have received much new information here./ First, that the great Diadare of Cayro`when he arrived in Damasco/and marched against the Arabs/who defeated him/ and sadly have destroyed and shattered him./ Nevertheless this new information is true and reliable/ truly, about him we have new and recent information from one month and less ago/that comes from those parts/one of the news items averred that the Sophy had sent one of his ambassadors/to His Majesty the King of Hungary/because he waged war against the Turks/reason why the said Sophy will soon be on the other side with a large army/which embassy was discovered in Angori and was arrested and taken to Constantinople/and all its members immediately cut to pieces.ʸ The said Sophy/thought [end page 11] to have found another route to come to Suria [sic; Syria]/verily all these lands fall apart of fear. In Aleppo it is ordered to prepare a field for the said Sophy/about whom we learn that at Aynan Arafse and Antepanʳ forty thousand men have been fielded/ and at Antiochia with the Gulf fifty thousand, who after the *Feria*Δ will march to various countries/and Alladoli [sic; `Ala al-Dowleh], when he learnt this news/he immediately sent an envoy to the aforesaid Sophy./ It is said to give him a safe-conduct/ during 15 days/so that he might come in person to him/to talk to him./ And thus he has given him a safe-conduct/and he came to him with two hundred of his knights/ and it is said/ that the first thing was/that the said Alla doli had dismounted from afar/ and continued on foot with all his retainers/and threw himself at the feet of the said Sophy/saying that he is a local lord/and that he wants to be his slave/that is as much as a sold one and servant/with all his towns and castles/ and that he wants to have a good peace with him./ The said Sophy said nothing else in reply, /therefore he wants to pray with all his people, after this prayer had been done/he told him [ʿAla al-Dowleh] that he went forth with God/because

ʸ The German text here has *Treybentē*, which I read as *trabanten*, or foot soldiers.

ʳ "The Great Diadare, the last Mamluke Sultan" Anderson 1732, p. 386.

ʴ On the mention of this embassy, see Lemaire 1997, p. 259, note 399; Göllner 1994, vol. 1, p. 40.

ʵ I have not been able to identify these places in Syria.

Δ *Feria* or market festival, often in observance of a religious holiday.

why am I an enemy/ to all those who prayed at mid-day/and my sword will never again wait as long as this lineage is in the world,/therefore I do not want you to be my servant in this manner./ When the said Alladoli returned in his country/ and prepared himself with much fear./ Therefore, I tell you/that we receive new information about these matters every day.

It is said that the said Sophy is a good friend of the Christians/and its religion/and that he takes with him the Patriarch of Armenia/with many monks and priests/and twenty thousand brave Armenian men/that he keeps about him/and wherever he lays siege/ he orders the mosques to be razed/ and to let stand the churches of the Christians./ He drinks wine/rather with abandon/ just like us/he eats pork meat./ It is said/ that four quires of paper would not suffice to write the things that they [end page 12] say about the man./ I believe it is true/that this is the one, who will destroy the Mohammedan belief/ That god wants this is submitted/by Priamo Malimpiero/who reports on August 9 from the town of Cogno [sic: Konya]^λin Caromonia [sic; Karaman]^ϛand which is now moving away from Lord Peter^δ with the greatest fear/ in the entire surrounding country/thus he had received an order/from the Great Turk through two *vlachi*./ Vlachi means something like a courier^Ϟ who had to

λ. In 1502, the Venetians reported that the Sophy had “three Armenian priest with him, who *per anno octo continui* are there as his preceptors, reading the Evangel and our sacred scripture.” Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, p. 23 (27/11/1502).

ϛ. A high Venetian official in Cyprus.

Ϟ. After the conquest of Karaman the Ottomans moved its provincial capital to Konya in 1483.

ϟ. On Karaman and its rulers, see F. Sümer, “Karaman-oghullari,” *Encyclopedia of Islam*2. This refers to the *Deposition fata a li magnifici signori rectori di Cypri per domino Priamo Malipiero, del magnifico missier Dionisio, novamente venuto del Cogno et Caramania* (24 August 1507). Scarcia-Amoretti 1979, pp. 105-06.

Δ I have not been able to identify this person.

Ϟ. The term *vlachi* (in the Italian original *ulachi*) was used by the ancient Germanic peoples to describe inhabitants of the former Roman Empire, who were largely Romanized and spoke Latin or Celtic languages. The term *vlachi* is probably derived from the name of the Celtic Volcae, a tribe living near the German tribes. The name of the Romanian principality of Walachia is a remembrance of their presence in that region. Their Slav neighbors, borrowing the term from the Goths, gave them the name Vlachi (or Vlasi), while the Vlachs call themselves Romani, Romeni, or Aromani. Kelley L. Ross (2003). “Decadence, Rome and Romania, the Emperors Who Weren't, and Other Reflections on Roman History”. *The Proceedings of the Friesian School*.

move quickly and rapidly/and that he[\]should see to it with all care/ that his orders were to mobilize as many people as he could/and likewise the said Turkish lord/also sent the [same] command to the lord of Satagli^ʔthat he should prepare himself./ Thereafter, came three *vlachi*/one after the other with short intervals/ and all in one day/ [ordering that] everybody should mount up/ and ride vigorously to the Dangori region [sic; Ankara] named Cassaria [sic; Kayseria]/that they made there the army's muster/and that from many parts and lands people rode swiftly and all went to the said places of Dangori and Cassari./ The much lauded Sophy was near the border of Trapezonta [sic; Trabson]/and from Asia/ where he stood with an impressive army/ most of which was covered with armor/ as were their horses/ with white steel/ numbering more than an estimated forty thousand or more/without [counting] the innumerable foot soldiers/ and other kinds of mounted people./ And this is a major thing to say/I want to remain silent whether one can believe that,/ because / the innumerable people that live around there,/who are mostly subjects of the Great Turk,/ all join the said Sophy/ crying, saying and maintaining/that he is sent by God./ This has been learnt from persons who returned from the said place/where the Sophy is staying./ All of them report the same/ as to the manner in which has made the Great Turk fear him much / as well as all his commanders/so that they feared to march forth/ because of this kind of new information and rumors./ Therefore, one of them departed from Constantinople/recently and it is reported that the Great Turk in person is [end of page 13] en route/with his army/ because he saw and heard about the fear that his commanders and pashas had because of the great and positive reputation of this Sophy/ who was extending his great freedom/ and the very best brotherhood and justice/ that he accorded everybody/ in such a manner/ that innumerable people follow him/ who take their wives and children with them/all in accordance with Persian custom./

According to the *Encyclopedie methodique: economie politique et diplomatique*, vol. 2 (Paris, Liege 1786), p. 3, the term *ulachi* refers to black Italians or *valaques* or Bosnian mountaineers. See also the *Cambridge History of Turkey*. Cambridge 2006, vol. 3, p. 159 for a slightly different explanation.

[\] Presumably Lord Peter.

^ʔ Satalia, not Antalya (Turkey).

They believe/when they die with him/ that they will go to paradise/because they do not wage war to rule/nor to be feared, but only for their faith [in him]/ whom they worship/ and seldom does one see him with uncovered face./ They say he is 24 years old. A Milanese merchant named Dionisio/ who came from Trapezonta/ confirms this./ viz., that he has marched through Caramania/ and says that he has seen the pasha of Caramania/who marched with ten thousand horse/and with five thousand foot soldiers./ He also awaits [another] ten thousand foot soldiers from the Dangori [Ankara] and Cassaria [Kayseri] region./ The general commander of the Turkish army is the pasha of Natalia [Anatolia]/ whose name is Belliarbe.ʸ One says that so far he is there with eighty thousand men both foot and horse in Angori and Cassaria. And from the Great Turk it has become known that he wants/ to muster a large and powerful army and to be able to do so he has imposed a substantial fiscal contribution on the people/to pay the men who march to war./ The said Dionisio, the Milanese merchant maintains/ that the Great Turk has written to the said commander/ named Belliarbei/that he soon has to break up/and march forth/and that meanwhile he had to destroy the land of Alladoli because the lord of that land has been the reason/ that the Sophi has advanced so far/ as he had given him support and the army passage through his land./ Meanwhile, when the army of the Great Turk was making preparations to march against the said Alladoli/ to cause damage to this lord/ several *vlachi* or couriers came here/ having scouted the country in various towns/ how the army of the Great Sophy marched against a famous Turkish town, which is called Arzmeniaʷwhich is situated in the land of the Turk./ When they [end of page 14] learnt such news/the Turkish army did not want to march any more to the city/ where they had decided to go./ This Dionisio said/ when he was staying in Angori [Ankara] on 29 August/that new tidings came, which confirmed for/the commander of the Turkish army/ that the Great Sophy had taken then the city of Arzmenia/and that he had made it his possession/and [that of] his court [and] his entire army/and he reinforces that location,/ which new tiding very much upset the Turkish army./ This was also confirmed from Cogno [sic; Konya]/by many

ʷ This was Qaragöz Pasha, *begler-begi* of Anatolia.

ʸ Presumably, Erzerum.

merchants/who had received there new tidings/ such as that Camallo^١ was with 29 sails at war/ that he waged in the Sea of Chaicia^٢ to smite the son of Carmanico the elder^٣ who is called there Ramadaogli,^٤ who was in the environs of Alexandria/and believed that at this location near the sea of Chaicia/ one would find six thousand Mamluks/ sent at the orders of the Sultan [of Egypt] at the request of the Turk/ to expel one chief of various Arab mountains/ who is called Alladoli,/ which ruler is also a reason that the Sophy came/ as he gives him passage and support/that he was able to,/ because many chiefs subject themselves to the Sophy/ and innumerable people,/ which is one reason of the Turk's fear/and of the Sultan's/ that which will follow daily/you will be informed about.

^١. This is Kemal Reis, who was admiral of the Ottoman navy from 1494 until his death in December 1510.

^٢. Chaicia, Chalcia, Karka or Karkava, a small island situated near Rhodos.

^٣. Probably referring to Turgutoğlu Mahmud Bey (1483-1487), the last Karamanid ruler.

^٤. Ramazanoğlu.

Letter from Napoli in Romania^λ

The news is that on the 17th of the past month/ the Sophy was only for three days in the land of the Turk/ nevertheless every day his people went to the border of the said Turkish lord/ to do him the greatest damage./ Therefore to defend the country, the Bellibarbei [sic; *begler-begi*] of Natalia [sic; Anatolia]/ was made pasha/and because he knew the great danger/ he declined it/ saying/ that he did not want to go there/ and [then the Great Turk] made him on pain of death/ to accept this task. Thus forced/ he prepared the largest army/ had his men march through Natalia/however, he very reluctantly executes this task. [end page 14]

Letter received from the consul of Scio.^ϣ

The news is about the Armada/that is the naval fleet in Constantinople/ of 150 ships/ for the most part new galleys/ and one barque [?].^ϣ As I have said in my letter/ these are being equipped/ it is believed that they will sail during the current month./ One awaits from hour to hour the ship from Copa^Δ/through which one will received the truth and of all affairs/so that Your Eminence may know.

Yesterday one received from the factor of the merchants,/ who was constantly at the *Passagli*^Δ how the Turkish lord has sent troops on

^λ Nafplion fell to the Venetians (who called it Napoli di Romania) in the late 14th century; it was held by the Ottomans from 1540 to 1686, then by the Venetians until 1715, and then again by the Ottomans until 1822, when after their ouster it became the first capital of the Kingdom of Greece. According to the second Italian edition, the only one that has dates for the four letters, this letter is dated 4 August 1507 (*Littere date da Napoli de Romania quarto de di Agosto M.d.vii*). Jordogne 1980, p. 215, n. 2.

^ϣ Scio is the Italian rendering of the name of the Greek island of Chios is in the Northeastern Aegean Sea midway between the islands of Samos and Lesbos. The island is only 8 km from the west coast of Turkey; it is the fifth largest island in Greece. It was held by Genoese until 1566, when it came under Ottoman occupation until 1822. According to the second Italian edition of Rota's *La Vita*, the only one that has dates for the four letters, this letter is dated 3 September 1507 (*Littere hauute dal Consule de Scio tertio di Settembre M.d.vii*). Jordogne 1980, p. 215, n. 2.

^ϣ Here the German text has: *in ainer Barcke*, literally: 'in one barque,' which does not make sense here.

^ϣ I have been unable to identify this place.

^Δ Presumably the bazaar.

receiving information to assist/ in the reconstruction of the new and the old fortress,/ which is partly in ruins. The Sophy has captured and beheaded the son of the lord of Lonadoaula [sic; 'Ala al-Dowleh] his old enemy/ and the land of that lord is on the border at a location bordering the land of the Sultan [of Egypt]/ the other part with that of the Turk./ He had asked the Turk for help/ and [the latter] had sent orders throughout Natalia/that all the *timorati*[¶] had to ride to assist the said Mandaula [sic; 'Ala al-Dowleh]/on pain of [losing] their head/ and already the *singiacho* [*sanjaqchi*][¶] of the Tara/ has gone there with his *timorati* [*timarli*]/. Likewise, yesterday came here from Crasso[¶] a messenger, Proteioro, from the said location/ who has confirmed to me that which I have written above/and has told me/ that he as messenger has ridden to all *timorati* [*timarli*]/ and just before his departure from there/ otherwise he had not been allowed to come hither. Et cetera.

After the letter of July 30 our citizen found himself in conversation/ with the said secretary/ of the Fabulario of Morca^Δ named Cernota/who is a Christian,/ who told him/that on the 29th of the said month/ that a messenger had come from the Porte to the said Fabulario,/ who brought an order to Fabulario/ that he should mobilize all *timarii* [*timarli*] and Turks/ that are to be found in Morca [Bursa?]/and to make them ready/so that might ready to march/ against the Sophy following the next order/ which order had been sent throughout Serbia, Albania, Bosnia/ and all other places/to the same [end of page 15] purpose/ and that a son of the Great Lord [i.e. the Ottoman Sultan] had sent three thousand horse/ to oppose and to suppress such intention,/ who captured three thousand of the Sophy's men/ and he had them roasted alive/ and two he had flayed/ and he had them all suffer a terrible death,/ because he had learnt/ that

λ. Two grandsons of 'Ala al-Dowleh were captured during the 1507 campaign and then prepared as kebabs and eaten by the Qizilbash. Sa'd ed-Din 1280, vol. 2, p. 131.

¶. This refers to the *timarli sepahis*, holders of a piece of land called *timar*. The proceeds of this land constituted their pay in return for their military service.

¶. The *sanjak* was a subdivision of a province or *eyalat*. The chief of the *sanjak* was known as *sanjakchi*.

¶. I have not been able to identify this place.

Δ I have neither been able to identify this person nor his title.

the Turk had decided to send the pasha against the Sophy with so many people as there had assembled before him./ The said Cernota also added/that more than 25 Turks have escaped from the Sophy/with money and many presents/and when the Fabulario of Morca/ realized the very great danger/ he had written to his Suesso[\] /who is close to the Porte/ that his person is in great danger, partly because of the prestige of Spagina^ʃ/who says he has doubts/ and requests him/that does not want him from Morca/ neither him nor his court/ and alone all the other people/ and so he ever might be needed/ then he would go and also subject himself to the Turk.

Letter from bene in bene Salernitano^ʃ

Sent to the Eminent Arnolfo Salernitano^ʃ from Damascus. The news in Damascus is that a king in Persia has arisen/ called Sophy./ In truth he is more divine/ than otherwise/at the border of the Turk/and therefore, the Turk had inflicted on him various extraordinary things/ that are utterly incomprehensible/ both to him and some of his cities./ Although he is but a small worm compared to the Turk/ he arose against the said Turk/ to take revenge for his injustice./ The Sophy was said to have burnt/ a castle called Ventas,^Δ which had three hundred hearths. The Sophy had with him four thousand horse/ and ten thousand foot/ and one of his commanders/ called Busia^ʒ who is forty years old/ strong and of great reputation./ As they came to the said castle/ and stormed it/although the Turk had about five thousand mercenaries in the castle/because it was close the border of Persia./ He attacked it for two or three hours/ and then took it/and found therein thirty or forty Jews/he

[\] I have not been able to identify this person.

^ʃ I have not been able to identify this person.

^ʃ According to the second Italian edition, the only one that has dates for the four letters, this letter is dated 20 January 1508 (*Littera de bene in bene Salernitano mandata al magnifico Arnolfo Salernitano. XX. Ienaro. M. d.viii in Damasco*). Jordogne 1980, p. 215, n. 2.

^ʃ Member of a well-known Venetian family, which supplied some Doges to the city.

^Δ I have not been able to identify this place.

^ʒ Properly, Pasha.

had their eyes [end of page 16] taken out/and let them go./ And of women and men he killed about ten thousand persons,/ in addition to the mercenaries of the Turk./ Immediately thereafter quite a few other castles thereabouts/ informed and begged him/ that they all wanted to adore the cross/ as does the Sophy./ All that he gains/ belongs to the entire community./ He moves around without a beret on his head/ and is a man of few words/ and has the greatest reputation/ and has about thirty years/ rather less than more./ He is courageous in the manner of how they become victorious/ and marches through the kingdom of Trabisonda [sic; Trabson]/ called the realm of Bemfarmio,ʸ The Turk heard/ that he burns everything in this realm/ and he thought that his rule had been lost./ He [therefore] sent one of his sons named Catello/ a brave man with four thousand men/who came at Tacaro [sic; Tokat?]/ where a battle took place/ on a plain called Mesto,/ but in reality that location was another Roncivalle,ʞ because here also a big battle took place/ because the Sophy defeated the Turk and killed thirty thousand persons/ as well as the son of the Turkish ruler.ʟ Immediately this news tiding spread throughout the entire country/and in one month's time he took it/except for the town of Astur/which was surrounded on one side by a large river/ and as big as Napoli./ In it there were many troops of the kingdom who had gathered there/ and thus they lay there for some days/ until a bare foot monk made a bridge through craft/ because they could not cross the water/and the monk enabled three hundred persons to pass at one time/when the army crossed/ then it rested for four or five days/ and thereafter they say/ he savagely stormed it/ for eight or nine hours/ so that the dead bodies became ladders./ He is the first one/ who attacks/ and he behaves in the following manner before he goes to battle./ He

ʞ I have not been able to identify this term.

ʟ This refers to the battle of Roncesvalles in Spain, where, according to the 'Song of Roland', Charlemagne left a small band of soldiers commanded by Roland to defend the pass at Roncesvalles, which they did to the last man against a superior force of Saracens. It is an epic case of the utmost heroism.

ʟ The author of this letter invented this story, which continues until the end of this letter, because there was no battle between Esmā'il and the son of the Turkish Soltan, in which the latter died. Also, none of the other events described there occurred. The intent of the author clearly was to raise hope for a second front in the rear of the Ottomans, which would weaken their penetration into Europe. On this subject, see the Introduction of this article.

kneels on the ground/ and raises his hands to heaven/ and prays to God/ and the others, all those that are his, act in the same way./ When they have gotten up he then immediately begins the attack/in this manner that he never leaves the battle/ until he is the victor or dead./ In the city died about eighty thousand persons of his,/ he took the city and he had them all killed with the scimitar/ so that it is estimated/ that about two hundred thousand persons died there/ in the [end of page 15] manner/ that he did not withdraw/ until he had won six kingdoms./ Thereafter he marched against the kingdom of Messor[\] where he mustered his men/ and found that he had forty thousand horse/ and sixty thousand foot/ and in the kingdom the Turkish soldiers fled before him/ because he had so many men whose number truly is countless./ They follow him everywhere/ without recompense/ and immediately after they had won that kingdom/ they converted to our religion/before he demanded it from them./ They have now taken twelve kingdoms/ and he always wins them without slaughter and storming,/ because they believe he is a miraculous man./ He had a road cut through a mountain/ named Gazello^ʔ/ the most terrible [one],/ with manual labor/ to march into the kingdom of Intrue^ʔ/ which he traversed easily/ and if he had not made them cut through that mountain/ he would have had to take a roundabout way of about two hundred miles./ Nobody has been able to govern this kingdom of Intrue/ reason why its people are lawless, very savage and strange. This land produces the Mosto pearls/and other precious stones and the people dress like those in Curtica^ʔ and wear dragon skin as armor to protect themselves/ and on that several shields of tanned leather/ four or five lamb [skins] are needed for one [shield]/ and they are men without fear/ entirely naked/ from birth onwards very strong./ Because of this they have put up much resistance against him/ such that they expelled the Sophi from their lands about four times.

Finally the Sophi had many fireworks made/ in this way that he was

[\] Perhaps Messon, if so, then it is Amasiya.

^ʔ I have not been able to identify this mountain, which probably is fictitious.

^ʔ I have not been able to identify this place.

^ʔ I have not been able to identify this place.

able to wreak much death,/ but more among his own than among their people,/ but before he brought them and his banner/ they had to swear to him/ and gave him fifty thousand men of their own/ who are as good as one hundred thousand of the others/ and he immediately departed from this kingdom/ and came to the kingdom of Papallonia [sic; Babilonia or Iraq]/ that he very easily conquered./ There he found many savage people/, but rich in gold and silver,/ whom he now holds as his own people./ In this kingdom he had built two strong castles/ in whose entrance/ they made [guard?] houses./ He then moved to the kingdom of Silinche^λ, which he took/ and where he had many people killed/ as to one part and as to the other part/ he had found many Jews/ whom he had all killed [end of page 16] And he also found there many Christians/ whom he treated very well/ and he took many of them with him./ They have cast cannon for him/in such a manner/ that the Turk is very much upset/ and does not know what he should do./ He had wanted to give him the entire empire of Trabisonde/and two million gold pieces/ on condition that he would return again to Persia./ Therefore he has decided to take all of his land/of which the least one is the kingdom of Trabisonde/and the Turk has mobilized all his forces/and it does not help him much/ because on a daily basis he takes his land/ in such a way/ that it is an incredible thing to see/ such a large an army and with some many troops.^γ He leads twenty thousand horse with the cannon/with it are several Christians./ In this way/ that the Romans never had such an army as this/ apart from the cannon./ He still has to win one kingdom./ Here is it said/ that if he wins/ then he will march against Constantinople,/ and thereafter to the Slavic lands./ And he wants to make a law/ to set free/ the Christians in the towns that the Turk holds/and wants to come to Rome/it is believed to have himself baptized there/ and to kiss the feet of our Pontiff./ Then to march to the kingdom of Alla vallona^ϑand take

^λ Seleucia in Cilicia, now called Silifke (Mersin Province - Turkey).

^γ According to *Le baptesme*, Esma'il was marching to Trabisonde in 1508. However, according to Ottoman sources, in 1510, Esma'il sent a raiding party under one of his half-brothers against Trabson. Prince Selim killed many of them and took Esma'il's half-brother prisoner. Bacque-Gramont 1987, p. 24.

^ϑ In the original a la Valona, i.e. to Valona, which probably refers to Valona or Vlorë, a town and port in S.W. Albania, the center of the principality of Valona that included the town of Valona,

away this other part from the Turk./ It is said that he wants to give a gift of all these things to the Church of God./ Verily brother this is not even one thousand of a part/ because so great is his power/ of this man/ that one hears about him ever more/ that it is truly thought an impossible thing to believe/when I wrote this./ The same day a new tiding has come/that Prester John marches through India[\] and is coming now to Jerusalem/with four times hundred thousand Indians/ in this manner/that the great Khan takes great precautions in Jerusalem/ for it is believed that he wants to conquer Christ's tomb/which deed is God's will./ I do not write more about these matters/I hope in God to be with you in September/or in March next year,/ if not in September./ I beg you to write me through the de Sauli Bank^ʔ in Venice/ about some of the events in Italy,/ as I wish to know/ how they develop/ and give my regards to Master Paolo/ and tell him/than when I come/that I will bring him things/from the Levant. May God always protect you against evil in Damascus. Printed in Augsburg by Erhart ogling.

Berat and Fier. The principality was held by the Ottomans since 1417.

\. Prester John, the legendary Christian king popular in European chronicles and tradition from the 12th century onwards. Prester John was supposed to live in India (later in Ethiopia), and, although separated from Christendom in the West by a number of powerful Moslem states, he not only was able to defend his own lands, but regularly was depicted as coming to the assistance of the Christians threatened by the Turk. Beckingham, Charles. *Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost Tribes*, Aldershot 1996; Silverberg, Robert, *The Realm of Prester John*, Ohio University Press, 1996.

ʔ. This refers to the Genoese bank founded by Domenico Sauli, an important merchant-banker.

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***The Influence of the Centrality of Sultanieh
on the Political and Religious Situation of Dargazin***

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Abstract

Sultanieh has been one of the places which in Ilkhanid's period came to centrality and till many years after the downfall of Ilkhanids has been influential to its surrounding areas and has been influenced in return as well. One of such nearby areas which grew in light of the centrality and the political and economical importance of Sultanieh was in Dargazin to the west of Sultanieh. The economical and security needs of the capital, and the gaining support of the religious groups and scholars, have been three main factors in paying attention to the surrounding areas. The findings show that the necessity of ensuring the security of the capital and its economical needs, along with the geographical and political location of Dargazin, has played an important role on the interconnection of these two areas and the historical evolution of Dargazin. This study tries to benefit from the historical sources in order to examine the effect of Sultanieh centrality on the situation in Dargazin, and to determine the historical connection between the two cities in the political and social fields, and to explain some changes in this regard. This study is a library and source analysis research and the information is organized and analyzed after being collected.

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Keywords: Ilkhanid, Sultanieh, Hamadan, Dargazin, A'lam.

Introduction

“Dargazin” or its arabic “Darjazin” was one of the northeren areas of Hamadan and the center of a region called “A'lam /Almar,”[\]which in the middle centuries of Iran's history shared borders with Sultanieh and Zanjan to the west, Qazvin to the north, and Saveh to the east. The name of this site was first used in the lost book of “Nafsat-al-Masdur”, the compilation (532 A.H/1138 A.D.) of the minister of Anushirvan ibn Khalid Kashani, which was in mentioning the time in which the famous minister of Saljuqs “Abu al-Qasim Qawam al-Din Nasir ibn Ali Dargazini” (527 A.H/ 1133 A.D.) was in charge. Emad al-Din Kateb Esfahani (519-597 A.H/ 1125-1201 A.D.) and Yaqut Hamawi, (626 A.H/ 1229 A.D.) have cited this city as a city from the region “A'lam” and Qawam al-Din is the minister of there”(Yaqut,1995, p. 569). Emad Kateb referred to it describing “Dargazini the minister” that, “Ans Abad is a village from the county A'lam close to Dargazin. Qawam al-Din used to relate himself to Dargazin in that Dargazin is the biggest town of that region. Most of the citizens are either astray or religious.The majority of them are Khorramdin and they follow Mazdak” (Emad Kateb, 1997, p. 144). In Iraq's Saljuqi period (511-590 A.H/1117-1194 A.D), because some individuals from Dargazin had some positions of power in Saljuqis' government, this area was being focused. Especially at the time when Qawam al-Din Dargazini was minister and with his special care to his birthplace, it gained high position and reputation. From the downfall of Saljuqs till the gaining power of Ilkhanids, however, it lost its importance and eventually with announcing Sultanieh as the capital in the vicinity of Dargazin, once again it regained its former position. However, changing the capital often results in the abundance of food and prosperity in various regions which of course is not merely because of the great need of the population of the capital to the agricultural products but mostly because of security reasons, without which no development in the agriculture would happen and agriculture would be limited to a small stretch of field around the capital. This transformation was often temporary but sometimes it lasted (Lambton, 2013, p. 183). A look at the

[\] A'lam or Almar in the past was one of the great historical areas in Hamadan that was a large geographical area and Dargazin was at its center and its largest city.

history and evolutions of Dargazin during and after the time once Sultanieh was the capital tells us about many transformations in this area which continued even during and after the downfall of Ilkhanids. These transformations are apparent in the different political, cultural, and economical areas. Now the fundamental question of this research is, "what were the effects of the centrality of Sultanieh on Dargazin?", and what are the reasons behind them?". No doubt, the political and economical needs of Sultanieh to the surrounding and neighboring areas have played an important role in the political, economical, and cultural promotion of the area of Dargazin. As a result of being located in the flat and fertile plains of the northern Hamadan, and also being in the way of trading roads, Dargazin has always been at the center of attention for the governors, and an appropriate place for the dwelling of peoples and emigrant groups such as Turks and Mongols. Most of the events of the middle centuries of Iran's history have been influenced by this fact that the historical recognition of this period will not be possible unless we take these facts into account.

To our modest knowledge no independent research has been done so far on the influence of the centrality of Sultanieh on the political and religious situation of Dargazin, and we can only refer to it in some diffused citations in the local sources and history books. Therefore, the lack of comprehensive and scientific research into this field and the centrality of Dargazin in the chronicles of Ilkhanids, Timurids, and Turkmens bring in light the necessity of this research in which the author has tried to recognize and analyze the mutual relations of Dargazin - Sultanieh with reliance on historical methods and based on geographical studies and analyses. Even today, a look at the geographical situation of this area would tell us about the importance of Dargazin in the middle of Zanjan and Hamadan.

The Reasons for Building and Choosing the Location of Sultanieh

The Sultanieh Plain was a meadow used by the Mongols for hunting, spending time, and summer resort. It was called "Conquer Olang," meaning meadow or falconry. (Mokhlesi, 1985, p. 3). But after many years, when the place was mostly used for military purposes and pastures, the area was first noticed during the reign of Arghun. He tried

to build a mansion on the Sherviaz meadow (Conquer Olang or Sultanieh), but he died at the beginning of the work. Oljaito, Arghun's son, completed the construction of the building (704 AH) and named it Sultanieh (Vassaf al-Hazrat, 1959, p. 255). For this reason, this building was built mostly on the basis of political intentions of the Ilkhanate rulers (Razavi, 2009, p.178). However, this wasn't the sole reason for building Sultanieh. In fact, Sultanieh boasted climate, economical and livelihood potentials, and its good meadows and pleasant weather, to Mongols, were reminiscent of their birthplace. (Sobouti, 1990, p. 30). Also, the strategic location and transportation routes of this place, which was on the way to Ajam Iraq, attracted many traders and merchants from India, China and Europe (Bayani, 1992, p. 485; Nourbakhsh, 1985, p. 92). In the end, during the Mongol invasions and a period of turmoil after the fall of the Seljuqs until the Ilkhanates came to power, most of the prosperous cities of Khorasan were destroyed, but in the central areas there were still signs of prosperity. Therefore, the economic life and culture was transferred from Khorasan to the central and western regions (Razavi, 2009, p. 9). The new capital in central Iran attracted trade routes with numerous advantages and was considered as the center of political, economic, cultural and social life of the country (Ibid, p. 178). In a short time, a flood of craftsmen and artists went to Sultanieh, and some industries such as pottery flourished to such an extent that the pottery industry of this city impressed Varamin, Sultanabad, Saveh, Kashan, Tabriz, and possibly Hamadan (Rezvan and Karimian, 2014, p. 49). However, since Sultanieh was a newly established city and was mostly used for hunting and military purposes, it was dependent on other neighboring areas in terms of economic, demographic and livelihood needs, which was undoubtedly taken into consideration at the time of its construction. Hafiz Ebru says in this regard, "Eventually, they took the position of Conquer Olang, which is a very clean summer resort and there are many villages around it and good meadows and climate diversity" (Rezvan and Karimian, 2014, p. 42). The importance of Sultanieh, its economic and commercial centrality, and the existence of ten thousand shops (Ghashani, 1969, p. 46), as well as the unique storage of grain, all in all, affected the adjacent areas at the entrance to the capital. The needs of the population required attention to the outside world and, in a way, created a two-way relationship between the capital

and the surrounding areas. This was while the influence of Soltanieh and its connection with the surrounding areas was not limited to food supply and the supply in the market, and Sultanieh was also influential in the field of urban development. As a result of Oljaito's steps, some towns, which were mostly in the surrounding area of Sultanieh, were built under the names of "Sultan Abad-e Chamchamal", "Oljayto Abad" and "Aq Qala".

In addition, a few public utilities were built or renovated in the Sultanieh area, and in some other towns and cities. They were called "Abvab Al-Bar" which were generally formed around the tomb of its founder. The examples of which were the "Shanbe Qazani" in Tabriz. Khajeh Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah Hamadani also built Rabe Rashidi based on the same model of Shanbe Qazani (Khanmoradi, 2018). Moreover, among these buildings was the Abvab Al-Bar of Bouzanjerd in Shera district of Dargazin which was built by Khajeh Rashid al-Din (Khajeh Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah, 1940, pp.162-215), or some other shrines and tombs in this area all of which were the result of being close to the capital "Sultanieh", and the development of the routes leading to the capital. We will elaborate on them later.

The Influential Factors in the Focus of Ilkhanids on the Neighboring Areas

The Geographical and Geopolitical Status of Dargazin in the Eastern Borders of the Hamadan Plain

Hamadan in Iran is divided into two western and eastern parts because of the Alvand mountain ranges. These mountains are a natural barrier in the north western and south eastern side, and based on the political divisions in eastern and western districts, function as a barrier between the central plateau and the central Zagros, and to the west border (west and south west) have created some connected plains like-Malayer, Nahavand, Tuyserkan, and Asad Abad- which are categorized under the group of western plains. In the other side of mount Alvand to the eastern (eastern and north eastern) border, there are some plains: Hamadan-Bahar (Chahar Bluk or Samine Rud), Ghahavand (Shera' or Chera), Kabudarahang, and Razan-Famenin (Beik Mohammadi et al, 2016) on which Dargazin is also located. A look at the natural geography

of this area shows that throughout the northern borders, Dargazin is separated with the highlands of Kharaqan from the neighboring areas like Qazvin which has given Dargazin special importance regarding the climatic and geopolitical situation. Furthermore, the area of Dargazin has always been a suitable place for the cultivation of crops and the passing of travellers and troops. Along with the highlands of Kharaqan, Dargazin has been the gateway to the regions of Qazvin and Rey which in return demanded extra special attention to it. For this reason, governors have focused on it a lot from the dim and distant past and even after the Assyrians attacked Mede's territory, they built some military castles there (Frye, 1968; Anspacher, 1912, p. 58; Radner, 2003, p. 443; Boederman, 1997, p. 79; Crouch, 2009, p. 37). After that and in the Islamic period, this place attracted the attention of those Arab tribes who had come to fight with Deylamans (Qomi, 2006, p. 268; Isbahani, 1981, p. 239). Then Turkmens and other groups inhabited the place and at the time of Ilkhanids, Dargazin had more of military and transiting importance and its government was continually changing between the hands of Mongol and Turkmen rulers. Hence, the protection of Dargazin for Ilkhanids, at the closest distance to Sultanieh, for traveling to the central regions of Iran like Isfahan and Shiraz, and for dealing with the attacks of western regions of Iran, was regarded vital. At the time of Ilkhanids there were two routes connecting Sultanieh and Hamadan. One of them proceeded to the south of Sultanieh and after crossing the regions of Sojas and Sohrevard reached Hamadan and according to Abu Ishaq Estakhri, this route was more straightforward than others. It was always subject to the Kurds' invasions as they had control of Sohrevard. So at dangerous times people used Qazvin-Hamadan route which could go around the area and avert the danger (Estakhri, 1994, p. 196). At the start, this route continued along the current road of Zanzan to Abhar and to Qazvin. Then in "Barsin" or "Farsin / Farsjin", a county in Qazvin, it split into two branches: one branch traveled towards Kharaqan and Dargazin and the other branch travelled to Qazvin. The first route reached Dargazin after crossing Avaj and Mahnian, and from there it got to another Farsjin in the area of Dargazin. There, it also split into two branches: one of them traveled to Hamadan and the other traveled to Isfahan (See figure 2).




figure 1. Map of Hamadan province and its plains located on both sides of the Alvand mountains with the east and west Direction of Hamadan plain

(Beik Mohammadi et al,2016, p. 685/ Edited by the Author)

The branch to Isfahan was called “Isfahan road” or according to Mustawfi Qazvini “A'lam road” importance of which brought great benefits to its surrounding towns (Mustawfi, 1983, pp. 44-65; Estakhri,1994, p.192; Ibn Rusta, 1986, pp. 195-196; Ibn Hauqal, 1987, p. 102; Abu Dulaf, 1964, p. 127; Varjevand, 1998, p. 759; Tucker, 2015, pp. 172-173). In the reports of Ibn Hauqal and Estakhri there are some differences in the distance between the towns. Ibn Hauqal has measured the distance between Barsin to Hamadan up to seven Parasangs (a unit of length equal to 6.24 km) and Estakhri mentions this distance as 10 parasangs. Probably, the first one had meant the Farsin in the area of Dargazin and the second Farsin / Farsjin had been one in Qazvin according to Estakhri (Ibn Hauqal,1987, pp. 103-104). The A'lam road was regarded highly important in Ilkhanids' Period and it gradually got

more and more military and economic importance to a point where at the time of Choupani Emirs (738-758 A.H/ 1338 A.D) and Ilkani it was used in the battles of these two groups. It was also at this period that Dargazin in importance along this route. According to Owliya Chalabi, the castle of Dargazin was renovated in 740 A.H. due to military reasons like the importance of the bases between the towns (1993, p. 335). During the Safavids, this route was still important and was considered as one of the significant paths to travel to Hamadan and Baqdad. Sultan Suleyman Ottomani, in two of his invasions of Iran, (940-941 A.H/ 1534-1535 A.D) traveled through this route and Nasuh Matrakçı meticulously described its caravanserais which here we would briefly mention them to have a better picture of the route: “On 12 Rabi’ol Akhar 941 AH , 20 October 1534 he (Sultan Suleyman) sets off from Saeen Qal’e to Baqdad and after passing houses, Persian temples, the little villages like Robablar, Ab Garm, Ave (Avaj), Darband kharaqan, the village Hamian (Mahnian), the county Dargazin, the village Sazin, Dastgird (Dastjerd?), La’en Chaman (Lalejin?), arrives in Hamadan”(Matrakçı,1998, p.45). Matrakçı’s account of Sultan Suleyman journey to Baqdad shows that this route is, only with slight difference, along today’s Qazvin-Hamadan Road (See figure 2).




Figure 2: Approximate Sultanieh route from Dargazin to Isfahan and Shiraz

However, despite its importance, the Sultanieh-Isfahan route was considered a minor one and mostly the travelers and troops, who set off to Hamadan and Baqdad, used it and except for the Avaj defile, which made the passing of travelers difficult especially through winter months, there was no other danger threatening the travelers. What is more, the existence of many villages and archeological remains from Saljuqis and Ilkhanids along this route shows its great importance.

The Abundance of Agricultural Products of Dargazin: supplying the Nutritional Security of the Capital

With the fast growth of Sultanie's population, the need for agricultural products and supplying the requirements of its inhabitants was felt more than before since Sultanieh was unable to provide it alone. For this reason, obtaining the crops from the surrounding areas increased in importance. One of such places was "Sa'en Qal'e" near to Sarjahan and at a distance of five parasangs to Sultanieh, which after the

mongolian invasion was ruined. But at this time it was developed once again and since this town was in Dargazin's route on the "A'lam road", it made a lot of profits (Mustawfi, 1983, pp. 44-65). Based on the account of Mustawfi (680-750 A.H/ 1282 -1349 A.D), Dargazin had a myriad of gardens at the center of the area called "A'lam" in which grains, cotton, grapes, and high-quality fruit were farmed (Ibid, 73).

Dargazin has been one of those areas in Iraq Ajam that boasted the best grounds for growing grapes (Petrushevsky, 1965, pp. 389-391). Therefore, this fact increased the importance of Dargazin in the Ilkhanid period so much that Mustawfi has mentioned that the towns located along the "A'lam Road" that benefited from many things because of the importance of Dargazin in producing crops (Mustawfi, 1983, pp. 44-65). As a result of the political situation of that time and the great desire of Ilkhan in creation of that situation, Sultanieh was definitely regarded as the most important place. However, this city was not in the way of trading routes and lacked a suitable area for growing crops (Razavi, 2009, p. 178). Moreover, unlike the cities like Isfahan, Neyshabour, and Rey it did not have an ancient structure and was based on an area of pasture far from the fertile areas. Basically till the time it was the capital, Sultanieh benefited from the nearby products (Lambton, 2013, p.187). But since most of the profits were being spent on the capital and the trips of princes, unlike the Saljuqi period in which the profits were being spent on the province, this practice had probably some damaging effects on the nearby areas (Ibid, 376).

The Religious Groups and Scholars: the Prerequisite for Gaining the Social Credibility of Ilkhanids

The Mongolian Ilkhanids did not make any serious attempt to attract the people of society and religious groups until the appearance of qazan Khan and his conversion to Islam. It was after their defeat from Egyptian Mamluks and qazan Khan's conversion to Islam that they turned to the society and from the time of qazan Khan, they tried to gain validity among the people with constructing religious buildings and attending to big Sufi scholars. At this time, Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah Hamadani who was holding the ceremony called "Abvab Al-Bar" in different areas by the order of qazan Khan, did not forget his birthplace. He built a monastery and devoted some places to it in Hamadan and the village

“Bouzanjerd” from the area “Shera” to the west of Dargazin and the birthplace of the great Sufi “Abu Yaghob ebn Yousef Bouzanjerdi” (Death 440 or 441 A.H/ 1049-1050 A.D), one of the first Sufis of Hamadan (Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah, 1940, pp. 162-215; Iqbal, 2005, p. 307). In addition to the aforementioned buildings, according to Khvand Mir, many of such buildings were constructed in the various towns and villages of Iraq at the time of qazan Khan and Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah (Khvand Mir, 2001, p. 189). These activities were continued in Mohammad Oljayto's period and with moving the capital to Sultanieh, Oljayto paid attention to the Sufi Scholars more than ever. Therefore, in his first step he invited “**Sheikh Sharaf al-Din Dargazini**” (Death 743 A.H/ 1343 A.D), from the scholars of Shafi'i religion, which of course this action was at the time of completing the castle of Sultanieh. He took part in that aggregation, along with some of the scholars and mystics such as “*Sheikh Safi-al-din Ishaq Ardabili*,” to the invitation of Oljayto, and for “thanking God because of the completion” (Khunji's, 2003, p. 252; Amini, 1984, p. 12; Chardin, 1953, p. 1876). *Sheikh Sharaf al-Din* also was one of the close friends of “*Sheikh Alaodole Semnani*” and one of the most famous Sufis in Ilkhanids court (Karbalaie, 1965, pp. 397-8). Mustawfi personally visited *Sheikh Sharaf al-Din Dargazini* in one of his trips (the 8th century AH) to Dargazin, and realized that the Sunni people of Dargazin were his followers (Mustawfi, 1983, p.73). *Sheikh Sharaf al-Din Dargazini* lived up to a hundred years (Karbalaie, 1965, pp. 397- 8) and he was mentioned, for the last time before his death, in Togha Temur Khan's invasion, the ruler of Khorasan (737-754 A.H/ 1337-1353 A.D), to the capital of Sultanieh and Hamadan (Samarqandi, 2004, p.166; Karbalaie, 1965, pp. 667-8; Riyadh, 1991, p. 25). It was said that *Sharaf al-Din* had been to Sultanieh for several times and at the time of Ilkanid Emirs' reign, he had considerable respect in Dargazin (Hafiz Abru, 1938, p. 156; Khvand Mir, 2001, p. 227). Dargazin was not merely known by his Sufi scholars and the Sunni and Shi'es had great influence and respect at that time. It is not known exactly that the Shi'es of Dargazin had what status in the society but it seems that in Sultan Mohammad Oljayto's time, and with his conversion to Shi'e, the Shi'es had been regarded respectfully and as a result, some buildings like Imamzadeh Azhar, which is a grandson of one of the Imams, has been built for this purpose.

The Influence of the Centrality of Sultanieh on the Situation of Surrounding Areas

Demographic Transformation of Dargazin

At the time of Iraq's Saljuqi reign (511-590 A.H/ 1117-1194 A.H), Dargazin was like a little town in the state of A'lam in which the demographic growth had just started before that. When the well-known Saljuqi minister "*Abu al-Qasim Qawam al-Din Dargazini*" (Death 527 AH/ 1133 A.D) came to office, in spite of the fact that he was originally from "Ans Abad" near Dargazin, he related himself to Dargazin because it was bigger and more wealthy (Imad Kateb, 1997, pp.108 &144; Yaqut, 1995, p. 569). However, it lost its importance with the downfall of Iraqi Saljuqs until when Sultanieh became the capital, it developed again, and to the account of yaqut, at this time Dargazin was the throne of Sultan in the area of A'lam (Yaqut,1995, p. 569) which can be a sign of regaining the former position in Ilkhanids' period that happened after a short pause in its development. The description of Mustawfi (680-750 A.H/ 1282-1349 A.D), who had personally gone to Dargazin, visited the place by his own eyes, and given an account of the situation of the town and its inhabitants, proves the recent claim. Mustawfi recognizes the town of being one of the neighborhoods of the A'lam area, from the five areas of Hamadan, which at that time was called A'lam Kiln (Mustawfi, 1983, pp.72-3). "Dagazin has been a village from the area of A'lam and now it is a town and the people call some other places by this name, too. It has a high ground. There are many gardens in it. The grains, cotton, and grapes grow very well there. The people are Shafei Sunnis and they are purely believers. And the source of income of *Sheikh al Eslam Sharaf al-Din Dargazini* (may God bless the muslims till he is alive) from the court is a toman and two thousand dinars" he said (Ibid, 73).

The miniature paintings of the town and gardens of Dargazin from the Turk traveler Nasuh Matrakçı, who came to Dargazin in Safavid's period, is one of the first paintings remaing of Dargazin which shows the town's situation and the royal gardens of this area. *Mustawfi* also had refered to them. The origin of such gardens must have dated back to Ilkhanids' time because at this time Dargazin was the throne of Sultan in

the area of A'lam and the most important town of it (See Figure 2).

The Expansion of the Religious Buildings of Shi'ite

The geographical location of Dargazin and its relationship with Sultanieh had some religious influences, in addition to the political and economical effects. Without doubt, the relationship between the scholars of Dargazin with Sultanieh, which was mentioned before, had some effects as well. Therefore, some activities of Ilkhanids, like constructing two shrines related to "Imamzadeh Hud" and "Imamzadeh Azhar" are of such effects. Despite the importance of those two shrines, there are few references of them in the sources and this reason has caused a lack of consensus in the association of these buildings to a person or some people. Some recognize the building as the shrine of some Sufi scholars of Dargazin like Sheikh Aref Dargazini (the 7th century AH) or Sheikh *Sharaf al-Din Dargazini* (Death 743 A.H/ 1343 A.D) and /or *Sheikh Shei'e Allah Dargazini* (the 8th century), (Azkaei, 1993, p. 69). Based on the architectural features of the building, it is related to Ilkhanids' period. Moreover, as some the scholars like *Sharaf al-Din Dargazini* and *Sheikh Shei'e Allah Dargazini* passed away after the downfall of Ilkhanids, this hypothesis does not seem to be correct. However, some other researchers have associated them to a grandson of one of the Imams and they believe that his ancestor goes back to Imam Sajjad. Seyyed Morteza Razi, in "*Bahr al-Nesa*" states that *Azhar Ibn Imam Zayn al-Abedin* is martyred in the town of Dargazin (Razi, 48). But among the children of *Imam Zayn al-Abedin* there was no such name and this fact prompted others to relate him to an Azhar who was a descendant of Imam Mousa Kazim which after 11 generations and the name of his ancestors are as follows: *Seyyed Azhar Ibn E Mohammad Ibn-e Akmal Ibn-e Mohammad Ibn-e Ali Ibn-e Mohammad Ibn-e Morteza Alam al-hoda Ibn-e Hossein Ibn-e Mousa Ibn-e Mohammad Ibn-e L'araj Ibn-e Mousa Abi Sabhat Ibn-e Ibrahim Almorteza Ibn-e Imam Mousa Kazim*. He was a notable and respectful Seyyed and it is noted that he lived in the 8th century and was invited to Iran from some governors of Iran and then settled down in Hamadan (Bahr al-olum, 2014, p. 15). I deem this hypothesis true because the construction of the aforementioned buildings was also after the conversion of Ilkhanids to Islam and Shi'ite, which was done with the aim of spreading and developing Shi'ite or in other words supporting the

Shi'ite of Dargazin against the majority of population which were Sunnis. After all, constructing such buildings is a sign of Dargazin's religious importance for the rulers of Sultanieh. The buildings were basically built along the way to Sultanie and before that, there had been some shrines built along the Dargazin-Sultanieh road and in the area of Kharagan from the Saljuqi period (Afshar, 2018, pp. 141-156; Dehkordi, 2017, pp. 172-173).

The Political Instability: The Ensuing Chaos after usurping in the Lands of Dargazin

Although there were some advantages, the proximity of Dargazin to Ilkhanid's capital had some disadvantages because the neighboring areas of Sultanieh were mostly a place for fights and wars of Mongolian Emirs and the antagonists of Ilkhanids. Based on the report from sources, ruling the regions of Dargazin and Kharagan was at the hands of Naz Khatun the name of one of the emirs of Kurdistan. Therefore it was known as "the lands of Naz Khatuni" (Khvand Mir, 2001, pp. 207-8; Samarqandi, 2004, p. 90). But at the end of Ilkhanids' regime, Emir Choupan who probably was the founder of Choupanian Dynasty, started to seize the Nazkhatuni lands and with the help of "*Qazi Mohammad*" managed to confiscate them (Samarqandi, 2004, pp. 60 & 90; Hafiz Abru, 1938, p. 73; Khvand Mir, 2001, pp. 207-8; Qazvini, 2007, p. 181). Such an action was a sign of great change in the ownership and occupation of the lands by the influential emirs of the court which started from Oljayto's time and increased in the period of Sultan Abu Saeid. As a result, every landowner from the smallest to the biggest ones gained a lot of influence, the system of feudalism developed a great deal, and at the same time the ownership of the lands by the Mongol landowners rose enormously. The commands of Sultan Oveis Jalayeri (757-776 A.H/ 1356-1374 A.D) demonstrate that the dependency of villagers on the land was determined more than ever. In one of his commands, it is said that "the villagers of Hamadan should not be displaced from their own lands. The refugees must come back to their villages. Make them farm in their own villages" (Granotovsky, 1980, p. 238). Such a report could refer to a fundamental change, or in other words, a sort of chaos which could be both the result of a change in the pattern of landowning, and the consequence of political instability which not only caused the displacement of the

inhabitants of these areas, but also had no benefit for the Choupani emirs because with the emergence of *Jalayerids* / Al Jalayer (740-784 A.H/ 1340-1382 A.D) there began a period of wars and hostilities which ended with Choupani emirs' defeat. Now if this is true that the castle of Dargazin was renovated around the year of 740 A.H (Owliya Chalabi, 1993, p. 335), it has happened during the reign of "Choupanian" (738-758 A.H/ 1338- 1357 A.D) over the regions of *Iraq Ajam*. The castle was probably built for military purposes and was like an interstate military base. It, perhaps, changed many rulers during the skirmishes between Jalayeri (740 A.H/ 1340 A.D, Sheikh *Hasan-e Bozorg* 784 A.H/1382 A.D Sultan Ahmad) and Choupani emirs (738 A.H/ 1338 A.D, Sheikh Hasan-e Kučak till 758 A.H/ 1357 A.D, the assassination of Malek Ashraf), (Azkaei, 1993, p. 24). After that in Timurids second invasion (787-794 A.H/ 1385-1392 A.D), Sultanieh, Hamadan, and Dargazin were given to Miranshah and his sons Abu Bakr and Omar because the responsibility of seizure of these regions was given to them (Samarqandi, 2004, p.811). Therefore, some of the lands were the place of settlement for Abu Bakr Ibn-e Miranshah (794-809 A.H/ 1392-1407 A.D) and most of his battles against Mirza Omar Miranshah and other princes and also some of his invasions over the central parts of Iran were all taken place from these lands (Zi Qa'de 808 A.H). In these skirmishes, the areas of Dargazin were damaged a lot in a way that in the battles of Qara Yousef with Ahmad *jalayeri*, who was in this region to the invitation of Khurshah Dargazini, and Mirza Eskandar, the total destruction happened to these areas especially to Sultanieh, Qazvin, Hamadan, and Dargazin (Hafiz Abru, 2001, p. 506). In such situations, therefore, Dargazin's control was continually changed between Mongolian and Turkmen emirs. It was turned into a military base and the only benefit of that was for military uses.

Emerging Local Dynasties and the Perpetuation of their Control after Ilkhanids

Providing the security of the capital (Sultanieh) was one of the other important issues which the Ilkhanids had to attend to it. They tried to solve this problem with building castles and military bases in the surrounding areas. For this reason, one of the areas that rose in importance was Gavrud between Hamadan and Zanzan. The state of

Gavrud was exactly in a place where a route from Sultanieh traveled to Dargazin and the central regions of Iran. Moreover, most of the attacks on the capital were carried out in this place. Therefore, the need for ensuring the political and economical security of the capital resulted in the importance of Gavrud. But most of the significance of this period was at the time of Ilkhanids, Turkmens and Timurids. At the time of Timur's invasion this region was ruled by Sultan Ahmad Jalayeri, who fled in panic, and Timur entered Sultanieh and seized it and appointed Amir Adel as its ruler (Shami, 1993, p. 97; Yazdi, 2008, p. 703). Amir Adel, who had also managed to assume the power of Hamadan, was executed with the return of Timur. In this seizure, Timur appointed one of his emirs named Pir Ahmad Saveh as the ruler of Iraq, Qom, Hamadan, Kashan, and Dargazin and after that returned to Samarghand and the three year invasion of Tamerlane came to an end (Samarqandi, 2004, p. 602). However, in the year of 791 AH "Khorram", who had the responsibility of protecting the castle of Gavrud, seized Sultanieh and some joined him and together they set off to invade Hamadan. When they arrived in Dargazin, Pir Ahmad Saveh, who was in Hamadan, went to confront them but could not defeat them and was arrested (Hafiz Abru, 1938, p. 250). So, at Sultan Ahmad Jalayer's command, they divided the regions between the emirs. "Shera/ Chera" and "Farahan" were under the control Seyyed Seyf al-din Qazvini, and Hamadan and Dargazin were under the control of "Bayazid Farahi" who had arrested Pir Ahmad (Ibid; Samarqandi, 2004, pp. 628-630). Therefore, several parts of Gavrud and Sultanieh were under the control of Khorram who was originally from Dargazin. It was said, however, that at this time Khorram was assassinated by one of Adel Agha's emirs called A'jaki who was also the commander of the guards of Sultanie's castle. After that, Hamadan was ruled by A'jaki who killed and looted people in the regions of Hamdan and Kurdistan and till the year 794 in which Tamerlane came to Sultanieh, he ruled there (Samarqandi, 2004, p. 630; Shami, 1993, p. 427). Baba Haji was the name another ruler of Gavrud who had power over Hamadan and Dargazin, in addition to Gavrud and Sultanieh. He set off to Qazvin at Shahrokh Timuri's command to suppress Jahanshah who had seized Qazvin and in the way he killed *Sadr al-din Dargazini* (Rumlu, 2005, p. 323). He also opposed Qara Yousef Torkaman for several years and even assassinated his son who had

power over Hamadan (Ibid, 353; (Tehrani, 1997, p. 72; Qazvini, 2007, pp. 250-251). After that the emirs of Gavrud joined the Torkamanan troops of Aq Qoyunlu and took part in the battles and invasions of Uzun Hasan (Death 882 AH). The last time that their name was mentioned was when Sheikh Hasan Aq Qoyunlu had sent Sheikh Haji Gavrudi, who was one of the emirs of Gavrud, to Khorasan (Rumlu, 2005, p. 719). However, since the emirs of Gavrud were Qara Qoyunlus' allies, they could not have their former at the time of Aq Qoyunlu's reign. However, in all of these years, those who ruled over Gavrud also had power over Hamadan and Dargazin. In other words, they had formed a semi-independent government including some parts of Hamadan and Dargazin to Sultanieh.

Conclusion

Choosing Sultanieh as the capital of Ilkhanid was accompanied with many changes in the political, religious, and economic situation of the neighboring regions. Dargazin was one of these regions which was located to the east of Sultanieh and between Zanjan and Hamadan. It also boasted high political and connecting importance at the time of Saljuqis. After Sultanieh being chosen as the capital in Ilkhanids' period, the size of the population in this city grew rapidly. The abundance of crops in the area of Dargazin, compared to the lack or shortage of it in the capital, the suitable geographical situation of this town, and the location of the town, which was at the closest distance to Sultanieh, were among the most fundamental factors in the relationship of Sultanieh and Dargazin. In addition to these factors, there were some other aspects like the connecting routes and the existence of several religious groups that facilitated this relationship. In Ilkhanid's period, especially because of the economical and political needs of the capital, Dargazin was considered really important and the accounts of the gardens and products of Dargazin could clearly tell us about the significance of this town in the middle of Hamadan and Zanjan. This connection was significant from many aspects and had some advantages and disadvantages. In this regard, the demographic growth of Dargazin was among the positive influences of Sultanie's centrality as it was only a small unimportant village in the north of Hamadan before Sultanieh became the capital. But after this event Dargazin turned into a big city along the road of

Sultanieh to Isfahan and several religious buildings were constructed in it. These positive factors also brought about some catastrophic effects. The continual presence of the kings, and the countless number of wars and skirmishes that took place in this area had some irreparable damages to the heart of Dargazin. Surely, the last kick was at the downfall of Ilkhanids when some Mongolian emirs had the power over this area and every one of them spent some time there and continued to wage war against other rivals who wanted to depose them. However, since Sultanieh was still considered one of the main political and economical centers even many years after the downfall of Ilkhanids, it was the place for local rulers and for this reason Dargazin had the connecting and military importance but did not have the former wealth and prosperity and the power was shifted among some emirs.

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***Ups and Downs in Iran – Japan Trade Relations: From the
End of Nāser-al-Dīn Era to the Rise of Reza Shah (1891 -
1941 AD)***

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Abstract

Japan was the first Asian nation in the nineteenth century which successfully implemented modernization. Therefore, to ensure its economic progress it sought new markets to sell its products. Iran, also with various motivations, to compensate for its backwardness sought to develop its relations with Japan. The present study attempts to study the ups and downs of trade relations between Iran and Japan in the contemporary era. Based on its findings, the study reveals that the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia boosted the trade between Iran and Japan and Japan became one of the Iran's top ten trade partners and the Japanese products officially entered Iran. Due to official relations, the trade activities between the two nations entered a new phase. Iran needed to be industrialized. Therefore, it hired Japanese experts and specialists to accelerate its progress. The trade balance between the two nations was equal in the beginning years of the Reza

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Shah era but gradually the Japanese benefitted more and this process continued.

Keywords: Iran, Japan -Trade Relations, Nāser-al-dīn Shah, Reza Shah.

Introduction

In the middle ages and the ancient era, China acted as the bridge between Japan and the Middle East including Iran. (Mizuguchi, 2002, p.94) We do not have enough information about the trade relations between Iran and Japan from the Safavid era to Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah era. Probably due to Japan's voluntary isolation and its lack of foreign relations, its relations with Iran were at its lowest state. (Oikawa, 1998, p. 139)

As a consequence of the Renaissance and industrial developments in the western countries, the world witnessed changes and developments. These changes affected both Iran and Japan. The Japanese attained constitutionalism sooner than Iranians did. Therefore, on account of their constant hard work, Japan progressed rapidly in a short time. In order to increase its development and progress, Japan needed to have both political and economic relations with other nations. (Zhapon dar Asr-e Tahavol; Yek Gharn az Doraneh Nowsazi, 1975, p. 111) In other words, after the modernization movement in 1968, following three centuries of isolation, Japan continued to build its country and to compensate for its backwardness from Europe and America.

To develop themselves, The Japanese had to make their presence felt in the world and had to involve themselves in the changes and developments in the world. As a result, they increased their relations with other nations. Iran, disillusioned by its relations with the colonizing west, turned to the emerging Japan.

The present study, probing into the motivations of Iran and Japan in establishing trade relations, attempts to deal with the economic relations between Iran and Japan from the final years of Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah to the end of the Reza Shah era which lasted almost fifty years. This study is concerned with the ups and downs in the trade relations of the two nations, their trade balance and the products exchanged between the two countries. The literature shows that in spite of its significance, the subject of this study has received little attention and the Literature on this study suffers from the dearth of scholarly material. Two studies have been conducted on the economic relations of Iran and Japan. The article by Nobuaki Kondo translated by Majid Shabestari into Persian. Kondo

has dealt with the beginning of the political relations between Iran and Japan in the Qajar period and has considered the history of political relations between the two nations culminating in the entrance of political and economic groups sent by Japan into Iran and the Iranian political and economic boards who arrival in Japan. He has considered the travel logbooks of Japanese passengers and has presented valuable information. (Kondo, 2008, pp. 547-556) Kondo has also dealt with the history of political relations between Iran and Japan.

This study enjoys its reliance on Japanese sources and researches, which make it very valuable. However, this scholar has not used the Iranian sources and archives. The next study on this subject is an article entitled Trade Relations between Iran and Japan During Reza Shah (Ravabet-eh Tejari Iran va Japan dar dour-e Reza Shah) which has not used the archive documents of Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the documents of the parliament of Iran (Shokrzadeh and Abadian, 1396 S.H.) The main difference between the present study and its predecessors is in its consideration of the fifty years of trade relations between the two countries which reveals the ups and downs in their relations and through its reliance on the latest archive and library documents presents valuable information analytically interpreted. Mohammad Chegini in his Article "Trade Relations of Iran and Japan from The beginning of Pahlavi" has provided a background of the relations between the two nations. He also discusses the trade relations of the two countries during Reza Shah. The difference between the present study and that of Chegini is that this study is document-based and it encompasses all the published works related to trades between the two nations; a merit which Chegini's paper lacks.

Economic Motivations Leading to Mutual Relations in the 19th Century

The leaders of Japan in the 19th century were very zealous at having economic relations with other nations. They sent a delegation led by Masaharow Yoshida to the palace of Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah in 1880 (1297 A.H.) and later on they visited Iran as ambassadors, travelers and researchers. These events happened just one decade after the Meiji movement. Nevertheless, Japan did not have any diplomatic envoy in Iran prior to the beginning of world war I. (Rajabzadeh, 1389, p. 45)

In spite of the long isolation, the initiators of Japan's modernization seized small opportunities to start trade relations with foreigners from remote islands such as Kyushu and through information from Portuguese and Chinese merchants, and also by studying became acquainted with the industrial development of the world. Since the end of the 19th century, they had followed their ambitions and had first turned to China. (Rafa't, 1340, p.258) They also made trips to Iran to find markets for their products and narrated a great deal of reports and stories from the turmoil and backwardness in Iran and the different criminal sentences carried out in Iran. (Naqizadeh, 1394, p. 18)

According to certain sources, the Iranian modernizers, even before the victory of Japan over Russia at the end of the 19th century, had arranged meetings with the newly established Meiji government in Japan and had obtained information about the developments in Japan, for instance Talebuf translated the newly published constitutional law of Japan into Persian.(Naqizadeh, 1394, p. 32) Moreover, the owners of Iranian newspapers such as Talebuf, Mirza Malkom khan, MohammadAli Foroughi, Nezam al Eslam Kermani, and Zein olAbedin Maraghei who owned newspapers and journals such as Iran, Akhtar, Habl Al-matin, and a certain number of governmental officials in Iran who witnessed the progress and developments of Japan criticized the conditions of Iran. The progress and advancement of this Asian nation was to such an extent that Ali Asghar Khan Amin Al-Soltan (Atabak Azam,) along with Mehdi Qoli Khan Hedayat, set out for Japan in 1903.(Hedayat, 1950, p. 15) They met Katsura Tafou, the incumbent prime minister, Ito Hirobumi, the first prime minister of Japan, Okuma Shigenobu, the previous prime minister, Komura Joutaro, the minister of foreign affairs, and some other high ranking officials.(Shimizu, 1392, p. 22) From that time on, Japan's industry and Japan-made products have been admired by Iranians. For instance, in his travel logbook, Mok̄ber-al-Saltāna talks about Japanese dishes made in Japan and in almost all Iranian houses the Japanese products existed. (Hedayat, 1389, p. 78) Ebrāhīm Sah̄hāf-bāšī Tehrani also made a trip to Japan in 1897 and spent fifty days in this country. However, he has few references to Japan in his writings. He also brought a few products from Japan with himself to Iran (Sah̄hāf-bāšī, 1358, pp. 85-91).

The Iranian writers and the elite of that era had a positive attitude towards Japan, and in their writings, they presented Japan as equal to Russia and U.K. and other developed nations. (Kermāni, 1972, p. 141) They also discussed the importance of education in Japan: "If science and moral education go together, it will result in Japan." (Dowlatabadi, 1371, p. 352).

The attention to and the appreciation of Japanese products was so great that in the National Parliament, they discussed the progress of Japan and the need for imitating its experience. (Mashrouh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shoray-e Melli, dorueh dovom, Jalase 151) All In all, the Iranians turned their attention towards Japan for two reasons: 1- The rapid advancement of Japan, 2- Its victory over Russia. 3- The third which is more important than the previous reason was the emancipation from the dominance of the two superpowers, Russia and the United Kingdom.

Yoshida Masaharu, the First Marketer of Japanese Products in Iran in Qajar Period

Yoshida Māsāharu was the first official ambassador of Japan in the Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah era, who under the order of Tsonetami Sano, Japan's minister of finance, who liked to expand the economic ties of Japan with other Asian nations, came to Iran, He was sent to Iran for this mission (Furukāwa, 2004, p. 33).

He brought with himself a great deal of goods and products from Japan, The best of which were presented to the Shah as souvenirs (Māsāharu, 1994, p. 189).

Based on the conversations between Shah and the Japanese ambassador, it became apparent that the Iranian's desire for modernization and progress, led to the development of relations between Iran and Japan. Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah immediately asked about industry in Japan and directly asked about Japan's railroad from the ambassador. (Māsāharu, 1994, p. 194)

Two times during their conversations, Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah emphasized that Japan and Iran were both Asian nations, revealing his

disillusionment about Iran's relations with the west and their interferences in the affairs of Iran. Shah showed his pleasure that a powerful Asian nation had emerged. At the end, the Shah of Iran asked the ambassador to convey his message of friendship to the emperor of Japan, and stated that the Shah of Iran intended to have economic relations with Japan. (Māsāharu, 1994, p. 197) In addition to the will of the Shah to have relations with Japan, the role of Iran's prime minister, Mirza Hossein Khan Sepah Salar, the reformist, must not be ignored. He was amongst those who were fascinated with Japan's rapid development (Adāmiyat, 1385, p. 156).

In his third trip to Paris, Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah, had already become acquainted with the Japanese products and had understood their significance. In a daily newspaper called Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah's Memories (*Ruznameh-e khaterat-e Nāser-al-dīnShah*), he had cited the list of Japanese products which had been purchased by the Shah in Paris (*Ruznameh-e khaterat-e NaserAldin Shah*, 1371, p. 314).

Nākamo Nāekiji also mentions that in his visit to Isfahan, the governor of Isfahan Zel Al Soltan, had expressed his regret for not having railroad in Iran.(Naokichi, 2016: 61) The trip of Yoshdia was reported in Iranian sources (*E'temād-al-Sālṭana*, 1367, pp. 474-477).

Also during the era of Muzafar Aldin Shah, the Japanese looked for ways to export their products to Iran. Similar to his father, Muzafar Aldin Shah was also curious about Japan, Hedyat talks about his curiosity (*Hedayat Mokḡber-al-Salṭana*, 1997, p. 137).

Meanwhile, a few Japanese were able to visit the Shah of Iran, such as Ineaga and Unove. Ineaga was assigned to investigate growing opium in Iran and Turkey. His trip started from Bushehr in June 1899 and he entered Tehran in September. Muzafar Aldin Shah received him in his summer palace and pinpointed the need to have proper trade relations between Iran and Japan. Ineaga also had a meeting with Mirza Ali Asghar Khan Amin Alsoltan.

Inove was then a student at Vienna University and he was spending his summer vacation in Caucasus, Iran and middle Asia. In September 1902 he entered Tehran. Although his trip was personal, he met Nasrollāh Na'ini Moshir al-Dowleh, the minister of foreign affairs, and

he was received in the house of the minister (kondo, 2008, p. 174). These individual efforts were not very successful in expanding trade relations. However, in the 20th century the trade relations between the two countries entered a new phase.

Trade Relations between Iran and Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century

There does not exist much record of the trade relations between Iran and Japan before 1920. Sporadic records in the travel logs show that during the Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah era the products which Yoshida brought to Iran were sold but the public did not have a very favorable attitude. Saḥḥāf-bāšī also brought some products from Japan into Iran but it did not mean that there were real trade relations between the two nations. During this period, the beginning of the 20th century, almost 70% of Iran's exports went to Russia and 10% went to England and India. The rest of Iran's exports went to the U.S.A, Germany and Japan. The major bulk of Iran's imports were from Russia (45%), and England and India (37%) (Hashem Pesaran and Salehi, 2009, p. 197). Therefore, a very small amount of the imports were from other countries such as Japan. Although both Russia and England had great interest in Iran, based on the documents, there is no report of interference or sabotage of England and Russia in the trade affairs of Iran and Japan. During Nāṣer-al-dīn Shah and until the crowning of Reza Shah, the trade between Iran and Japan was not very extensive. Therefore, Russia and England did not see these trade relations as a threat.

Based on Iran's trade statistics, the amount of imports from and exports to Japan was the lowest among the countries listed in the 1904 report. According to this report, Iran had the lowest import from Japan. Japan was a trade partner of Iran and imports from this country were 81892 Qerans and Iran had no exports to Japan in 1904. (Iran's Trade statistics (Ehsaeieh Tejarati Iran), 1311, pp. 10-12).

Table 1: Iran's exports to and Imports from Japan (from 1904-1915) (Iran's Trade statistics (Ehsaeieh Tejarati Iran), 1311, pp. 10-12)


Year	Iran's exports to Japan	Japan's exports to Iran	Total
1904	—	81892	81892
1905	—	52050	52050
1906	2000	11263	13263
1907	—	12165	12165
1908	—	1505	1505
1909	—	—	—
1910	—	200	200
1911	5	30	35
1912	۲۱۵۴۳۰۴	2114	217544
1913	220	4335	4555
1914	—	1330	1330
1915	20	—	20

* The unit is Qeran

The only vague point about this report is the amount of Iran's exports to Japan in 1912. Considering the amount of the exports of Iran during the previous years and after 1912, it is probable that there is an error in the number. Compared with the imports from Japan in the 1910's, in a span of five years, Iran had a small amount of exports to Japan, which

shows a stark imbalance. The followins diagram shows the exports of Japan to Iran from 1904-1915.

Diagram 1: The exports of Japan to Iran from 1904-1915



Based on Table 1 and the diagram, Japan's exports to Iran were diminishing during this decade and during the First World War and the involvement of most countries in the world war, the exports of Japan to Iran came to zero.

The Increase in Trade Output between Iran and Japan after the Arrival of Japanese Delegation in Iran

After paving the way for increasing the relations, Nuita Eishiro, an envoy from Japanese foreign embassy along with a six-member delegation entered Iran in 1923 to find a representative office and form trade contracts which had already been discussed in European capitals between political envoys of Iran and Japan. With his entourage in Iran, he stayed for nine months and a half.

A few Iranian sources have listed six to twelve people as the members of the Japanese delegation. (Eyn-Al Saltaneh, 1379, p. 6665) While Ahmad Shah was absent, during three months, in Tehran, they met Mohammad Hassan Mirza, the crown prince. They also met Reza Khan, then head of the ministers. (Pānj Safarnameh-e Zhaponihaye

Didār konandeh az Iran (1920/1300), 1394, p. 62).

After the First World War in Europe, due to the halt of importing goods to Iran, Japanese goods entered Iran through India. The trade between Iran and Russia decreased on account of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. (40% non-oil exports and 32% imports). (Hashem Pesaran and Salehi, 2009, p. 201) The trade output with Japan which was very low before the First World War, increased during the war and after the war. During 1922-1923 the trade output with Japan came to 1600000 yens, the imports and exports were equal each being 800000 yens. Moreover, based on the records of the coin bank of Yukuhamu, the total imports from Japan to Iran was 7822088 Rials equal to 186240 English pounds, which amounted to only 1% of the total imports of Iran.

Therefore, Japan was the tenth country among the most important trade partners of Iran, moreover, the total value of Iran's exports to Japan was about 12/396/925 Rials (about 295/164 English pounds) which amounted to only ½% of the total exports of Iran. Japan was the ninth exporter of goods from Iran. The total amount of Iran's exports to Japan were 742259 kilograms of opium, a large amount of which was then exported from Japan to China. (Kondo, 2008: 177-178) At the same time, Iran's imports from Japan amounted to 9% of the total imports of Iran and Japan stood higher than U.S and Germany which provided 7% and 8% of Iran's imports respectively (Hashem Pesaran and Salehi, 2009, p. 198).

Based on the observations of Nūta, from Tehran's Bazaar in the Qajar period, Japanese goods were very primitive and simple and they were goods which could not have found their ways into Europe and were hastily sent to Iran's market. (PānjSafarnamēh-e Zhaponihaye Didārkonandeh az Iran (1920/1300), 1394: 94) The main goods which were sent to Iran were textiles such as cotton textile. Of course England was also the chief exporter of cotton textiles to Iran. According to Nūta, the Japanese goods were of lower quality and higher prices compared with European goods. (PānjSafarnamēh-e Zhaponihaye Didārkonandeh az Iran (1920/1300), 1394, p.65).

Moreover, a number of books written by the orientalist indicate that

Iranians were interested in Japanese industries, in his book, *Iran va Qazieh-e Iran*, explaining Iran's silk trade and Gilan's silk and mentions that in the middle of the nineteenth century (1854) The growth of silk in Gilan was damaged and some silk was imported from Japan which was not good and didn't sell properly. (Curzen, 1966, p. 485)

Reza Shah Era and the Approach of the Iran's Government and Elites towards Japan

Due to the political problems and turmoil, after the victory of constitutionalism in Iran, the effort for industrial and trade evolutions were not successful. However, the goals and wishes of the elites to develop Iran persisted. After the crowning of Reza Shah and due to his orders, these goals and wishes came into action and realization.

Paying closer attention to Japan and its progress during the Reza Shah era led to the publication of a book on Japan. Esmail-e Koushan, in the second decade of Reza Shah's reign published the book entitled Japan's Empire from the beginning till present (*Emperatouri-e Japan az badv-e Tashkil ta konoun*). This book dealt in detail with the geography, history, political system, economy and culture of Japan. Most chapters of the book dealt with economic and civil aspects of Japan (Chapters two to nine of the second part of the book), which displays how the Iranian elites were influenced by the industrial progress of Japan (Koushan, 1317, p. 12). Moreover, the magazines and daily papers of Iran during this era show great interest in Japan. In the significant journal of that era, *Armāghan*, there was a report by Mirza Ali khan Fouladvand who had higher education from Paris. The author admired the political and trade relations with Japan. (Armāghan, Tir 1309, pp. 294-306) Moreover, in another journal, *Taqaddom*, the economic progress of Japan was emphasized and its exports to China and Europe were cited (Taqaddom, Mehr 1306, p. 126).

During Reza shah's era both structural and executive causes led to the development of relations between Iran and Japan. As for the structural reasons, one can refer to the political conditions which paved the way for economic activities in Iran. First, more than a decade had passed after the First World War. The end of the war led to gradual stability in the country. Second, the revenue from selling oil facilitated economic activities. As for the executive causes, the government's attention to the

safety of roads increased the progress of trade and diminished its risks. Moreover, the modernization policies which targeted economic, social, and cultural aspects of the society had led to developments in foreign trade which was affected by the Pahlavi's will to earn the necessary budget for implementing its modern projects. These developments in economic activities caused closer ties between the Pahlavi government and new nations which were not very important before in trade activities of Iran. Therefore, Japan with its great economic and political importance in Asia, could not be ignored by the officials of foreign affairs in Reza Shah's era. Moreover, during this era, the nationalistic motives originating from Europe were in vogue. The rise of Hitler in Germany and the racism of the Nazis and the close ties of Iran with Germany influenced the nationalistic policies in Iran. Affected by this nationalism and to abstain from the traditional hegemony of powers such as England, Iran felt it necessary to turn to a great and developed nation such as Japan.

During the early years of the 20th century, especially during the First World War, the growth of industry in Japan accelerated; whereas, the European countries were involved in war and bloody competitions. Japan took advantage of the absence of European countries and increased its exports to Iran. Especially its textile products, and it captured most of the Asian market. (Palmer, 1995, p. 1376) Japan was ready to create and maintain relations with the Middle East countries and use their markets. Iran was one of the populated nations of the Middle East and Japan considered the priority of Iran in establishing formal relations.

The Expansion of Trade Relations after Implementing Official Relations

Till the end of the First World War, Japan did not have any diplomats in Iran. Before the first political Japanese institution started its work in Iran, the Japanese government had a trade representative in 1926 A.D. (Kolliati Dārbareye Rāvabet-e Dolāt-e Shahanshahi Iran, 2535Shahanshahi: 6-7). Iran also had the plan to establish its embassy in Japan in the new year (*Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e shoray-e Melli*, The Seventh phase, Meeting 110).

During the first decade of starting political relations between the two

nations, some measures were taken to increase trade relations, cultural exchanges, sending students, establishing direct navigational relations and telegraphic communications.

A trade contract and a navigational contract along with a protocol and three letters were signed by the envoys of Iran and Japan on October 18th, 1332 A.D. in Tehran. Nevertheless, the height of relations between Iran and Japan occurred after signing the fraternity pact between the two countries in 1339. This pact was signed during the era of Matin Daftari serving as the prime minister. The pact had four articles and was the first document which encompassed both political and friendly relations between the two countries. (Documents Center Islamic Consultative Assembly, retrieving number: (ق 3/1/2/48/12)).

A year later, Kavabata, the representative of a Kaboshiki Gaysha [1] trade company, after extensive negotiations with S.Takami, the head of Japan's trade chamber in Karachi, for the sake of trade studies over the public and private applications of cotton came to Tehran through Zahedan. After surveying and examining the markets in Khorasan and Tehran, he intended to establish an office for Gaisha in Tehran to buy the cotton of Khorasan, Astarabad, Mazandaran and Tehran (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1312, Box 30, file 52/208, document 067).

In 1334 A.D. an exhibition of the Japanese cargo was founded in Tehran. Based on the existing documents, the Japanese demanded that their products be exempt from invoice issuance and other regulations as long as they were not intended for sale. The ministry of foreign affairs of Iran accepted their request. The Iranians believed that the presence of Japanese merchants in Iranian markets could benefit Iran's foreign trade (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1313, Box 9 file 99).

To expand their sale in Iran, the Japanese intended to leave a good impression, this is proved by the documents left from that time. For instance, in 1314 S.H. the Japanese government, through a letter requested the halt in displaying the film, *Bataille*. In response, Iranian foreign minister responded: "The government of Iran does not feel responsible to follow he requests of the embassies in banning the films

which might be in conflict with the interests of other nations. However, for countries which are ready to fulfil the requests of Iran in similar situations, there can be exceptions.”(Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1313, Box 14 file 13/9) Other reports show that the Japanese had requested the banning of the film *Yushi Vala*, a film related to slums and whore houses similar to Tehran’s Shahr-e Now (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1313, Box 14, file 16, document 1).

During 1939-1940, Iran’s imports from Japan amounted to 19/324/000 yens equal to 96/620/000 Rials. This amount was twelve times higher than the amount in 1924-1925. Iran’s exports to Japan was 32/587/000 rials. This amount was two times higher than the exports in 1924. Japan was the second partner of Iran’s trade. The first one was Germany. 10/5% of the whole trade output of Iran in 1939 belonged to Japan. The most important exporting item of Japan to Iran was cotton textile which amounted to 90% of Iran’s imports. In 1938-1939, Japan had the highest amount of export of cotton textile to Iran compared with other countries. In this respect, Japan was more successful than the Soviet Union and England. Iran also exported cotton to Japan which amounted to 90% of Iran’s exports to Japan (Kondo, 2008, p. 179).

Employing Japanese Counselors

During Reza shah’s era, most engineers who were employed in building the railroad in Iran were from the U.S and Germany. However, in certain situations, from Japan also some engineers were employed. In his memos, Mokhber Al Saltaneh refers to the Japanese engineers in Iran in 1312 S.H.(Hedayat Mokhber-al-Saltane, 1997, p. 399). Whereas, the documents of Iran’s foreign ministry refer to them in 1310S.H.(Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1310, Box 23, file 12, document 12, under the title of the Japanese railroad expert translated from a Japanese journal). Moreover, from the meetings of the national parliament of Iran can also be inferred that both the Belgian and Japanese experts were employed in building railroad in Iran (*Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e shoray-e Melli*, The Eighth phase, meeting 51). When Hedayat was the prime minister and Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh was the minister of finance and Mahdi Farokh was the head of the industry office, a bill was presented to the parliament to employ a

Japanese expert (Documents Center Islamic Consultative Assembly, retrieving no: (ق 247/1/2/83/8)). The importance of the issue was so great that the members of the parliament devoted one of the secessions of the parliament on Tuesday Mehr 8, 1309 S.H. to the employment of the Japanese engineer (Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Shoray-e Melli, The Seventh phase, Meeting 152).

After the debate between the members of the parliament over the high wages of the foreign counselors, they approved the employment of Suzuki. However, over article 2 related to his salary, a great deal of suggestions were proposed. Finally, Mohammad Foruqi told the M.P.s that the employment of a Japanese was not meant to alleviate the relations with Japan, because the relations were already very good and the government of Japan was not behind this employment rather the Iranian government itself intended to employ him. (Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e shoray-e Melli, The seventh phase, Meeting 152) Finally the M.P.s accepted his employment. Moreover, in 1939 and after the end of his work, the Japanese journal, *Japan chronicle* issued a statement and stated that his employment was extended for one more year (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1310 S.H., Box 23, file 12, document 13).

Moreover, in 1932 A.D., Iranian government decided to employ a Japanese expert to have better utility from fishing in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the related bill was presented to the parliament and the parliament gave permission to the ministry of industry to employ the Japanese expert for six months with the monthly income of five thousand Swiss Francs (documents Center Islamic Consultative Assembly, retrieving no. 247/1/2/83/8).

The Arrival of Low Quality Cheap Japanese Products in Iranian market

During this era, Japan had become one of the ten trade partners of Iran. The importance of Japan was so great that one of the main centers of the foreign affair section in Iran's main office of trade belonged to Japan, during the first Pahlavi era (Sadeqi, 1387, p. 57). According to Iran's ambassador in Japan in Aban 12/1312 S.H. during the decade of 1310 S.H. a number of Japanese companies competed with one another

to have trade relations with Iran. Based on his report, Cokura, a Japanese company was very interested in expanding trade with Iran and in a letter to Iran's embassy, the company asked the ambassador to introduce the high ranking Iranian merchants to it. The embassy responded to the latter. It was believed that the Japanese rushed to Iran's markets due to their problems with the U.S., China and India. (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1312 S.H., Box 28, file 9, document 4). At the same time, in Mehr 1333 A.D. the famous company, *Mitsubishi*, also sent its representative, Jini Echiro Oyama to Tehran (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1312 S.H., Box 28, file 9, document 2). Yoshiharu Shinohasa who was then just twenty six years old, came as the representative of Kanga Fouchi company, to sell cotton textile in Iran and buy the raw cotton of Iran and send it to Japan. This document relates that the reason for expanding trade with Iran was the banning of Japanese products in China and the high tariff over Japanese products in India (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1312 S.H., Box 28, file 10, document 13).

The Japanese papers did their best to introduce Iranian market during these years. The Tokyo *NichiNichi* published an article "Iran, Bazar-e Jadid Japan" in its 25th and 28th June 1333 by Yamaguchi, the then Japanese representative in Iran (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 1312 S.H., Box 28, file 9, document 7).

Mehr Journal also published a report about the Japanese goods in the world in 1332 A.D. In the report it was stated that Japan had captured Europe and the whole world through trade and economy. The Japanese goods were sold at lower prices in other countries than the goods of those countries themselves. How the Japanese were able to make their products so economically and send them to far away markets? The report also expressed wonder at how the industrial nations in Europe and Asia could respond to Japanese economic power (Mehr, Khordad 1313, p. 94).

The Trade Output of Iran and Japan

Based on Iran's customs report, from the fiscal year 1333 A.D. and the previous years such as 1331 A.D., Iran's trade output with Japan increased, and Japan's rank came to 6 while it was previously 20. At the

same time, Iran's export to Japan in 1933-1934 A.D. was 30 million rials and this amount was 8 million rials higher than 1931-1932 A.D.(Ehsaieh-e Tejarati-e Iran, p.151).

Iran's imports from Japan were mainly cotton textile and Iran's export was mostly raw cotton. There is a document, reporting the import of summer paper hats from Japan.(National library and Archives of I.R. Iran, retrieving no (100667/1/13)). The diversity of Japanese goods exported to Iran was much greater than that of Iranian goods exported to Japan. Based on this list, 21 items were exported from Japan to Iran while only 3 items were exported from Iran to Japan (Ehsaieh-e Tejarati-e Iran, p.151).


Table 2: The item types in Iran and Japan trade (1932– 1934 A.D.)(Ehsaieh-e Tejarati-e Iran, 151)

Iran's exports to Japan	Japan's exports to Iran
Raw cotton Opium Kitty (Tragacanth) Miscellaneous goods	Cotton textiles, Cotton threads, Toys, Glassware, Woolen textile, China, Tea, Clothes, Silk textile, Sofa, and home furnishings, manual instruments, paper, natural rubber, bicycle, tricycle, various kinds of threads.
Total: 12/515/521 Rials	Total: 82/042/829 Rials

Table 3: Annual trade of textiles and thread products of Iran (Rashidi, 1386: 215)

Country year	1308 S.H.	1309 S.H.	1310 S.H.	1311 S.H.	1312 S.H.
England	25/0	23/1	18/2	19/4	16/4
India	15/9	14/5	14/1	7/6	7/6
Soviet Union	48/7	51/6	53/9	42/0	25/6
Japan	2/0	2/2	8/2	19/5	45/6
Italy	3/6	6/4	4/2	8/4	2/1
Total Imports	167	143	231	169	143

Diagram 2: The export of textile threads from Japan to Iran during 1929– 1933 A.D.



In the fiscal year 23th June 1931 to May 1932 (S.H.), Japan was the eighth trade partner of Iran. Iran imported products amounting to 24/874/705 Rials from Japan. Excluding the oil products of the south of Iran and the fishing products of the Caspian Sea, it amounted to 5/970/069 Rials (Ehsaieh-e Tajarati-e Iran, p.3). During these years, especially in 1932 A.D. Iran's foreign trade output was not satisfactory because thanks to the foreign trade policy of Japan, the cotton textile threads and the sewing products entered Iran's market at low prices. Therefore, because of the ease of imports, Iran's exports reduced (Mazandarani, 1316, p. 99).

A consideration of Iran's foreign trade output up to 1933 reveals that during 1931 and 1932, Japan exported more than 52 million Rials of goods to Iran and it imported more than 4/5 million Rials from Iran and it had the sixth position after the Soviet Union, America, India and Egypt (Ehsaieh-e Tajarati-e Iran, p.41).

In 1939 A.D., Iran's imports from Japan amounted to (96/629/000 Rials), which was 12 times more than its imports in 1924 A.D. Whereas, Iran's exports to Japan increased to 6/587/000 yens equal to

32/935/000rials which was two times higher than 1924 A.D. Japan was the second trade partner of Iran after Germany and it possessed 10/5% of the total foreign trade of Iran in 1318 S.H./1939A.D. The main exporting product of Japan to Iran was cotton textile which comprised more than 90% of Iran's imports from Japan. In 1938 A.D. and 1939 A.D., Japan had the highest export of cotton textile to Iran and it stood higher than England and the Soviet Union (Shimizu, 1986: 243). Iran's main exporting product was cotton which made 90% of Iran's exports to Japan (Kondo, 2008, p. 53). Based on the documents, Iran intended to reduce the trade balance with Japan to increase its exports to Japan (National library and Archives of I.R. Iran, retrieving no.23321/1/13). During these years Iran followed maintaining balance in its imports, supporting the exporters and domestic products, and encouraging the merchants to control imports in order to ban the entrance of the unnecessary consuming products (Musaii, 1390, p. 59) Iran was not able to achieve its goals as far as Japan was concerned. The statistics of Iran's custom's office reveals that Iran's trade balance with Japan was negative and it had little exports to Japan and a high amount of imports. The following table shows the details of this trade balance.

Table 4: Iran's exports to Japan and imports from Japan during Reza shah's era (Ehsaieh-e Tajarati-e Iran, Edareh-e kol-e Gomrokat)

Year	Japan's exports to Iran	Iran's exports to Japan	Total
1307S.H.	4 million Qeran	18 million Qeran	22
1308	7 million Qeran	5 million Qeran	12
1309	9 million Rials	32 million Rials	41
1310	25 million Rials	6 million Rials	31
1311	52 million Rials	5 million Rials	57
1312	82 million Rials	12 million Rials	94
1313	55million Rials	9million Rials	64
1314	78million Rials	8million Rials	86

Year	Japan's exports to Iran	Iran's exports to Japan	Total
1315	33million Rials	13million Rials	46
1316	32 million Rials	26 million Rials	58
1317	33 million Rials	1 million Rials	34
1318	96 million Rials	53 million Rials	149
1319	6 million Rials	49 million Rials	49
1320	0/5 million Rials	12 million Rials	12/5

Conclusion

From the middle of the 20th century political considerations in the relations between Iran and Japan gave way to the economic considerations. The public view in Iran praised Japan for its victory over Russia and the formation of the parliament in Japan and the economic power of Japan became known in Iran. The economic relations of the two countries in the early years of the 20th century was limited. However, two important factors: the end of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia led to the increase of trade output between Iran and Japan. Japan became one of the ten main trade partners of Iran, and officially Japanese products entered Iran. Based on the documents and reports, the Japanese products which were exported to Iran and other nations had low quality up to the beginning of the Second World War. The Japanese were famous for selling junk products. Therefore, during these years Iranians had no opinion about the high quality Japanese products. After the inauguration of official relations, trade relations between the two nations were formed. Iran yearned for industrialization. Therefore, Japanese experts were employed to accelerate the industrialization of Iran. During the first year of Pahlavi I the trade balance between the two nations was almost equal. However, gradually the Japanese exports increased and the trade relations benefitted the Japanese. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the official relations between the two countries suspended.

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Box 14 file 13/9.

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[1] Kaboshiki Gaysha is a kind of stock company which operates based on Japan's Law.